Virginia Commonwealth University

VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2014

Present with an Uncertain Future: Dispositional Mindfulness,
Covariation Bias, and Event-Related Potential Responses to
Emotional Stimuli in Uncertain Contexts
Robert J. Goodman
Virginia Commonwealth University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Psychology Commons
© The Author

Downloaded from
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/3526

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars
Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.

PRESENT WITH AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS,
COVARIATION BIAS, AND EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO
EMOTIONAL STIMULI IN UNCERTAIN CONTEXTS
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

by

Robert J. Goodman
Master of Arts
Cleveland State University, 2009

Director: Kirk Warren Brown, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Psychology
Department of Psychology

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, VA
May, 2014

ii

Acknowledgements
First, I thank the chair of my committee and primary mentor, Dr. Kirk Warren Brown, for his
guidance on this project, and for his longstanding dedication to my advancement. You have
continually challenged me to think critically, listen genuinely, and to be comfortable not
knowing and relish in the questions. Your dedication to research and practice is inspiring. I also
thank my committee members, Dr. Scott Vrana, Dr. Michael Southam-Gerow, Dr. Zewelanji
Serpell, and Dr. Michael Inzlicht, for their constructive suggestions and continued support during
this project. I am very fortunate to have had the opportunity to work with and learn from you. I
would also like to express my very great appreciation to Dr. Linda Zyzniewski and Dr. Norm
Bregman for their unwavering support and enthusiastic encouragement. You have made so
many significant contributions to my professional development, and I have learned so much from
your example. A special thank you to Dr. Chelsea Reid-Short for being such a genuine friend as
we navigated the last five years of graduate school. Thank you to David Currier for sitting with
me in silent contemplation for countless hours, and for helping show me the way over countless
mountains, especially the figurative ones. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their
continual support and encouragement. In particular, I would like to thank my fiancé Alisa
Maibauer for her love, understanding, strength, and dedication to my success. You shouldered
far more than your fair share of responsibilities while I pursued this final degree. Finally, I
would like dedicate this document to my parents for their unflinching love and support from day
one. This document is a tribute to your humbling example.

iii

Table of Contents
Page
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... iii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vi
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. viii
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................x
Introduction and Review of Literature .............................................................................................1
Uncertainty...........................................................................................................................5
Informational Uncertainty and Emotional Appraisal ...........................................................7
Neural Correlates of Emotional Appraisal during Informational Uncertainty ..................12
Mindfulness and Emotional Appraisal...............................................................................18
Mindfulness and Neural Measures of Emotional Appraisal ..............................................21
Informational Uncertainty and Emotional Anticipation ....................................................24
Informational Uncertainty and Neural Correlates of Anticipation ....................................32
Mindfulness and Anticipation ............................................................................................36
Mindfulness and Neural Correlates of Anticipation ..........................................................37
The Present Research .........................................................................................................39
Method ...........................................................................................................................................45
Power Analysis ..................................................................................................................45
Participants .........................................................................................................................45
Psychometric Measures .....................................................................................................45
Stimulus Materials .............................................................................................................48

iv
Procedure ...........................................................................................................................50
EEG Recording and Signal Processing ..............................................................................53
Statistical Analyses ............................................................................................................55
Results ............................................................................................................................................56
Preliminary Analyses .........................................................................................................56
Specific Aim 1. Uncertainty and Self-Reported Appraisal ................................................56
Specific Aim 2: Uncertainty and Cortical Measures of Stimulus Appraisal .....................59
Specific Aim 3: Mindfulness and Self-Reported Stimulus Appraisal ...............................73
Specific Aim 4: Mindfulness and a Cortical Measure of Stimulus Appraisal ...................81
Specific Aim 5: Uncertainty and Self-reported Stimulus Anticipation .............................96
Specific Aim 6: Uncertainty and a Cortical Measure of Stimulus Anticipation..............103
Specific Aim 7: Mindfulness and Self-Reported Stimulus Anticipation .........................106
Specific Aim 8: Mindfulness and a Cortical Measure of Stimulus Anticipation ............113
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................113
Limitations .......................................................................................................................127
Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................128
References ....................................................................................................................................130
Appendices ...................................................................................................................................145
Vitae…. ........................................................................................................................................172

v

List of Tables

Table

Page

1. Mean normative valence and arousal ratings for each pseudo-random stimulus order ...........49
2. Means and standard deviations for affect and stimulus ratings by cue type and stimulus type57
3. Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition across
early, middle, and late signal windows at left-hemisphere electrode positions. ......................62
4. Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition across
early, middle, and late signal windows at midline electrode positions. ...................................63
5. Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition across
early, middle, and late signal windows at right-hemisphere electrode positions.....................64
6. Parameter estimates modeling the scalp distribution of LPP amplitudes (µv) across signal
window and stimulus condition ...............................................................................................65
7. Parameter estimates modeling the effects of signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus
valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 ............................................72
8. Correlations between measures of mindfulness, uncertainty distress and anxiety-related
traits..........................................................................................................................................74
9. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of MAAS mindfulness, signal window,
stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4 .......83
10. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of FFMQAW mindfulness, signal
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and
CP4...........................................................................................................................................85
11. Correlations between LPP amplitude (µv) and mindfulness at electrode site CPz .................87
12. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of IUS intolerance of uncertainty, signal
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and
CP4...........................................................................................................................................88

vi
13. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of URS emotional responses to
uncertainty, signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at
electrodes CPz and CP4 ...........................................................................................................90
14. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of NEO neuroticism, signal window,
stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4 .......90
15. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of BDI depression, signal window,
stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4. ......94
16. Correlations between covariation biases and post-stimulus affect ratings ..............................97
17. Correlations between covariation biases and post-stimulus picture ratings ............................97
18. Correlations between psychological traits and a priori and online covariation biases ..........108

vii

List of Figures

Figure

Page

1. Trial Events during the trial sequence of the cued image task and their relation to specific
aims ..........................................................................................................................................11
2. Trial structure for each type of trial in the Cued Image Task ..................................................52
3. Scalp distribution of grand average LPP waveforms depicting each stimulus condition across
a -100 ms (pre-stimulus) to 2500 ms (post-stimulus) recording period...................................60
4. Grand average LPP waveforms elicited by neutral and aversive images preceded by certain
and uncertain stimulus cues at electrode CPz during the early, middle, and late signal
windows. ..................................................................................................................................66
5. Scalp topographies depicting differences in late positive potential amplitudes between
aversive and neutral images at every 100 ms interval within the early, middle and late signal
windows ...................................................................................................................................67
6. Scalp topographies depicting differences in late positive potential amplitudes between
aversive images elicited by uncertainty and certainty cues at every 100 ms during the early,
middle and late signal windows ...............................................................................................68
7. Interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on post-stimulus affect ratings .......77
8. Interaction between stimulus valence and BDI depression on post-stimulus affect ratings. ...78
9. Interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on post-stimulus picture ratings .....80

viii
10. Grand average LPP waveforms at electrode locations CPz and CP4 elicited by certain and
uncertain aversive and neutral visual stimuli, shown separately for high and low MAAS
mindfulness groups created by a median split .........................................................................82
11. Interaction between stimulus valence and MAAS mindfulness on LPP amplitude (µv) at
electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows .................................................84
12. Interaction between stimulus valence and FFMQAW mindfulness on LPP amplitude (µv) at
electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows .................................................86
13. Interaction between stimulus valence and IUS intolerance of uncertainty on LPP amplitude
(µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. .....................................89
14. Interaction between stimulus valence and URS emotional responses to uncertainty on LPP
amplitude (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows.....................91
15. Interaction between stimulus valence and NEO neuroticism on LPP amplitude (µv) at
electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. ................................................93
16. Interaction between stimulus valence and BDI depression on LPP amplitude (µv) at electrode
sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. ................................................................95
17. Scalp distribution of grand averaged SPN waveforms elicited by each stimulus cue across a
1000 ms (post-expectancy rating) to 4000 ms (earliest image onset) recording period ........104
18. Grand average SPN waveforms at electrodes Fz and FCz elicited by neutral, aversive, and
uncertain stimulus cues ..........................................................................................................107

Abstract

PRESENT WITH AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS,
COVARIATION BIAS, AND EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO
EMOTIONAL STIMULI IN UNCERTAIN CONTEXTS
By: Robert J. Goodman, M.A.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014
Director: Kirk Warren Brown, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychology
Uncertainty represents a robust threat that can amplify aversive experiences and
exaggerate negative expectations about uncertain future outcomes. Mindfulness – an open and
receptive attention to present moment experiences -- has been shown to facilitate adaptive
regulation when faced with a variety of distinct emotional threats. Reduced experiential
avoidance and equanimity in the face of unpleasant emotional experiences have been theorized
as central to these emotional regulatory benefits. The present study explored whether
dispositional mindfulness would promote adaptive responses to uncertainty during the
anticipation of, and after exposure to emotional stimuli, as indicated by self-reports and neural
(event-related potential) markers of anticipation and appraisal. Participants were exposed to
stimulus cues that informed them about the valence of a subsequent emotional picture as neutral,
aversive, or uncertain. Consistent with past research, uncertainty during the anticipation of an

emotional stimulus amplified unpleasant stimulus appraisals, and participants demonstrated
biased expectations to associate uncertainty with aversiveness. Dispositional mindfulness was
associated with lower expectations for unpleasant stimuli, and was found to amplify the effect of
uncertainty on a cortical marker of stimulus appraisal called the late positive potential (LPP).
Traits that contrasted with mindfulness predicted opposite patterns of association with these
measures. However, these findings were directly the opposite of findings from past research. A
theoretically defensible explanation is discussed for these findings and suggestions were made
for future research on the role of mindfulness on ERP variability.
The results from the present study contribute to a growing body of evidence that suggests
that uncertainty during the anticipation of potentially negative future outcomes can exert a potent
downstream influence on emotional anticipation and appraisal processes. Further research is
needed to clarify the role of dispositional mindfulness during emotional stimulus anticipation and
appraisal following uncertainty.

Present with an Uncertain Future: Dispositional Mindfulness, Covariation Bias, and EventRelated Potential Responses to Emotional Stimuli in Uncertain Contexts
We live in a world that is constantly changing and difficult to predict. Uncertainty is
ubiquitous, and resolving it is a primary human motivation (Kagan, 1972). Uncertainty about
potential future threats can be debilitating because not having adequate information about a
potentially negative future outcome can impair the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and regulate
responses (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Exaggerated attempts to resolve uncertainty are
foundational to worry, and represent a central component of many anxiety disorders (Barlow,
2002). Psychologists (Baumeister, 1985; van den Bos, 2010) and existential philosophers
(Camus, 1942; Heidegger, 1927; Sartre, 1937) have described the experience of confronting
uncertainty as disorienting and unpleasant (Heidegger, 1927; Kierkegaard, 1983; Sartre, 1939).
However, the existentialists note an important upside to this confrontation: in the very act of
acknowledging the hard fact of uncertainty people make progress toward living an honest,
authentic, and meaningful life. For example, Sartre (1939) found that in the process of coming to
terms with uncertainty, he realized the basic opportunity for human freedom, creativity, and
meaning. As summarized by Grene (1984), a central point of existentialism is that human
integrity grows from acknowledging the difficult truths of the world, including uncertainty, and
being honest about them.
This orientation of honesty toward the facts of experience characterizes mindfulness,
which is commonly described as an open and receptive awareness to whatever is occurring in the
present moment (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta -- a primary
discourse on mindfulness that has been a cornerstone of Buddhist contemplative practice for its
2500 year history – suggests mindfulness is particularly beneficial when applied to precisely
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those states considered dreadful by the existentialists, including uncertainty. One reason for this
is that mindfulness is theorized to promote a more equanimous, receptive awareness toward
difficult experiences, such that a person is better able to see them clearly, “unadulterated by
habitual reactions and projections” (Anālayo, 2003, p. 60). The present study will empirically
examine whether trait mindfulness promotes adaptive responses to aversive events under
conditions of uncertainty as measured by self-reported and cortical measures of appraisal and
anticipation.
Past research has linked dispositional mindfulness with adaptive responses to a variety of
emotional threats (for a review, see Goodman, Quaglia & Brown, in press). Uncertainty
represents a robust threat to a considerable number of people, and evidence from several studies
indicates that uncertainty can negatively influence processes involved during both emotional
appraisal and anticipation. Appraisal responses include amplified perceptions of unpleasantness
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2010; Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006; Sanfey,
2009) and states of negative affect (Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Nader & Balleine, 2007). This
heightening of unpleasantness by uncertainty is theorized to result, at least in part, from changes
during the anticipation of uncertain future outcomes, and specifically the tendency to expect that
uncertainty will lead to aversive outcomes. This tendency to associate uncertainty with
aversiveness is a phenomenon known as covariation bias (Tomarken, Mineka and Cook, 1989),
and it plays a central role in the amplification of unpleasant emotional responses to uncertainty
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2013).
The present research will first attempt to replicate effects from a past study (Grupe &
Nitschke, 2011) that examined the influence of uncertainty on emotional anticipation and
appraisal processes. This study provided evidence that uncertainty amplifies self-reported
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unpleasant perceptions and negative affect. In addition to these self-report measures, past
research has provided peripheral nervous system (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011) and neuroimaging
(Sarinopoulos et al., 2010) evidence that uncertainty amplifies unpleasant emotional appraisal
processes. The present study attempts to extend this incipient body of evidence using cortical
measures known as event-related potential (ERPs): patterns of electrical activity measured at the
surface of the scalp that are time locked to the presentation of a stimulus. Of interest to the
present research is a widely-studied ERP component known as the Late Positive Potential (LPP),
which is sensitive to differences in the valence and arousal inducing properties of an emotional
stimulus (Carretie et al., 2001; 2004; Cuthbert et al., 2000; Schupp et al., 2003), as well as topdown modulation of emotional stimulus appraisal and meaning (Hajcak et al., 2010; Hajcak &
Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Olofsson et al., 2008).
Another goal of the present study is to examine differences in anticipatory processing of
emotional stimuli under conditions of uncertainty. Past research using the experimental
paradigm used in the present study found that participants demonstrated inflated expectations
and post-experiment estimates that uncertainty leads to aversive outcomes (Grupe & Nitschke,
2011). Additional research indicates that uncertainty modifies activity in neural regions during
the anticipation of emotional stimuli (for a review, see Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). The present
study will extend this existing body of evidence by examining self-reported expectations during
states of uncertainty, as well as a cortical measure of emotional anticipation known as the
Stimulus Preceding Negativity (SPN). The SPN is an event-related potential measure that is
thought to reflect the anticipation and the intensity of motivational engagement toward a
forthcoming emotional stimulus (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba,
2007; Takeuchi, Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005). Similar to the LPP, the
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SPN is sensitive to the valence and arousal inducing properties of a stimulus (Howard,
Longmore, & Mason, 1992; Poli et al., 2007), and the top-down modulation of stimulus meaning
(Moser et al., 2009; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).
Finally, the present study will explore dispositional mindfulness – the frequency with
which people enter into states of open and receptive awareness to the present – as a
psychological quality that modulates self-reported and cortical measures of emotional stimulus
appraisal and anticipation under conditions of uncertainty. I expect that when participants are
exposed to aversive stimuli under conditions of uncertainty, mindfulness will promote less
unpleasant emotional appraisals of the stimuli, as indicated by lower self-reported unpleasant
affect and picture ratings, and attenuated LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli. I also
expect mindfulness will modulate processes involved during the anticipation of emotional
stimuli. Mindfulness is expected to promote lower levels of covariation bias, and I will explore
the relation between mindfulness and the SPN during emotional stimulus anticipation under
conditions of uncertainty.
In sum, the present study has been designed to replicate and extend past research linking
uncertainty to changes in stimulus appraisal and anticipation. I will also explore the important
role that mindfulness may play in ameliorating the influence of uncertainty on measures of
emotional stimulus appraisal and anticipation. In the sections that follow I will describe several
distinct types of uncertainty discussed in the scholarly literature, and will specifically target
informational uncertainty – a state in which information about the probability of a future
outcome is restricted or absent – as the focus of the present study. Then I will describe extant
literature on the influence of uncertainty on stimulus appraisal processes, and how mindfulness
might promote more adaptive appraisals of uncertainty-related stimuli. Next, I will discuss the
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literature on the effect of uncertainty during anticipation. People are intrinsically motivated to
resolve informational uncertainty (Kagan, 1972), and I will describe covariation assessment as a
way people accomplish this. Then I will discuss evidence that prior expectations can distort
covariation assessments and bias predictions about uncertain future outcomes. When people
develop the tendency to expect uncertainty will lead to aversive outcomes the experience of
informational uncertainty can become highly aversive, and I will describe research that
implicates covariation bias in the development of maladaptive cognitive and emotional responses
to uncertainty. After discussing the nature of uncertainty and anticipatory processes, I will
outline my rationale for exploring the influence of mindfulness on anticipatory processing under
conditions of uncertainty.
Uncertainty
Several types of uncertainty have been described in the literatures of psychology,
economics, philosophy, and neuroscience and it is important to distinguish between them
because they have unique influences on human experience (van den Bos & Lind, 2009). For
example, the philosophical concept of vagueness claims the very existence of everyday objects is
uncertain (Unger, 1980). This vagueness suggests that what we perceive as everyday objects
(i.e., a desk) are fundamentally uncertain, insofar as their constituent elements/parts (i.e. drawers,
legs, etc.) and the boundaries they share with other objects (i.e., a bolts, nails) are imprecise and
uncertain (Unger, 1980; Horgan, 1995). Another type of uncertainty known as personal
uncertainty is similar to the construct of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957) and
focuses on the uncomfortable feelings that arise when one is aware that something personal
about the self is inconsistent or vague (Baumeister,1985; Van den Bos, 2010). Put simply,
personal uncertainty is the uncomfortable affective experience that results from being uncertain
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about the self or where one stands on important issues about the self (Van den Bos, 2010). The
Uncertainty Management Model (Van den Bos, 2010), a theoretical framework used to predict
the effects of personal uncertainty, suggests that people are motivated to resolve the discomfort
of personal uncertainty through worldview defense (van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Midedema,
& Vandenham, 2005; van den Bos, van Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006), religious zealotry, and
compensatory conviction (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956; McGregor, Haji, Nash, &
Teper, 2008; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001).
Several other programs of research have examined individual differences in the way people
relate to uncertainty about the self. According to Uncertainty Orientation Theory (Sorrentino and
Roney, 1999) some individuals are positively oriented toward approaching and resolving
uncertainty (uncertainty orientation), while others ignore and avoid it in favor of familiarity
(certainty orientation). Uncertainty Identity Theory (UIT; Hogg, 2007) is another psychological
theory that regards the drive to resolve uncertainty as a motivating force. An extension of Social
Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986/2004), UIT explores uncertainty as a fundamental human
motivation that causes people to identify with groups as a way to defend the self from feelings of
personal uncertainty. People who have high self-uncertainty are, for example, more likely to
identify with extremist groups that have clearly defined boundaries and stable ideologies (Hogg,
2007).
While there are numerous psychological theories about uncertainty, the most basic and
widely studied form has its roots in the scholarly work of economics, and is known as
informational (or Knightian) uncertainty. Research on informational uncertainty explores how
people respond to situations where there is limited information about the probability of
occurrence for a future outcome. The primary distinction between informational and personal
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uncertainty (and its close relatives) involves the restricted focus of personal uncertainty to
negative affective states that result from uncertainty about the self. Informational uncertainty, on
the other hand, is a not restricted to the affective consequences stemming from uncertainty about
self. It is broader construct that involves cognitive and affective responses to situations in which
the information needed to predict future outcomes is limited or completely unknown.
Informational uncertainty has been widely studied in the context of decision making and
economics, and can be further split into two different types: risk and ambiguity (Knight, 1921).
The primary distinction between risk and ambiguity involves whether the probability of a future
outcome occurring is known or unknown. Under conditions of risk (also known as
unambiguous probability; Ellsberg, 1961), the probability of an outcome occurring is known
(Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel & Camerer, 2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher,
2009). For example, the option to select any spade from a deck of playing cards is less risky
than the option to select any queen precisely because the relative probability of each outcome is
known. In contrast, ambiguity involves a complete lack of information about the probability of a
particular outcome occurring (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Fox & Tversky, 1995; Knight, 1921).
For example, if a person was asked to predict what kind of picture would be displayed without
having any foreknowledge about them.
Informational Uncertainty and Emotional Appraisal.
Uncertainty increases the physiological arousal and intensity of emotional experience,
and this is sometimes perceived positively (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Sorrentino, Ye,
& Szeto, 2009; Whalen, 2007). For example, pleasant experiences are prolonged when they are
followed by uncertain events, and people seem to intuitively leverage this as a way to increase
excitement for pleasant experiences. We wrap gifts, throw surprise parties, and seek dangerous
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thrills like skydiving (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Wilson, Centernar, Kermer & Gilbert,
2005) in part because our excitement is amplified when what is to come is hidden and unknown.
The experience of uncertainty has been shown to instigate introspection and contemplation
(Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, & Hewitt, 1988), and uncertainty about important future
outcomes, such as performance on a test or at a sporting event, can evoke “facilitative anxiety”
that leads people to prepare and perform on important tasks more effectively (Alpert and Haber,
1960).
While there are positive aspects to uncertainty, sometimes it can have deleterious
consequences for mental health. Uncertainty about important, potentially aversive future
outcomes can impair performance and curtail the ability to plan for the future (Grupe &
Nitschke, 2013). When paired with a potentially aversive outcome, uncertainty is almost
universally experienced as aversive (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; van den
Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Vandenham, 2005), and exposure to uncontrollable or
unpredictable events has been linked to the manifestation of depression (Msetfi, Murphy,
Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005). For example, people who are exposed to unpredictable patterns of
shocks (vs. predictable patterns of shocks) show heightened baseline levels of anxiety (i.e.,
contextual fear) to the experimental context (Davis, 1998), and these differences in heighted
baseline anxiety distinguish between clinically anxious and non-anxious people (Grillon,
Morgan, Davis, & Southwick, 1998; Pole, Neylan, Best, Orr, & Marmar, 2003).
Informational uncertainty and negative affect. The distinction between ambiguity and
risk has important consequences for decision making, and for the experience of felt uncertainty
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Risk has been shown to instigate aversive responses
across several species, including chimpanzees, birds, fish, and bumblebees (Caraco, 1981;
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Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Gilby and Wrangham, 2007). While risk varies in terms of its
tolerability, ambiguity is almost universally experienced as aversive among human and nonhuman animals. When given the option between making a decision that involves risk or
ambiguity, people avoid ambiguity, even in situations where it has a considerably higher payoff
than risk, a phenomenon known as ambiguity avoidance (Curley, Yates, & Abrams, 1986;
Ellsburg, 1961; Camerer & Weber, 1992).
Ambiguity is avoided even when the situation is clearly innocuous. For example, both
rats and humans prefer to receive a sequence of shocks that are predictable over an equivalent
sequence that is unpredictable (Abbot, 1985; Abbot and Badia, 1979; Badia and Culbertson,
1972; Miller, Marlin, & Berk, 1977; Mineka and Kihlstrom, 1978). While predictable and
unpredictable shocks elicit a clear fear response, only unpredictable shocks evoke states of
contextual fear, a sustained state of fear in the experimental context (Davis, 1998). Additionally,
the unpredictability of a stimulus only evokes such negative reactions when paired with an
aversive stimulus, and not with a neutral stimulus (Grillon, Baas, Lissek, Smith, & Milstein,
2004). The unpredictability of a forthcoming aversive stimulus has been shown to amplify levels
of fear and aversion not only to the unpredictable stimulus, but to the situations in which
uncertainty is experienced (Davis, 1998).
Informational uncertainty and stimulus perception. While evidence suggests
uncertainty can amplify unpleasant affect, it can also amplify perceptions of a stimulus as
unpleasant (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011). When people do not have adequate knowledge about the
future, the ability to anticipate threats and how to best regulate responses to them is impaired
(Nitschke & Grupe, 2013). This impaired state can produce considerable anxiety because is
suggests that one’s current mental representation of the situation/environment is not complete, or
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is incorrect (Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Peterson, 1999). One way people attempt to update their
mental representations and resolve uncertainty is through a process known as covariation
assessment. However, people are notoriously poor at covariation assessment, and exaggerated
attempts to resolve uncertainty can lead to biased expectations that serve not only to amplify
negative affect in uncertain contexts, but to actually distort basic perceptual processes
(Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006; Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christense, &
Zeke, 2009; Sanfey, 2009).
Specific aim 1. Several studies have demonstrated that unpredictable threats are more
anxiety provoking and elicit greater physiological responses than the same threats when they are
predictable (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Grupe &
Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967; Nader & Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos
et al., 2010). Moreover, when people associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes, these biased
expectations can influence how unpleasant stimuli are actually perceived (Grupe & Nitschke,
2011; Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006). The first aim of the present
research was to replicate these findings by providing evidence of greater self-reported unpleasant
affect and unpleasant stimulus ratings when participants were uncertain about the nature of a
forthcoming emotional stimulus, compared to when they were certain (see Figure 1, Specific
Aim 1). The paradigm administered in the present study exposed participants to a cueing
stimulus that provided information about the nature of the forthcoming emotional picture as
either certain (aversive or neutral) or uncertain. On half of the experimental trials, participants
were asked to rate the valence of their affective state after being exposed to the emotional
stimulus, and on the other half of trials, participants were asked to rate their perception of the
valence of the image stimulus itself. After checking to determine participants understood the
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Figure 1. Trial Events during the trial sequence of the cued image task and their relation to specific aims.
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nature of the stimulus cues, I tested whether aversive and neutral images preceded by uncertainty
cues elicited more self-reported negative appraisals (higher unpleasant affect and stimulus
ratings) compared to aversive and neutral images preceded by certainty cues? Consistent with
past research using this paradigm (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011), this aim was to replicate evidence
that participants self-report affect and perceptions of the pictures as more unpleasant when
experienced under uncertainty.
Neural Correlates of Emotional Appraisal during Informational Uncertainty. Considerable
research has linked the amygdalae to learning and fear expression (LeDoux, 1996), and many
studies suggest amygdalae activity is increased during the appraisal of uncertainty (Davis and
Whalen, 2001; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Rosen and Donley, 2006; Rosen and Schulkin, 1998;
Whalen, 1998). Informational uncertainty increases states of fear and anxiety and increases
amygdalae activity in human (Bornhovd et al., 2002) and nonhuman primates (Belova, Patton,
Morrison, & Salzman, 2007). For example, activity in the amygdalae increases in the mere
presence of unpredictability in both mice and humans. In an otherwise innocuous context an
unpredictable pattern of sound pulses was found to increase activity in the amygdalae and
instigate avoidance-related behaviors in mice (Herry et al., 2007). Additionally, these authors
found that these identical sound patterns were shown to increase amygdalae activation and
heighten attention bias to emotional faces in humans, an indicator of anxious arousal. Another
study found that the magnitude of associated uncertainty with aversion predicted increased
activity in the amygdalae during the anticipation of uncertain outcomes (Sarinopoulos et al.,
2010). Under more complex conditions, such as during gambling tasks where the probability of a
particular outcome is variable, amygdalae activity is also increased by the degree of uncertainty
(Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher,
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2010). While findings linking uncertainty with amygdalar activation are compelling, it should be
highlighted that heightened activity in the amygdalae does not directly translate to increases in
negative emotions. While sometimes amygdalar activity indicates overt experiences of fear and
anxiety, the consequences of amygdalar activation on cognitive and affective experience are
largely controlled by regions of the prefrontal cortex (Whalen, 2007).
A recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies found that decisions made under
conditions of risk and ambiguity had similar activation profiles involving sub-regions of the
ACC and orbitofrontal cortices (OFC; Krain, Wilson, Arbuckle, Castellanos, & Milham, 2006).
The ACC is a limbic structure involved in error detection, reinforcement learning (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003), and the capacity to regulate
cognitive and emotion responses (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Increased ACC activity is
directly associated with higher levels of physiological arousal when emotional stimuli are
presented under conditions of informational uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Sarinopoulos
et al., 2010). Moreover, when participants make decisions that could lead to a reward, the level
of risk involved is directly related to activity in the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices
during the period after a participant’s behavioral response and before feedback about the
outcome (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Harris, Sheth, & Cohen, 2008). Importantly,
activity in the ACC and orbitofrontal cortex increases linearly as the risk becomes ambiguous
(Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005). In summary, considerable evidence suggests
that well-defined neural responses involved in stimulus appraisal are altered following
manipulations of informational uncertainty.
Cortical evidence. While a variety of neuroimaging studies have provided experimental
evidence that informational uncertainty elicits patterns of brain activity related to heightened
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states of physiological arousal following exposure to unpleasant stimuli (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs,
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Sarinopoulos et
al., 2010), brain-based evidence from studies capturing event-related potentials (ERPs) have
shown analogous effects (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008; Tritt, Peterson, and Inzlicht, under review). Of
primary interest to the present study is a component known as the Late Positive Potential (LPP),
an ERP measured at the surface of the scalp that is time locked to the presentation of emotional
stimuli.
The Late Positive Potential. The LPP is a positive-going slow wave that is maximal over
the centro-parietal midline in the 400 – 2000 ms latency range (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley,
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000). LPPs are present in some studies for the entire duration that
emotional stimuli are presented (e.g., up to 6 seconds; Foti & Hajcak, 2008; Hajcak &
Nieuwenhuis, 2006), and can even extend after stimulus offset (Hajcak & Olvet, 2008). LPP
amplitudes are theorized to reflect sustained attentional allocation and attentional narrowing
induced by stimuli that carry motivational relevance (Ferrari, Bradley, Codispoti and Lang,
2011; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2013; Hajcak and Olvet, 2008; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
1997; Schupp et al., 2000; Weinberg and Hajcak, 2011). The LPP is also sensitive to
manipulations of stimulus meaning and top-down regulation of emotional appraisal processes
(Blechert, Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, & Gross, 2012; Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006), and there
is evidence to suggest that the early time window of the LPP may more closely related to the
motivational relevance of a stimulus, while later time windows reflect perceptions and
evaluations of stimulus meaning (Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Jundhofer, 2006).
Decades of experimental studies have elucidated factors that influence the LPP. For
example, the LPP is influenced by the context in which an emotional stimulus is presented

14

(Cacioppo et al., 1993). When negative stimuli are embedded within a larger sequence of
positive stimuli, LPP amplitudes are increased. This finding suggests that LPP amplitudes are
amplified by evaluative inconsistency (Cacioppo et al., 1993). The LPP is particularly sensitive
to manipulations of attention. For example, distraction manipulations that divert participants’
attention away from the arousing properties of a stimulus attenuate LPP amplitudes, as does the
presentation of emotional stimuli in unattended locations of the visual field. LPP amplitudes are
also influenced by meaning evaluation, such that LPP amplitudes are blunted when participants
receive descriptions of emotional picture stimuli that frame them in a more positive way (Foti &
Hajcak, 2008). This reduction of LPP amplitude is even sustained when participants are reexposed to the stimulus 30 minutes later (MacNamara, Oschner, & Hajcak, 2011), which
suggests that LPP amplitudes may be particularly sensitive to changes in stimulus appraisal.
Moser et al. (2009) demonstrated the sensitivity of the LPP to a top-down appraisal
manipulation by providing participants with instructions to use specific emotion regulation
strategies to modify their emotional experiences during anticipation of emotional pictures. Three
conditions were deployed in the study. On some trials participants were cued to view the
pictures “as if from a detached, third person perspective” (reappraisal), while on other trials they
were cued to “imagine [they] were personally partaking in the pictured events” (self-focused), or
to simply view the pictures and respond naturally. Results indicated that instructions to decrease
emotional responses by reappraising the picture content were associated with attenuated LPP
amplitudes (Moser et al., 2009). In a similar study, Thiruchselvam et al. (2011) examined the
modulation of the LPP following cues to engage in top-down emotion regulation strategies. In
this study participants received a cue to either (1) simply attend to the picture as normal (view
and watch), (2) to distract themselves by “generating thought unrelated to the image presented on
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the screen” (distraction), or (3) to “adopt the perspective of a detached observer” (reappraisal).
Results indicated that instructions to distract or reappraise negative emotional stimuli were
associated with an attenuated LPP compared to normal viewing. However, these authors
extended the previous findings of Moser et al (2009) by examining when these effect occurring
during the time-course of the LPP. The process model of emotion regulation suggests that
attention-centric emotion regulation strategies have earlier influences than top-down reappraisal
strategies (Gross, 1998). Consistent with this theory, when participants were instructed to
distract themselves from the emotional content, the LPP was modulated at an early time (as early
as 300 ms), whereas instructions to reappraise modulated the LPP much later after stimulus
exposure (1500 ms).
Simultaneous recording of EEG and fMRI has implicated a network of brain regions that
differentially generate and modulate the LPP based on stimulus valence, including the visual
cortices, temporal cortices, amygdalae, orbitofrontal cortex, insula, and posterior cingulate cortex
(Liu, Huang, McGinnis-Deweese, Keil, & Ding, 2012). LPP amplitude is modulated by betaadrenergic receptor activity in the amygdalae, which exerts downstream effects in visual cortical
areas (de Rover et al., 2012). Other studies have suggested the LPP arises due to a global
inhibition of activity in the visual cortex that has been linked to an extended processing duration
for an emotional stimulus (Brown, van Steenbergen, Band, de Rover, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012).
This is convergent with findings that increases in LPP amplitude are associated with slower
reaction times during cognitive tasks and interference with attention-related ERPs on the
subsequent trials (Weinberg and Hajcak, 2011).
Substantial research has indicated that LPP amplitudes are modulated by motivationally
salient emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli (Ferrari, Bradley, Codispoti and Lang,
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2011; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2013; Hajcak, Weinberg, MacNamara, & Foti, 2012; Keil et al.,
2001; Oolofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008). LPP amplitudes are highest for affective
stimuli that are directly related to biological imperatives, particularly threat and reproduction
(Weinberg and Hajcak, 2010). Several studies have indicated that LPP amplitudes are reduced
by top-down control over attention and emotional responses, such as when participants are
instructed to deliberately focus their attention to non-arousing features of a stimulus (Hajcak et
al., 2001), or to engage in cognitive reappraisal or distraction in reference to emotionally charged
images (Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes, Rydstrom, & Gross, 2011) or facial expressions
(Blechert, Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, & Gross, 2012; Hajcak and Nieuwenhuis, 2006;
MacNamara, Ochsner, & Hajcak, 2011). The LPP is also sensitive to cultural differences in
emotional suppression (Murata, Moser, & Kitayama, 2012). Additional evidence suggests the
modulating influence of stimulus valence on the LPP reflects rapid processing driven specifically
by a current focal stimulus, and are not influenced by the valence of stimuli presented on
preceding trials (Schupp, Schmälzle, Flaisch, Weike, & Hamm, 2013).
Of central importance to the present study, LPP amplitudes are increased when people
confront a variety of distinct threats, including uncertainty, which further supports the LPP as a
robust measure of stimulus appraisal. For example, LPP amplitudes are increased when spiderphobic individuals are presented with spider-related stimuli (Schienle, Schäfer, and Nauman,
2008). The experience of acute stress has been found to bias stimulus processing toward
unpleasant cues, as measured by heightened LPP amplitude (Weymar, Schwabe Löw, & Hamm,
2012). LPP amplitudes are also amplified when participants engage in proximal defenses against
existential threats, such as death (Klackl, Jonas, & Kronbichler, 2013). Most importantly, when
participants’ are exposed to stimuli that increase uncertainty (e.g., ambiguous facial expressions),

17

LPP amplitude is increased compared to unambiguous positive and negative emotional stimuli
(Tritt, Peterson, and Inzlicht, under review).
Specific aim 2. An incipient body of neuroimaging and ERP evidence indicates that
uncertainty modulates neurological activity associated with the appraisal of aversive stimuli
presented under conditions of uncertainty (Davis and Whalen, 2001; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005;
Rosen and Donley, 2006; Rosen and Schulkin, 1998; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010; Whalen, 1998),
including a post-stimulus marker of emotional appraisal known as the LPP (Tritt, Peterson, and
Inzlicht, under review). The second specific aim of the present study is to determine whether
emotional appraisal as indexed by the LPP is largest for aversive stimuli presented following
uncertainty about the nature of an emotional image stimulus, compared to when participants
know that an upcoming emotional image stimulus will be aversive (see Figure 1, Specific Aim
2). After conducting a region of interest analysis to determine that the LPP is modulated by
affective picture content at electrode locations consistent with past research, I will examine
whether uncertainty about a forthcoming stimulus increases LPP amplitude following exposure
to aversive and neutral image stimuli.
Mindfulness and Emotional Appraisal
Ancient Buddhist and contemporary Western descriptions of mindfulness highlight
heightened attention and awareness of the present as a primary defining feature (Brown & Ryan,
2003; Bodhi, 2011). As a mode of attention deployment, mindfulness involves establishing open
and receptive attention to internal and external experiences as they occur in the present moment
(Anālayo, 2003; 2013; Bishop, 2002; Bodhi, 2011; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Dreyfus, 2011; Dunne,
2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Said differently, mindfulness involves maintaining an “equanimous
receptivity” to whatever occurs in present moment experience (Anālayo, 2003; 2014; Bodhi,
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2011). Rather than preferencing or evaluating certain experiences, mindfulness involves simply
remaining aware of what occurs (Teasdale, 1999), including unpleasant experiences. This is not
to say that thoughts, appraisals, and judgments do not arise during states of mindfulness, or that
pleasant and unpleasant experiences are avoided (or approached). A characteristic that
exemplifies the receptive nature of mindfulness involves allowing the stream of emotions,
thoughts, and appraisals – whatever arises in awareness -- to take their course through awareness.
This capacity to grant all experiences equal time on the stage of awareness promotes a more
balanced, empirical perspective toward the data of immediate experience (Brown, Ryan, &
Creswell, 2007), such that the full-range of experiences is allowed, including those experiences
we are motivated to avoid, such as uncertainty.

This mindful orientation enables one to watch

the unfolding of subjective states from the perspective of an observer, rather than getting carried
away by the flow of thoughts and ongoing commentary about experience (Brown and Ryan,
2003; Kabat-Zinn, 1990).
Clinical perspectives on mindfulness propose that this heightened receptivity promotes
psychological and behavioral flexibility such that clients are better able to stay with and witness
aversive experiences, rather than avoid them, and thereby promotes more autonomous, skillful
responses (Follette et al., 2006; Greeson et al., 2009). Mindfulness has been incorporated into
several evidence-based therapies to enhance the effective treatment of psychopathology due to
these adaptive regulatory benefits (Didonna, 2009), including Mindfulness-Based Stress
Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993),
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 2005) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive
Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002). A number of meta-analytic reviews support the efficacy of
mindfulness-based therapies for the treatment of several psychological disorders, including those
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that covary with maladaptive responses to uncertainty, such as generalized anxiety disorder and
depression (Bohlmeijer, Prenger, Taal, & Cuijpers, 2010; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010;
Piet & Hougaard, 2011; Vollestad, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2012).
Mindfulness is theorized to promote greater receptivity to affective states, and as a
consequence, heightened sensitivity to interoceptive cues that indicate the need to regulate
emotions (Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013). The burgeoning scientific literature on mindfulness is
beginning to provide behavioral evidence for these emotion regulatory outcomes. For example,
mindfulness training has been shown to improve the self-regulation of attention (Goldin et al.,
2009; Jha et al., 2007) and to promote a greater willingness to stay with and experience aversive
emotional stimuli (Arch & Craske, 2006). Dispositional mindfulness has been associated with
adaptive responses to a variety of aversive emotional states, including social evaluative threat
(Brown, Ryan, Creswell, & Niemiec, 2008; Brown, Weinstein, & Creswell, 2012), aversive
socioemotional stimuli (Brown et al, 2013; Way et al., 2010; Taren, Creswell, and Gianaros,
2013), and mortality salience (Kashdan, Afram, Brown, Birnbeck, & Drvoshanov, 2011;
Niemiec et al., 2010).
I theorize that mindfulness might also play a role in promoting adaptive emotional
responses following uncertainty. Anxious responses to uncertainty are perpetuated when people
repetitively engage in future-oriented thinking about potentially negative uncertain outcomes
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), and such exaggerated attempts to resolve uncertainty are antithetical
to mindfulness. Mindfulness is inherently present-oriented state during which affect is
experienced in an open and receptive way, including negative affect (Arch & Craske, 2006).
Dispositional mindfulness has been associated with lower levels of rumination, and lower levels
of self-reported negative affect (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Rather than attempting to change or
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resolve uncertainty, a mindful approach involves confronting uncertainty receptively and
observing the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that follow. By dampening the tendency to
manipulate and resolve uncertainty, mindfulness may promote more comfort with uncertainty
and ameliorate the tendency for uncertainty to increase negative appraisals, indexed here by
negative affect and picture ratings, following an uncertainty cue and subsequent exposure to
aversive stimuli.
Specific aim 3. The third specific aim of the present study is to determine whether trait
mindfulness will predict less unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the display of
uncertain stimulus cues (see Figure 1, Specific Aim 3). To address this aim I will test whether
trait mindfulness lessens unpleasant affect after uncertain stimulus cues and aversive images. I
will also test whether trait mindfulness will predict less negative image ratings after uncertain
stimulus cues and aversive images. Additionally, to test the specificity of these questions
concerning mindfulness, I will also examine whether traits that contrast with mindfulness, such
as uncertainty distress and anxiety-related traits, will predict higher unpleasant affect and more
negative image ratings following uncertainty stimulus cues and aversive images.
Mindfulness and neural measures of emotional appraisal. Evidence drawn from
neuroimaging and ERP-related studies are consistent with behavioral studies by suggesting that
mindfulness promotes adaptive responses to negative affective states. Dispositional mindfulness
as measured by the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) has been
associated with heightened activity in the prefrontal cortex and the down-regulation of
amygdalae activity during states of rest (Way, Creswell, Eisenberger, & Lieberman., 2010), and
following emotional threats (Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007; Frewen et al.,
2010; Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2010), and has recently been associated with smaller right
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amygdala volume (Taren et al., 2013). Other studies have linked MAAS-measured dispositional
mindfulness (Way et al., 2010) as well as mindfulness training (Hölzel et al., 2008) with neural
activation in the orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region implicated in the processing of uncertainty
(Hsu et al., 2005; Krain et al., 2006), emotional appraisal (Oschner & Gross, 2005; Davidson,
2000), and the top-down regulation of amygdalae activity (Quirk and Beer, 2006). Dispositional
mindfulness has also been associated with cortical indicators that are thought to be generated in
the ACC and are responsive to stimulus uncertainty, such as the Error-Related Negativity (Teper
and Inzlicht, 2013) and Feedback Related Negativity (Teper and Inzlicht, in press).
Mindfulness and the Late Positive Potential. Mindfulness is theorized to reduce the
influence of appetitive and defensive impulses on perceptions and thought (Davis and
Thompson, in press; Anālayo, in press), and emerging studies on mindfulness and the LPP
provide empirical support this perspective. Recent ERP evidence indicated that two measures of
dispositional mindfulness – the MAAS and the FFMQ act with awareness subscale – predicted
attenuated LPP responses elicited by highly arousing pleasant (e.g., erotica) and unpleasant (e.g.,
mutilations) motivationally salient emotional images (Brown, Goodman, & Inzlicht, 2013).
Another study conducted by Sobolewski, Holt, Kublik, and Wrobel (2011) reported similar
findings when comparing experienced meditators with meditation naïve participants. That is,
mindfulness practitioners showed reduced LPP deflections to unpleasant emotional stimuli
compared to non-meditating controls.
These dampening effects of mindfulness on LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli
can be observed as early as 400ms after stimulus contact, and this is particularly interesting in
light of previous work on emotion regulation and the LPP. As mentioned earlier (in the previous
section on the LPP), studies have found that manipulations of attention (e.g., distraction) and
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stimulus appraisal (e.g., taking a third person perspective) dampen LPP amplitudes to emotional
picture content (Moser et al., 2009; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). When participants are
instructed to distract themselves from the emotional content, the LPP is modulated at an early
time (as early as 300 ms), whereas instructions to engage in top-down reappraisal of the
emotional content modulated the LPP much later after stimulus exposure (1500 ms). This is
consistent with the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), which suggests that
attention-related emotion regulation strategies have earlier influences than more effortful topdown reappraisal strategies. That mindfulness has been shown to attenuate the LPP responses at
such an early stage in the time-course of emotional processing suggests that this dampening
effect is more likely the result of an attention-deployment strategy, rather than a more effortful,
top-down emotion regulation strategy, and is consistent with the theoretical framework that the
adaptive emotional responses to aversive stimuli result from a distinct way of deploying
attention.
Specific aim 4. This sensitivity of the LPP to uncertainty, emotional appraisal, and
dispositional mindfulness suggests it is a viable window into the differences in emotional
appraisal under conditions of uncertainty, as well as the moderation of this uncertainty
amplification effect by dispositional mindfulness. The fourth specific aim of the present study is
to determine whether dispositional mindfulness is associated with attenuated LPP responses to
aversive emotional stimuli under conditions of uncertainty (relative to certainty) during an early
time window of the LPP (see Figure 1, Specific Aim 4). To address this question I will test
whether mindfulness is associated with lower deflections of the LPP following aversive images
preceded by uncertainty relative to certainty cues across three time windows. Additionally, to
test the specificity of these questions concerning mindfulness, I will also examine whether traits
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that contrast with mindfulness, such as uncertainty distress and anxiety-related traits, will predict
higher LPP deflections elicited by aversive image uncertainty, relative to certainty stimulus cues.
Informational Uncertainty and Emotional Anticipation.
In the previous sections, evidence was reviewed that suggests that uncertainty can
increase unpleasant affect and negative stimulus perceptions during the appraisal of aversive
emotional stimuli (Grupe & Nitschke, 2010; Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke,
2006). This heightening of unpleasantness by uncertainty is theorized to result, at least in part,
from changes during the anticipation of uncertain future outcomes, and specifically the tendency
to expect that uncertainty will lead to aversiveness (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), a phenomenon
known as covariation bias (Tomarken, Mineka and Cook, 1989). In addition to replicating and
extending past research on emotional appraisal following uncertainty, the present study will
explore differences during anticipatory processing of emotional stimuli under conditions of
uncertainty.
Prior research using an identical experimental paradigm has provided evidence that
suggests participants commonly demonstrate expectations for uncertainty to lead to aversive
outcomes (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011). Additional research indicates that uncertainty modifies
activity in neural regions during the anticipation of emotional stimuli (for a review, see Grupe &
Nitschke, 2013). The present study will replicate and extend this existing body of evidence by
examining self-reported expectations during states of uncertainty, as well as a cortical measure of
emotional anticipation known as the Stimulus Preceding Negativity (SPN). The SPN is an ERP
measure thought to reflect the anticipation and the intensity of motivational engagement toward a
forthcoming emotional stimulus (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba,
2007; Takeuchi, Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005). Similar to the LPP, the
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SPN is sensitive to the valence and arousal inducing properties of a stimulus (Howard,
Longmore, & Mason, 1992; Poli et al., 2007), and the top-down modulation of stimulus
meaning, or appraisal (Moser et al., 2009; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).
Finally, the present study will explore dispositional mindfulness as a psychological
quality that moderates self-reported and cortical measures of emotional stimulus anticipation
under conditions of uncertainty. Mindfulness is expected to promote lower levels of covariation
bias, and I will explore the relations between mindfulness and the SPN during emotional
stimulus anticipation under conditions of uncertainty. In the following section, I will discuss
relevant scholarly literature on the relationship between uncertainty and worry, and will outline
how prior expectations for uncertainty to lead to aversive outcomes can lead to maladaptive
perceptual and affective responses to uncertainty. After discussing the nature of uncertainty and
anticipatory processes, I will outline my rationale for exploring the influence of mindfulness on
anticipatory processing under conditions of uncertainty.
Uncertainty and Worry. The amplification of fear and aversion when faced with
uncertainty can be debilitating, and can lead some people to worry excessively. Uncertainty is
considered a primary feature of worry, which is defined as a state of anxious concern focused on
how uncertain future events will occur (Buhr and Dugas, 2002; MacLeod, Williams, & Bekerian,
1991). Worry about uncertainty future outcomes can become crippling when people have
exaggerated expectations that uncertainty will lead to aversive outcomes, a phenomenon known
as covariation bias (Grupe & Nitschke, 2010). This heightened tendency to associate uncertainty
with aversiveness commonly leads to maladaptive results in several life domains, such as health
and finances (Camerer and Weber, 1992). It is not surprising that uncertainty about potentially
negative future outcomes can drive people to worry excessively. Uncertainty signals that our
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cognitive representations of the world are incomplete or inaccurate, and this can impair abilities
to plan for and regulate responses to potentially negative future outcomes (Hirsh & Inzlicht,
2008). One way people detect and attempt to resolve uncertainty is through a process known as
covariation assessment, and it is through this process that prior expectations and beliefs can
begin to distort cognitive and affective responses to uncertainty in maladaptive ways.
Covariation assessment. People naturally develop elaborate cognitive representations to
make sense of the world (Piaget, 1954), and these representations enable people to make the
world seem coherent and meaningful (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Our mental
representations are particularly useful during anticipation, and allow for predictions and planning
for potential future adversity when faced with uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). When
mental representations are recognized as lacking or inconsistent, people experience uncertainty
and engage in various cognitive strategies to resolve it (Heine et al., 2006). This exploration
represents a major brick in the foundations of social psychology research conducted in the
1950’s-1970’s. For example, when people face uncertainty about their standing in relation to
others, they become motivated to engage in social comparison to resolve their uncertainty
(Festinger, 1958). Similarly, when people are uncertain about the causes of others’ behavior
they make causal attributions to understand the causes of their behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley,
1973). When people simultaneously hold two conflicting ideas, they experience dissonance and
become motivated to resolve the inconsistency (Festinger, 1957). In each of these instances the
source of uncertainty involves detecting and recognizing that our mental representations are
lacking or inaccurate.
Covariation assessment is a process used for detecting the relations between stimuli,
behaviors, and outcomes (for reviews see Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Crocker, 1981). This
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capacity to anticipate the future clearly serves an adaptive function as a way to make sense of
past events, control the present, prepare for the future, obtain goals, and avoid negative
outcomes. However, when people hold inaccurate beliefs or expectations about a situation, or
how the future will unfold, this information can bias the outcome of covariation assessment
processes and lead to predictions that are not in line with objective situational information.
Biased expectations. There is a substantial body of evidence that suggests people are
notoriously poor at predicting future outcomes (Cordray & Shaw, 1978; Kahneman & Tversky,
1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). One common reason for such prediction errors is that the
expectations people hold about a situation are heavily weighted and can distort perceptions of the
situation. When our expectations are in line with objective situational information our
predictions about future outcomes are typically more accurate than when our expectations are
divergent from objective situational information. One reason for this is that our expectations can
distort our covariation estimates, and any predictions we make based on those estimates will
overwhelmingly reflect our preconceived notions and expectations, rather than the objective
situation (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For
example, when participants are asked to estimate the covariation between two dichotomous
variables, their covariation estimates indicate utilization of only the information that they
personally deem important, even when information that would disconfirm the covariation is
manipulated to be more salient (Arkes & Harkness, 1983). This distorting influence of prior
expectations becomes even more prominent under conditions of ambiguity. When people are
placed in ambiguous situations and have no objective information on which to base covariation
judgments, predictions depend primarily on prior expectations. That is, pre-existing beliefs and
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expectations profoundly influence our predictions about future outcomes when faced with
uncertainty and distort perceptions and affective states.
The expectations we bring to bear on our experiences have important implications for
perceptual, affective, and cognitive processes. For example, in a study by Nitschke et al. (2006),
participants who were led to think a substance would taste better than they expected reported
lower aversion than participants who received accurate information. Expectations for more
pleasant taste increased the activation of taste-related brain regions, and these changes in brain
activation were corroborated with subjective reports of increased pleasantness. This evidence
suggests that very basic perceptual processes can be influenced by expectations (Nitschke et al.,
2006). Other similar studies have found that manipulating participants’ expectancies can bias
olfactory and gustatory stimuli (de Araujo, Rolls, Velazco, Margot, & Cayeux, 2005) and
aesthetic judgments of art and wine (Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christensen, & Zeke, 2009). The most
robust evidence comes from the widely known placebo effect found in drug studies and the
treatment of pain, in which participants’ expectations have been shown to influence perceptions
of treatment outcome. What is key about the findings from these studies is that expectations can
exert a powerful influence on and distort perceptual processes.
Covariation biases. When uncertainty elicits expectations for unpleasantness, the
anticipation and attempts to resolve uncertainty can become exaggerated, and become a potent
source of anxiety (Grupe, Oathes, & Nitschke, 2011; Kagan, 1972). Anxious responses under
conditions of uncertainty can lead to heightened expectations for aversion and distort the process
of covariation assessment. The tendency to associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes is a
type of covariation bias (Tomarken, Mineka and Cook, 1989), and research has implicated
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covariation bias as a strong factor that contributes to the development of clinical anxiety
disorders (Barlow, 2000; Borkovec, 2002).
Human and non-human primates are biologically predisposed to selectively associate
particular stimuli and situations with aversiveness (e.g., blood and injury; Cook and Mineka,
1990; Pury and Mineka, 1997). While most people selectively associate threatening stimuli with
aversive outcomes (Cook and Mineka, 1990), these effects are exaggerated among people with
heightened anxiety and fear (Davey and Dixon, 1995). When selective associations become
exaggerated, such as when uncertainty evokes heightened levels of fear and anxiety, they can
play a central role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety. Covariation bias is central to this
process (Davey, 1992; 1995). A growing body of research has demonstrated that the presence of
covariation bias can amplify the experience of fear (De Jong, Van den Hout, & Mercklebach,
1995). Exaggerated covariation assessments are thought to develop from experiencing a
negative event that evokes anxiety, and the degree of anxiety elicited determines how strong the
covariation bias will become (Pauli, Wiedemann, Dengler, & Kühlkamp, 2001).
Three distinct types of covariation bias are commonly studied in literature on anxiety
(and will be measured in the proposed research): a priori covariation bias, online covariation
bias, and a posteriori (or post-experiment) covariation bias.
A priori covariation bias. A priori covariation bias reflects a general baseline tendency
to associate a stimulus with aversiveness prior at the outset of an experiment, when participants
have no foreknowledge about the actual probability of co-occurrence between uncertainty and
aversive outcomes. Studies examining a priori covariation bias have found that people with
social phobia have a heightened a priori covariation bias to associate angry facial expressions
with aversive experience, compared to non-phobics (Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Hermann,
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Ofer & Flor, 2004). Additional research suggests a priori covariation biases may be the outcome
of prior states of anxiety in the context of uncertainty (Wiedemann, Pauli, & Dengler, 2001).
Online covariation bias. A second type of distorted covariation assessment is known as
online covariation bias or expectancy bias, which refers to heightened expectations that one will
receive a threatened aversive stimulus (UCS; such as an electrical shock or startle probe), more
frequently following the presentation of a threatening stimulus (CS) compared to an innocuous
stimulus (Davey, 1992; 1995). Exposure to fear-relevant stimuli has been found to increase
online expectancy ratings and skin conductance responses, and a posteriori (post-experiment)
estimates of covariation bias (Amin & Lovibond, 1997). Across numerous studies, expectancy
bias has been associated with trait anxiety (Chan and Lovilond, 1996). It has been suggested that
online expectancy bias is related to deficits in threat appraisal and may contribute to the nonspecific fear that is characteristic of anxiety disorders (Boddez et al., 2011). Online expectancy
bias has been associated with the persistence of PTSD symptoms among soldiers returning from
Iraq (Engelhard, de Jong, van den Hout, & Overveld, 2009), and online expectancy ratings are
resistant to extinction in phobics (de Jong and Merckelbach, 1993).
A posteriori covariation bias. The third type of covariation bias involves the tendency to
hold inflated retrospective (post-experiment) estimates of the co-occurance between two stimuli,
usually a negative stimulus and an aversive outcome (Chapman and Chapman, 1969; Tomarken,
Mineka, & Cook, 1989). However, the valence dimension of emotional stimuli may not be the
primary stimulus dimension that drives the development of a posteriori covariation biases. Using
a fear potentiated startle paradigm, Witvliet and Vrana, (2000) found that the arousal inducing
properties of a stimulus may be more important to the development of biased post-experiment
estimates than the valence of the stimulus.
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Pathological anxiety and phobias are strongly linked with biased post-experiment
covariation estimates. Contamination phobic individuals associate the co-occurance of
contamination stimuli with aversive outcomes more than non-phobic individuals (Connolly,
Lohr, Olatunji, Hahn, & Williams, 2009), and people with social phobia exhibit higher a
posteriori covariation bias between social cues and negative outcomes (Herman, Ofer & Flor,
2004). Additionally, changes in the degree of covariation bias are an important indicator for
psychological treatment. For example, a posteriori covariation biases are reduced among
phobics who undergo behavioral treatment (de Jong and Merkelbach, 1993), and people with
higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias toward spiders immediately following treatment are
more likely to relapse after treatment and continue experiencing exaggerated fear of spiders (de
Jong, van den Hout, & Merckelbach, 1995).
Specific aim 5. A recent study by Grupe and Nitschke (2011) demonstrated a priori and
online covariation biases in response to stimulus uncertainty using the same paradigm as in the
present study. Using a nearly identical paradigm, Sarinopoulos et. al (2010) found that
uncertainty-related a posteriori covariation bias was associated with neural regions involved in
the regulation of aversive experience. More specifically, they discovered that unpleasant stimuli
preceded by uncertainty cues induced greater amygdalae activation than unpleasant images
preceded by certainty cues. In line with other research described above, these studies suggest
that covariation biases may predict the degree to which uncertainty amplifies unpleasant affect
and unpleasant stimulus perceptions following aversive stimuli.
The fifth aim of the present research was to replicate past research that demonstrates that
a priori and online covariation bias amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the
display of unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty. After checking whether

31

participants demonstrated significant a priori and online covariation biases, I examined the
following two questions associated with specific aim 5 (see Figure 1, specific aim 5). Do
expectations to associate uncertain cues with an unpleasant outcome (a priori and online
covariation bias) predict more unpleasant affect after image exposure? Do expectations to
associate uncertain cues with unpleasant outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict
more unpleasant image ratings after image exposure? I also examined whether a posteriori
expectations to associate uncertain cues with aversive outcomes would be related to more
unpleasant affect and image ratings after image exposure. In line with past research (Grupe &
Nitschke, 2011), I did not expect that these a posteriori expectations would be associated with
affect and image ratings.
Informational Uncertainty and Neural Correlates of Anticipation. A variety of
neuroimaging studies provide experimental evidence that informational uncertainty elicits
patterns of brain activity during anticipation that relates to downstream increases in physiological
arousal during the anticipation of a reward/loss (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001). In this
study, Critchley et al. (2001) participants were presented with a playing card and asked to guess
whether the next card would be higher or lower (S1) before receiving performance feedback
indicating a monetary reward or loss (S2). Neural activity in the ACC and orbitofrontal cortex
was modulated by the degree of outcome uncertainty, and increases in ACC activity were
directly related to higher autonomic arousal as measured by galvanic skin response. These
results are consistent with a recent meta-analysis that has associated the anticipation of
performance feedback following decisions made under conditions of risk and ambiguity with the
modulation of activity in the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices (Krain et al., 2006).
Cortical measures of stimulus anticipation have also been identified that are sensitive to
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manipulations of uncertainty (Brown, Seymour, Boyl, El-Deredy, & Jones, 2007) and emotional
arousal (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba, 2007; Takeuchi,
Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005).
The Stimulus Preceding Negativity. The stimulus preceding negativity (SPN; also
known as the non-motor contingent negative variation; Brunia & Damen, 1988) is a negative
deflection of the stimulus-locked ERP that occurs during periods of emotional anticipation for a
forthcoming stimulus (van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004). It is typically elicited using an S1-S2
paradigm, where S1 is a neutral cue that signals the display S2, which is commonly an emotional
stimulus (Hajcak, Weinberg, MacNamara, & Foti, 2012). When the duration between S1 and S2
is sufficiently long (> 2s), the SPN can be divided into distinct subcomponents. An early SPN
that occurs within the first 1000 ms is commonly called the orienting wave, and is thought to
reflect the processing of S1 (Connor and Lang, 1969). There is a later component that reaches its
negative maximum just before the display of S2, called the anticipatory wave (Weerts and Lang,
1973), and this component is thought to reflect heightened preparatory processing or attentional
orienting toward an upcoming stimulus.
In paradigms where S2 would require some sort of motor response from the participant,
the SPN reflects preparation for a motor response. But when no motor response is required, the
component is thought to reflect the anticipation and the intensity of motivational engagement
toward a forthcoming emotional stimulus (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, &
Palomba, 2007; Takeuchi, Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005). Early studies
of the SPN found significantly greater deflections during the anticipation of impending shock
(Irwin et al., 1966; Rockstroh, Elbert, Sanavan, Lutzenberger, & Birbaumer, 1989), aversive
noise (Regan & Howard, 1995) and unpleasant emotional pictures (Klorman & Ryan, 1980).
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Furthermore, SPN amplitude has been correlated with other autonomic measures, such as heart
rate and fear-potentiated startle (Baas et al., 2002)
Similar to the LPP, the SPN has been consistently found to be larger during anticipation
of emotionally evocative stimuli (Simons et al., 1979), with larger negative deflections of the
wave preceding unpleasant, but not pleasant pictures. Additional evidence has indicated the SPN
is highly sensitive to the arousal inducing properties of the stimulus. For instance, Poli et al.
(2007) manipulated both stimulus valence and arousal dimensions, and found the SPN
deflections were larger (more negative) for images with higher normative arousal ratings. Also
similar to the LPP, emerging evidence supports the theory that SPN deflections may reflect the
motivational relevance of the picture content represented at S2, rather than the valence of an
upcoming stimulus. Evidence for this assertion comes from studies where the SPN is larger for
positive emotional stimuli that are highly arousing and motivationally salient, such as erotica
(Howard, Longmore, & Mason, 1992).
One study of the SPN that is directly relevant to the present research was conducted to
examine the influence of uncertainty and expectations on SPN amplitudes during the anticipation
of pain induced by a heat stimulus (Brown, Seymour, Boyl, El-Deredy, & Jones, 2007).
Expectancy ratings were found to influence SPN-measured anticipation, such that higher
expectations of pain were associated with larger deflections of the SPN. In addition,
participants’ ratings of the pain were directly associated with their prior expectations.
More recent studies of the SPN during anticipation of emotional stimuli are beginning to
emerge that examine how top-down influences on emotion modulate the component. As already
discussed, Moser et al. (2009) provided participants with instructions to use specific emotion
regulation strategies to modify their emotional experiences during the anticipation of emotional
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pictures. Three conditions were deployed in the study. On some trials participants were cued to
view the pictures “as if from a detached, third person perspective” (reappraisal), while on other
trials they were cued to “imagine [they] were personally partaking in the pictured events” (selffocused), or to simply view the pictures and respond naturally. Results indicated that
instructions to decrease emotional responses by reappraising the picture content were associated
with significantly larger (more negative) deflections of the SPN to unpleasant emotional stimuli,
compared to viewing these unpleasant stimuli in a self-focused way. The authors suggested that
this finding reflects that attempts to down-regulate emotion through reappraisal was associated
with enhanced orienting and less negative anticipation of the upcoming picture.
In a related study, and as also discussed previously, Thiruchselvam et al. (2011)
examined the modulation of SPN following cues to engage in top-down emotion regulation
strategies. In this study participants received a cue to either (1) simply attend to the picture as
normal (view and watch), (2) to distract themselves by “generating thought unrelated to the
image presented on the screen” (distraction), or (3) to “adopt the perspective of a detached
observer” (reappraisal). To determine whether participants were following the distraction
instructions appropriately and not turning away from the emotional stimuli before it was
presented, they examined the SPN, and found that cues to engage in distraction from the stimulus
were associated with larger SPN amplitudes compared to the no-regulation instruction
conditions. That participants had a higher SPN indicates that they were anticipating and orienting
their attention towards the impending unpleasant stimulus before it was displayed
(Thiruchselvam et al., 2011), and subsequently distracting themselves.
Specific aim 6. Research on the SPN suggests that the component reflects processes
involved in the anticipation of motivationally relevant emotional stimuli, including the orienting
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of attention toward the forthcoming stimulus. Similar to the LPP, the SPN is reliability elicited
in response to highly arousing unpleasant stimuli, and has been shown to be sensitive to
manipulations of expectation under conditions of stimulus uncertainty. Taken together, this
evidence suggests that the SPN may be a valuable cortical marker to assess the influence of
uncertainty on emotional stimulus anticipation. The sixth specific aim of the present study was
to explore whether a cortical marker of pre-stimulus emotional anticipation known as the SPN
increased following uncertain relative to certain-aversive and neutral stimulus cues (see Figure 1,
specific aim 6). To replicate past research that has found the SPN sensitive to cueing
information about the nature of an upcoming emotional stimulus, I will examine whether neutral,
aversive, and uncertain stimulus cues indicating a subsequent stimuli is aversive will increase
deflections of the SPN compared to cues indicating the stimulus will be neutral. I expect
aversive and uncertainty cues to elicit higher SPN amplitudes than neutral cues, which would
reflect heightened anticipation for the forthcoming emotional stimulus.
Mindfulness and Anticipation.
While I am aware of no existing evidence indicating that mindfulness would reduce
covariation bias, the suggestion that mindfulness would attenuate covariation bias is consistent
with current theoretical perspectives of the construct. One reason mindfulness may reduce
covariation bias is due to its empirical orientation toward the facts of present-moment
experience. Rather than engaging in thought about experiences, a mindful mode of processing is
“similar to that of the objective scientist seeking accurate knowledge of some phenomenon”
(Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007, pp. 214). From this perspective, mindfulness should promote a
greater willingness to stay with experiences that people are frequently motivated to avoid, such
as uncertainty. In this way, mindfulness may function as a type of exposure (Arch & Craske,
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2006). When people avoid uncertainty they are less likely to learn that uncertainty is not always
associated with aversive outcomes. By exposing oneself to the full experience of uncertainty, a
person is more likely to learn that uncertainty does not always lead to unpleasantness, and could
slow the development of online covariation bias, as well as weaken existing ones (a priori
covariation bias).
Specific aim 7. The seventh specific aim of the present study was to explore whether
trait mindfulness will predict lower levels of a priori and online covariation bias. To address this
aim I ask the following research questions. First, is trait mindfulness related to lower a priori
expectations for uncertainty cues to be followed by aversive images (less a priori covariation
bias)? Second, is trait mindfulness associated with lower online expectations for uncertainty
cues to be followed by aversive pictures (less online covariation bias)? To increase confidence
in any mindfulness-related findings, analogous tests will be conducted to explore whether traits
that contrast with mindfulness – such as measures of uncertainty distress, including intolerance
for uncertainty and emotional responses to uncertainty, and anxiety-related traits, including
neuroticism, worry, and depression – will predict opposite associations with a priori and online
covariation biases.
Mindfulness and the neural correlates of anticipation. The majority of research on
mindfulness and anticipatory processing to date comes from studies that have explored the
influence of mindfulness on the perception of pain (Gard et al., 2012; Kingston et al., 2007;
Grant and Rainville, 2009; Perlman et al., 2010; Zeidan et al., 2010; 2011). While anticipation
of pain and emotion are distinct, they both induce anticipatory arousal and modulate brain
activity in similar regions, and it has been suggested that anticipation of pain and emotion have
similar mechanisms of action (Wiech et al., 2008). Gard et al. (2012) found that mindfulness
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practitioners were able to reduce anxious arousal during anticipation of unpleasant electrical
shock by 29% during a mindful state, and this reduction was associated with increased rostral
anterior cingulate cortex activity. A second study found that experienced meditators self-report
the same pain intensity as controls, but less unpleasantness, and enhanced habituation in the
amygdalae and the anterior mid-cingulate during the anticipation of pain (Lutz, McFarlin,
Perlman, Salomans, & Davidson, 2012).One potential mechanism for this pain reduction
involves differences in anticipatory processing. Mindfulness is theorized to reduce the influence
of expectations on pain due to decreased cognitive elaboration on sensory feedback (Zeidan et
al., 2011).
Specific aim 8. While no research exists (to my knowledge) linking trait mindfulness
with the modulation of SPN amplitude, past research has shown the SPN is sensitive to cue
valence (Poli et al., 2007; Howard, Longmore, & Mason, 1992), attention deployment, and
instructions to engage in top-down emotion regulation strategies (Moser et al., 2009;
Thiruchselvam, 2011), as well as uncertainty (Brown, Seymour et al., 2007; Tritt, Peterson, &
Inzlicht, under review). Trait mindfulness has been show to decrease attention-related ERPs that
are sensitive to emotional stimuli (Quaglia, Goodman, & Brown, under review). Thus, the
eighth and final aim of the present study was to explore the relation of trait mindfulness to
emotional stimulus anticipation by examining SPN amplitudes elicited by each type of stimulus
cue (see Figure 1, Specific Aim 8). This investigation will be guided by two questions. First, is
trait mindfulness associated with attenuated SPN amplitudes following uncertain, aversive
relative to neutral stimulus cues? Second, to test the specificity of these questions concerning
mindfulness, I will also examine whether traits that contrast with mindfulness (uncertainty
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distress and anxiety-related traits) will predict larger SPN amplitudes elicited by uncertain and
aversive cues, relative to neutral cues.
The Present Research
Uncertainty has been shown to amplify unpleasant experiences, and considerable
evidence suggests anxiety is increased when emotional stimuli are preceded by uncertainty cues
(Sarinopolous et al., 2010; Grupe et al., 2011). Research conducted using an identical paradigm
as in the present study has provided evidence for this uncertainty amplification using selfreported expectations, stimulus ratings, peripheral nervous system (Grupe et al., 2011) and
neuroimaging measures (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). The present research will attempt to
replicate effects from Grupe & Nitschke (2011) by demonstrating the influence of uncertaintycues on self-reported emotional anticipation and appraisal. Second, the present study will
attempt to extend this past research by capturing cortical measures of stimulus appraisal (the
LPP) and anticipation (the SPN) that past research has indicated are sensitive to motivational
relevance of a stimulus (Carretie et al., 2001; 2004; Cuthbert et al., 2000; Moser et al., 2009;
Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba, 2007; Schupp et al., 2003; Takeuchi, Mochizuki,
Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005) and manipulations of uncertainty (Tritt, Peterson, &
Inzlicht, under review; Brown, Seymour et al., 2007). Third, the present study will explore
dispositional mindfulness as a psychological quality that dampens self-reported and cortical
measures of negative emotional stimulus appraisal and anticipation under conditions of
uncertainty.
The specific aims of the present study and their associated events in the trial structure of
the cued image task are depicted in Figure 1. Participants observed one of three types of
anticipatory cues [neutral (O), aversive (X), or uncertain (?)] before the presentation of an
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aversive or neutral image. In between the cue and the image stimulus, participants were asked to
rate how much they expected the subsequent stimulus will be pleasant vs. unpleasant, and after
the image was displayed they were asked to rate either the valence of the picture, or their
emotional state on Likert scales. The experimental paradigm collected all three measures of
covariation bias described above, namely a priori, online, and a posteriori covariation biases.
Specific aim 1. Several studies have demonstrated that unpredictable threats are more
anxiety provoking and elicit greater physiological responses than the same threats when they are
predictable (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Grupe &
Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967; Nader & Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos
et al., 2010). Moreover, when people associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes, these biased
expectations can influence how unpleasant stimuli are appraised (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011;
Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006). The first specific aim of the present
study was to replicate the findings that stimuli presented under conditions of uncertainty elicit
greater self-reported unpleasant affect and unpleasant stimulus ratings compared when the nature
of the emotional stimulus is known. After checking to determine participants understood the
nature of the stimulus cues, I examined the following questions:


Question 1.1. When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty cues
do they elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant affect) after exposure to
the image than neutral and aversive images preceded by certainty cues?



Question 1.2.

When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty

cues do they elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant stimulus ratings)
after exposure to the image than neutral and aversive images preceded by
certainty cues?
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Specific aim 2. An emerging body of neuroscientific evidence indicates that uncertainty
also modulates neurological activity involved during the appraisal of aversive stimuli presented
under conditions of uncertainty (Davis and Whalen, 2001; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Rosen and
Donley, 2006; Rosen and Schulkin, 1998; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010; Whalen, 1998), including a
post-stimulus marker of attention and emotional appraisal known as the LPP (Tritt, Peterson, and
Inzlicht, under review). The second specific aim of the present study was to determine whether
emotional appraisal as indexed by the LPP is largest for aversive and neutral stimuli presented
following uncertainty cues, relative to certainty cues. After conducting a region of interest
analysis to determine that the LPP is modulated by affective picture content at electrode
locations consistent with past research, I examined the following questions:


Question 2.1. Do certain and uncertain aversive images elicit larger LPP
amplitudes than certain and uncertain neutral images?



Question 2.2. Do uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images elicit larger LPP
amplitudes than certainty-cued aversive and neutral stimuli?

Specific aim 3. The third specific aim of the present study was to determine whether
trait mindfulness would predict more benign appraisals - less unpleasant affect and less
unpleasant stimulus ratings - following the display of uncertain stimulus cues. To address this
aim I examined the following questions:


Question 3.1. Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant affect following
uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued
aversive and neutral images?
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Question 3.2. Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant stimulus ratings
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certaintycued aversive and neutral images?



Question 3.3. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness (measures of uncertainty
distress and anxiety-related traits) predict higher unpleasant affect following
uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued
aversive and neutral images?



Question 3.4. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher unpleasant
stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images
compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images?

Specific aim 4. The fourth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether
dispositional mindfulness would predict attenuated LPP responses to aversive relative to neutral
emotional stimuli under conditions of uncertainty and certainty, during an early time period
(500-1000ms) of the LPP. To address this aim I examined the following questions:


Question 4.1. Is trait mindfulness associated with lower deflections of the LPP
following aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by
uncertainty and certainty cues?



Question 4.2. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher LPP
deflections elicited by aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded
by uncertainty and certainty cues?

Specific aim 5. Empirical evidence suggests that anticipatory, covariation biases may
predict the degree to which uncertainty amplifies of unpleasant affect and unpleasant stimulus
perceptions following aversive stimuli (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). The
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fifth aim of the present research was to replicate this past research by demonstrating a priori and
online covariation biases amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the display of
unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty. After checking whether participants
demonstrated significant a priori and online covariation biases, I examined the following two
questions:


Question 5.1. Do anticipations or expectations to associate uncertain cues with
unpleasant outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict more
unpleasant affect after neutral and aversive image exposure under conditions of
uncertainty relative to certainty?



Question 5.2. Do expectations to associate uncertain cues with unpleasant
outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict more unpleasant image
ratings after neutral and aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty
relative to certainty?

Specific aim 6. The sixth specific aim of the present study was to explore whether a
cortical marker of pre-stimulus emotional anticipation known as the SPN was larger (less
positive) following uncertain and certain-aversive stimulus cues compared to neutral stimulus
cues. After conducting a region of interest analysis to determine that the SPN was modulated by
affective picture cues at electrode locations consistent with past research, I examined the
following questions:


Question 6.1. Do uncertain and certain-aversive stimulus cues elicit larger (less
positive) deflections of the SPN compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues?

43

Specific aim 7. The seventh specific aim of the present study was to explore whether
trait mindfulness would predict lower levels of a priori and online covariation bias. To address
this aim I examined the following research questions.


Question 7.1. Does trait mindfulness predict lower expectancies for the first
uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (less a priori covariation
bias)?



Question 7.2. Does trait mindfulness predict lower online expectations for
aversive pictures to follow from uncertain and certain-aversive cues relative to
neutral cues (less online covariation bias)?



Question 7.3. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher expectancies
for the first uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (higher a priori
covariation bias)?



Question 7.4. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher online
expectations for aversive pictures to follow from uncertain and certain-aversive
cues relative to neutral cues (less online covariation bias)?

Specific Aim 8. The eighth aim of the present study was to explore whether trait mindfulness
was associated with differences in the SPN amplitudes elicited by each type of stimulus cue.
This investigation was guided by two questions:


Question 8.1. Is trait mindfulness related to attenuated SPN amplitudes elicited
by uncertain and aversive cues, compared to neutral cues?



Question 8.2. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher SPN
amplitudes following uncertain and aversive cues, relative to neutral cues?
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Method
Power Analysis
A previous study assessing mindfulness as a moderator of LPP amplitude (Brown,
Goodman, & Inzlicht, 2013), yielded a medium (ds = .63 to .70) effect size. A repeated
measures MLM-based power analysis was conducted using Optimal Design Software
(Raudenbush et al., 2011). Assuming medium effect size, a sample of N = 60 participants was
considered sufficient to achieve a power of .80 when is set at .05.
Participants
Participants consisted of 64 undergraduate students at a mid-Atlantic university who were
right-handed and volunteered to partially fulfill a course requirement for their Introductory
Psychology course. Participants with a history of neurological or psychiatric illness were
excluded from the study (n=2). Data from six participants were discarded due to excessive
paroxysmal artifact in the EEG signal (n = 6) or poor electrode impedances (n = 2), and three
participants were excluded for procedural non-compliance during the EEG recording for the
Cued Image Task [sleeping (n = 1), eating (n = 1), rushing (n =1)]. The remaining 52
participants [(29 (58%) female; 2 undeclared] gave informed consent prior to participation in
accordance with the Institutional Review Board.
Psychometric Measures
Trait Mindfulness. Two widely used measures were administered to capture individual
differences in trait mindfulness. Central to most definitions of mindfulness in the western
scholarly literature is the increased quality of present-focused attention and awareness.
However, many other distinct facets (e.g. nonjudgment, the ability to describe experiences) have
been incorporated in several existing measures of mindfulness, largely stemming from the wide

45

utilization of mindfulness as tool in psychotherapeutic contexts (Goodman, Quaglia, & Brown,
2013). The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and the Act
with Awareness Subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith,
Hopkins, Krietmeyer, & Toney, 2006) are robust measures of dispositional mindfulness that
directly capture conceptualization of the mindfulness construct in way that is consistent with our
theoretical approach. For this reason, I decided to measure mindfulness using these measures,
rather than many of the other psychometric instruments that take distinct approaches to the
construct.
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003; sample α = .85)
captures individual differences in the tendency to be attentive to and aware of the present
moment using 15 items. Responses are indicated on a 6-point Likert-type scale (almost always
to almost never) to items such as "I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the
present" and "I snack without being aware that I’m eating." Higher scores on the MAAS
indicate higher mindfulness. Several independent analyses attest to the validity and
unidimensional factor structure of the MAAS (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney,
2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Carlson & Brown, 2005; Cordon & Finney, 2008; MacKillop &
Anderson, 2007). A second mindfulness measure -- The Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006; sample α = .94) -- captures 5 distinct skills used during mindfulness
practice in 39-items, and uses a 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very true or always true)
Likert type scale. Of interest to the present study is the Acting with Awareness subscale (sample
α = .89), as it most closely reflects our conceptualization of mindfulness as open and receptive
awareness. Higher scores on the FFMQ indicate higher levels of mindfulness.
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Uncertainty Distress. Two scales were administered to capture individual differences in
distress evoked from states of uncertainty. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr &
Dugas, 2002; sample α = .93) was administered to measure individual differences in affective
responses to situations with uncertain outcomes. The 27-item IUS assesses the degree to which
people endorse notions that uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, uncertainty leads to the
inability to act, uncertain events are negative and should be avoided, and uncertainty is unfair, all
using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (entirely
characteristic of me). The 48-item Uncertainty Response Scale (URS; Greco & Roger, 2001;
sample α = .81) was administered to capture individual differences in the way people cope with
uncertainty across three domains (emotional responses to uncertainty, cognitive responses to
uncertainty, and the desire to change uncertainty). The scale has high internal consistency and
test-retest reliability and has been validated using psychological and physiological measures
sensitive to uncertainty threat. The present study will focus on the emotional responses to
uncertainty subscale.
Anxiety. Three measures were administered to assess maladaptive personality traits
related to anxious responses to uncertainty. Participants completed the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; sample α = .94) to assess
clinically significant aspects of worry, such as the generality of worry across time and situations,
and the inability to control the worrying process. Responses to each of the 16-item PSWQ items
are indicated on a 1 (not typical of me at all) to 5 (very typical of me) Likert-type scale. The
neuroticism subscale of the NEO-FFI (Costa and McCrae, 1992; sample α = .78) was
administered to assess dispositional anxiety, hostility, depression, impulsiveness and
vulnerability using a 5-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). Higher scores on this
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scale indicate higher neuroticism. Depressive symptomology was measured using the 20-item
Beck Depression Inventory (Beckham & Leber, 1985; sample α = .88).
Stimulus Materials
Images used in the present study were selected from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008) and were identical to those used by Grupe &
Nitschke (2011). The most aversive images specific to each gender were selected separately on
the basis of having the most unpleasant valence (M = 2.31) and highest arousal (M = 6.09)
ratings based on publish norms (Lang et al., 2008)1. These pictures generally included pictures of
mutilated bodies or violent attack scenes. Neutral images were selected on the basis of having
neutral valence and arousal ratings and consisted primarily of photographs of everyday
household objects. Participants were randomized to receive one of three pseudorandom
presentation orders to control for order effects. Each stimulus set contained 4 blocks of 27
images from their gender-respective stimulus pool. Each stimulus block was matched to contain
similar valence and arousal ratings for aversive and neutral images (see Table 1). Although the
same picture sets were used for each gender, the stimulus orders varied which IAPS slides
followed certain vs. uncertain cues. To ensure each of the stimulus orders were statistically
equivalent, a 6 (Stimulus Orders) × 4 (Stimulus Type: certain aversive, certain neutral, uncertain

1

The IAPS Slides administered for each gender and stimulus category were:
Male Aversive: 1300, 1930, 2053, 2120, 2141, 2205, 2730, 2800, 2900, 3000, 3015, 3030, 3051, 3053, 3060, 3063,
3071, 3100, 3101, 3102, 3110, 3120, 3130, 3140, 3150, 3160, 3170, 3220, 3230, 3261, 3266, 3301, 3400, 3500,
3530, 3550, 6010, 6020, 6022, 6190, 6244, 6250, 6313, 6350, 6370, 6560, 6570, 6830, 8230, 9040, 9140, 9220,
9594, 9921. Male Neutral: 1390, 1500, 1620, 1670, 2190, 2210, 2372, 2383, 2487, 2514, 2575, 2749, 2830, 2840,
2870, 2880, 4532, 5201, 5300, 5390, 5395, 5410, 5471, 5510, 5520, 5530, 5532, 5535, 5551, 5600, 5740, 5900,
5991, 6150, 6900, 7002, 7004, 7006, 7041, 7100, 7130, 7140, 7160, 7170, 7205, 7211, 7217, 7224, 7233, 7283,
7490, 7500, 7705, 7950. Female Aversive: 1300, 1930, 2053, 2120, 2730, 2900, 3015, 3030, 3060, 3071, 3100,
3102, 3110, 3120, 3140, 3150, 3170, 3180, 3220, 3230, 3261, 3301, 3400, 3550, 6010, 6020, 6022, 6190, 6213,
6244, 6250, 6313, 6350, 6370, 6550, 6560, 6834, 9040, 9050, 9140, 9220, 9250, 9252, 9253, 9300, 9410, 9433,
9490, 9561, 9571, 9594, 9910, 9911, 9921. Female Neutral: 1500, 1620, 1670, 2190, 2200, 2372, 2381, 2383, 2570,
2749, 2840, 2880, 5201, 5300, 5395, 5410, 5471, 5510, 5530, 5534, 5535, 5551, 5600, 5720, 5900, 5991, 6150,
7004, 7006, 7009, 7020, 7025, 7031, 7035, 7040, 7080, 7090, 7100, 7140, 7160, 7170, 7185, 7205, 7217, 7233,
7235, 7500, 7545, 7550, 7580, 7595, 7705, 7900, 7950.
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Table 1. Mean normative valence and arousal ratings for each pseudo-random stimulus order

Neutral

Uncertain-Neutral

Aversive

Uncertain-Aversive

Valence

Arousal

Valence

Arousal

Valence

Arousal

Valence

Arousal

Order 1

5.45 (.82)

3.41 (.82)

5.47 (.82)

3.43 (.79)

2.27 (.70)

6.03 (.87)

2.32 (.71)

6.26 (.77)

Order 2

5.47 (.92)

3.43 (.85)

5.41 (.54)

3.38 (.71)

2.28 (.78)

6.11 (.88)

2.31 (.50)

6.12 (.77)

Order 3

5.47 (.85)

3.40 (.81)

5.43 (.75)

3.44 (.79)

2.33 (.77)

6.09 (.90)

2.20 (.57)

6.15 (.71)

Order 1

5.46 (.78)

3.15 (.71)

5.59 (1.06)

3.17 (.74)

2.39 (.65)

6.06 (.84)

2.45 (.71)

6.08 (.64)

Order 2

5.54 (.89)

3.18 (.71)

5.45 (.86)

3.10 (.73)

2.41 (.67)

6.09 (.76)

2.41 (.70)

6.02 (.83)

Order 3

5.46 (.78)

3.14 (.69)

5.53 (.98)

3.19 (.77)

2.40 (.63)

6.09 (.82)

2.41 (.75)

6.02 (.67)

Male

Female

Note. Each pseudo-random trial order contained 32 neutral slides and 32 aversive slides preceded by respective certainty cues.
Sixteen aversive slides and 16 neutral slides were preceded by uncertainty cues. Each rating is indicated on a 0 to 9 scale.

49

aversive, uncertain neutral) Between Subjects Factorial ANOVA was conducted on the
normative valence and arousal ratings to verify that each of the stimulus sets were statistically
equivalent. As expected, there were no main effect for stimulus order [F(5, 575) = .39, p = .86,
η² = .004] and no significant order × stimulus type interaction [F(15, 575) = .08, p = .99, η²
=.002] on valence. The model testing arousal also indicated no significant main effect for
stimulus order [F(5, 575) = 1.10, p = .36, η² = .01], nor an order × stimulus type interaction,
F(15, 575) = .27, p = .99, η² = .01.

This suggests statistical equivalence between the stimulus

categories across normative valence and arousal ratings that accompany the IAPS stimulus set
(Lang et al., 2008).
Procedure
Each participant was randomized to receive one of three gender-specific pseudorandom
trial orders while they completed the battery of individual difference measures. Following the
administration of self-report measures, each participant was fitted to a Stretch-Lyrca EEG cap
(Neuroscan Quikcap®) and received verbal instructions about how to complete a Cued Image
Task on the computer. The task was administered using similar parameters as prior studies
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), in which participants observe one of three
types of anticipatory cues (neutral, aversive, or uncertain) before the presentation of an aversive
or neutral image. In between the cue and the image stimulus, participants are asked to rate how
much they expected the subsequent stimulus to be pleasant vs. unpleasant, and after the image is
displayed they were asked to rate the valence of the picture, or of their mood state.
Trials began with the visual presentation of a 2 second cue image in the center of the
computer monitor that indicated to participants the valence (aversive or neutral) of an upcoming
picture. Three different types of anticipatory cues were displayed: an “X” cue, which always
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indicated the upcoming picture would be unpleasant (e.g. a mutilated body), an “O” cue, which
always indicated an upcoming picture would be neutral (e.g., a spoon), and a “?” cue, which
indicated uncertainty about the type of picture that would be displayed. Exactly 50% of the
images following uncertainty cues were neutral, and 50% were aversive. Participants received
on-screen instructions explaining the relations between cues and pictures, but were not informed
that the “?” cues preceded the exact same number of unpleasant and neutral images. An
illustration of each of the four types of trial sequences is depicted in Figure 2.
Immediately following the presentation of a cue, participants were presented with an
expectancy rating scale. The prompt “Expect Aversive Picture?” appeared above a visual Likerttype scale with values ranging from 1 (expect neutral) to 9 (expect aversive), and the mid-point
value of 5 labeled as ‘uncertain.’ Participants used left and right arrow buttons on an external
button box to navigate an indicator arrow to their chosen expectancy rating value, and then
pressed an enter button to confirm their expectancy rating. The scale remained on the screen
until participants indicated a response.
The expectancy rating scale was be followed by a random interstimulus interval between
4 to 10 seconds and then a neutral or unpleasant image appeared centrally on the screen for a
duration of 1 second. Each picture was between 5 to 7 seconds, after which a mood or picture
valence rating scale (only one rating per trial) appeared. Both scales were be labeled as follows:
-4 = “unpleasant/negative,” 0 = “neutral,” +4 = “pleasant/happy.” 50% of the time participants
were asked to rate their mood, and 50% of the time they were asked to rate the previous image.
Participants indicated their rating using the identical procedure used for the expectancy rating. A
1 to 5 second intertrial interval will followed the rating scales. Each interstimulus and intertrial
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Wait for response

X

.5s

1s
4-10s

AVERSIVE
IMAGE

O

NEUTRAL
IMAGE

?

AVERSIVE
IMAGE

?

NEUTRAL
IMAGE

Wait for response
5-7s

1-5s

Figure 2. Trial structure for each type of trial in the Cued Image Task.
Note. Each row represents a different type of trial. The pictures presented are exemplars of those that appeared during the task, but do
not belong to the IAPS picture set. Cue types: ‘X’ = Aversive; ‘O’ = Neutral; “?” = Uncertain.
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interval consisted of a black background with a centrally presented yellow crosshair, on which
the participants were instructed to fixate.
Participants completed a total of four blocks, each block contained 8 neutral images and 8
aversive images preceded by certainty cues (‘O’ and ‘X’, respectively). An additional 4 aversive
and 4 neutral images were preceded by uncertainty cues (‘?’). Over the entire course of the
study, participants viewed 32 aversive and 32 neutral images following certainty cues, and 32
images following uncertainty cues (16 aversive and 16 neutral images). Randomized within each
block were 4-5 trials that presented cues which were not followed by an image. At the
conclusion of each block 3-4 images appeared without being preceded by an anticipatory cue.
Each participant took approximately 12 minutes per block, and had the opportunity for a short
break in-between blocks. Following the Cued Image Task, each participant completed a postexperiment questionnaire that contained a short measure of covariation bias. Participants were
asked: “What percentage of the question mark cues were followed by aversive events?” Upon
completion of these measures, the experimenter removed the EEG sensor cap, and then debriefed
and dismissed the participant.
EEG recording and signal processing
EEG was recorded using 36 sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in a Quik Cap
(Neuroscan; El Paso, TX). Electrode positions were based on the 10-20 international system
with a forehead ground and two monopolar references placed on the left and right
mastoids. Continuous EEG was digitized at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz using a NuAmps
Express digital amplifier (Neuroscan; El Paso, TX). Frequencies above 30Hz were removed
using an online low-pass filter. The electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded with monopolar
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electrodes located below and on the outer canthus of each eye. Offline, the monopolar EOG
channels were combined into bipolar channels.
EEGLAB 12.0 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and Matlab (Mathworks,
www.mathworks.com) were used for offline EEG data processing. Bad channels were detected
and removed with the automatic detection algorithms provided by EEGLAB. Continuous backto-back epochs (1s) were generated from the continuous EEG signal. Epochs containing
nonstereotypical artifacts were detected and rejected using native EEGLAB artifact detection
algorithms sensitive to abnormal values, distributions, spectra, and linear trends. After rejecting
epochs contaminated with paroxysmal artifacts, independent components analysis (ICA) using
the infomax algorithm was used to correct remaining artifacts in the continuous EEG signal.
High-pass filtering above .1 Hz has been shown to reduce ERP amplitudes (Luck, 2005), but
ICA decomposition works most effectively on data that has been filtered over .5 Hz. To
overcome this problem I followed the method outlined by Debener, Thorne, Schneider, and
Viola (2010). Data containing stereotypical artifacts (e.g. blinks, eye movements, EKG) were
high-pass filtered at 1hz offline to improve ICA decomposition, and then native EEGlab
algorithms for epoch rejection (joint probability and kurtosis) were used to remove additional
offending artifacts from the derived continuous ICA component activity. ICA was then
conducted a second time on the remaining clean back-to-back epochs to improve the quality of
the ICA decomposition and derive more ICA components that account for neural sources. The
ICA weights from this second pass were then re-referenced to a common average reference and
imported back into the original unfiltered continuous EEG data. Data epochs of interest were
then extracted from the continuous EEG signal to capture the SPN (0 – 4000ms expectancy
response) and LPP (-1000 to 1500ms picture stimulus) components. Epochs of interest were

54

baseline corrected and ICA components representing artifact were detected and pruned from the
continuous EEG signal using MARA, an algorithm designed to detect and subtract artifactual
ICA components from the underlying raw EEG signal (Winkler, Haufe, & Tangermann, 2011).
Finally, epochs with signal that exceeded +/- 75 µv were removed. Grand average, artifact-free
raw data epochs were then exported for analysis using SAS.
Statistical Analysis
Multiple steps were taken to ensure data met normality assumptions during the data
analysis process. To check for violations of normality, skewness and kurtosis statistics were
examined for all self-report, task-based, and ERP measures. Variables with skewness and
kurtosis values that exceeded +/- 1.00 were considered to be in violation of the normality
assumption, and frequency tables were then examined to identify offending values. Extreme
observations were winsorized (Dixon & Tukey, 1968), meaning that outliers (i.e. higher than the
97th percentile and below the 3rd percentile) were replaced by a value nearer to the next highest
value.
To account for the nested structure of the data, multilevel linear models with restricted
maximum likelihood estimation (REML; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) were conducted using SAS
PROC MIXED (Singer, 1998). Compound symmetry (TYPE=CS) was verified as the
covariance structure with the lowest (best) goodness-of-fit indices (-2LL, AIC, BIC) across
models with distinct outcome measures, as compared to Unstructured, Diagonal, Variance
Components, and Autoregressive covariance structures. Independent mixed models were tested
to explore any main and interactive effects between cue type and/or stimulus type, and
psychological traits (dispositional mindfulness, uncertainty distress, and anxiety-related traits) on
the primary dependent measures of interest (expectancy, picture, and mood ratings; SPN and
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LPP amplitude). Independent variables representing cue type (0 = neutral; 1 = aversive; and 2 =
uncertain) and stimulus type (0 = certain neutral; 1 = certain aversive; 2 = uncertain neutral; 3 =
uncertain aversive) were identified as categorical variables using the CLASS statement (Singer,
1998). SAS treats variables included in the CLASS statement as categorical predictors and
creates internal dummy variables to represent the levels of the variable.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Did participants understand the nature of the stimulus cues? To examine whether
participants understood the nature of the stimulus cues, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted to compare participants online expectancy ratings following neutral (“O”),
aversive (“X”), and uncertainty (“?”) cues. It was expected that participants would self-report
higher expectations for aversive images (higher expectancy ratings) following aversive stimulus
cues than neutral for uncertain and neutral cues. Additionally, expectancy ratings for uncertain
cues were expected to be higher than neutral cues. The model was significant, F(2, 102)
= 361.09, p < .0001, ηp² = .88. Participants expected aversive images to follow from “X” cues
(M = 7.66, s.d. = .90) more than “O” cues (M = 2.19, s.d. = 1.01) and “?” cues (M = 5.70, s.d. =
.854); uncertain cues elicited higher expectancy ratings than neutral cues (both ps < .0001). This
pattern of participant expectancy ratings suggests that participants understood the nature of the
cues.
Specific aim 1: Uncertainty and self-reported appraisal.
Grupe & Nitschke (2011) found that self-reported mood and picture ratings for aversive
images were higher when preceded by uncertainty compared to certainty cues. To gain a more
complete perspective on the nature of uncertainty and stimulus valence on self-reported
appraisal, analyses were conducted to compare the main and interactive effects of stimulus cue
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and stimulus valence on self-reported mood and picture ratings. Both mood and picture ratings
were made on a -4 (“unpleasant/negative”) to +4 (“pleasant/happy”) scale with the midpoint (0)
marked as “neutral”. The means and standard deviations for affect and stimulus ratings across
cue type and stimulus type are depicted in Table 2.

Table 2. Means and standard deviations for affect and stimulus ratings by cue type and stimulus
type.

Stimulus Cue and Valence

Measure

Certain
Neutral

Uncertain
Neutral

Certain
Aversive

Uncertain
Aversive

M

M

M

M

(SD)

(SD)

(SD)

(SD)

Affect Ratings

.61 (.61)

.60 (.69)

-2.29 (.97)

-2.11 (1.06)

Picture Ratings

.72 (.60)

.52 (.56)

-2.40 (.74)

-2.64 (.79)

Notes. Ratings were made on a scale from -4 (unpleasant/negative) to +4 (pleasant/happy) with a
midpoint of 0 labeled “neutral.”

Question 1.1: When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty cues
do they elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant affect) after exposure to the
image than neutral and aversive images preceded by certainty cues? To test whether
aversive and neutral images preceded by uncertainty cues elicited more negative appraisals
(unpleasant affect) after image exposure than when aversive and neutral images were preceded
by certainty cues, a 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, aversive) × 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain)
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on self-reported affect ratings. As expected, the
model indicated a highly significant main effect for image valence [F(1, 51) = 236.80, p < .0001,
ηp²=.82], such that participants reported more unpleasant affect following aversive images (M = 57

2.196, s.d. = .14) compared to neutral images (M = .61, s.d. = .09). This result suggests that the
stimuli influenced self-reported state affect in a way consistent with the valence of the emotional
picture content. There was a not a significant main effect for cue [F(1, 51) = 4.00, p = .051, ηp²
= .07], nor a significant cue × stimulus valence interaction [F(1, 51) = 2.79, p = .10, ηp²= .05],
which indicates that uncertainty did not amplify unpleasant affect following the display of the
emotional stimuli.
Question 1.2: When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty cues do they
elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant stimulus ratings) after exposure to the
image than neutral and aversive images preceded by certainty cues? To examine whether
aversive and neutral images preceded by uncertainty cues elicited more negative perceptual
appraisals (unpleasant image ratings) following image exposure than aversive and neutral images
preceded by certainty cues, an analogous 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, aversive) × 2 (cue type:
certain, uncertain) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on self-reported image ratings.
As with the prior analysis on mood ratings, there was a main effect for stimulus valence, F(1, 51)
= 470.162, p < .0001, ηp² = .90. Participants self-reported perception of aversive images (M = 2.52, s. d. = .10) were more unpleasant than neutral images (M = .62, s.d. = .07). This suggests
participants’ perceptions of the images were consistent with the valence of the emotional images.
There was also highly significant main effect of cue type [F(1, 51) = 16.54, p = .0002, ηp² = .25].
Images were rated as more unpleasant when they were preceded by uncertain (M = -1.06, s.d. =
.06) compared to certain cues (M = -.842, s.d. = .06). This indicates that uncertainty can alter the
appraisal of emotional stimuli by increasing perceptions of unpleasantness. There was not a
significant stimulus valence × cue type interaction [F(1, 51) = .19, p = .66, ηp²= .004], which
suggests the amplification of unpleasantness by uncertainty did not depend on whether the
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stimulus was neutral or aversive. Specific Aim 2: Uncertainty and cortical measures of
stimulus appraisal.
The second specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional
appraisal as indexed by the LPP is largest for aversive and neutral stimuli presented following
uncertainty about the nature of an emotional image stimulus, compared to when participants
know an upcoming emotional image stimulus will be aversive or neutral. Before conducting this
test it was necessary to conduct a region of interest analysis to determine whether the LPP
component is present and sensitive to the emotional valence at electrode locations and time
periods consistent with past research. Following the region of interest analysis, mixed models
will be tested to formally evaluate the questions from specific aim 2.
Preliminary Region of Interest Analysis on the Late Positive Potential. Visual
inspection of the ERP waveforms across electrode sites and stimulus conditions revealed that the
LPP began, on average, ~500ms after stimulus onset and continued, on average, until ~2500ms
after onset. This signal window is generally consistent with past studies using emotional visual
stimuli (e.g., Cuthbert et al., 2000; Hajcak MacNamara, Foti, & Keil, 2011; Weinberg and
Hajcak, 2011, Foti et al., 2010; Schupp et al., 2000). Figure 3 displays the scalp distribution of
grand average LPP waveforms for each stimulus condition across a -100 ms (pre-stimulus) to
2500 ms (post-stimulus) recording period. Fifteen electrode sites of interest were divided into
two independent spatial factors (anteriority and laterality) and one factor representing the early,
middle, and late time windows of the LPP (signal window). Following the recommendations of
Luck (2005), the cue and valence measures were collapsed into one variable (stimulus condition)
to ease interpretation and minimize experimentwise error rate by reducing the number of
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Figure 3. Scalp distribution of grand average LPP waveforms depicting each stimulus condition
across a -100 ms (pre-stimulus) to 2500 ms (post-stimulus) recording period.
60

individual p-value computations (and potentially spurious 4 and 5-way interactions). Once a
region of interest is statistically isolated, subsequent models will be conducted with stimulus
condition variable separated into the cue and valence factors.
To examine the effects of electrode location, signal window, and stimulus condition on
LPP amplitude a 5 [anteriority: frontal (F3, Fz, F4), fronto-central (FC3, FCz, FC4), central (C3,
Cz, C4), centro-parietal (CP3, CPz, CP4), parietal (P3, Pz, P4)] ×3 [laterality: left (F3, FC3, C3,
CP3, P3), midline (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz), right (F4, FC4, C4, CP4, P4)] ×3 (signal window;
500-1000 ms, 1500-2000 ms, 2001-2500 ms) × 4 (stimulus condition: certain-neutral, certainaversive, uncertain-neutral, uncertain-aversive ) repeated measures mixed model using restricted
maximum likelihood estimation (REML) (e.g., Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992) was tested. Means
and standard deviations for average LPP amplitudes during each time window for lefthemisphere, midline, and right-hemisphere electrode sites are depicted in Tables 3-5,
respectively. Parameter estimates for the full model are depicted in Table 6. Figure 4 depicts the
ERP waveforms associated with neutral and aversive images preceded by certain and uncertain
cues at the site CPz in the early, middle, and late signal windows. Figure 5 displays the scalp
topographies at 100ms intervals depicting the time course of the differences in LPP amplitude
between aversive and neutral stimuli. Figure 6 depicts the same information, but for the
difference between aversive stimuli preceded by uncertain cues and aversive stimuli preceded by
certain cues.
Main effects. There were significant main effects for anteriority [F(4, 204) = 297.84, p
<.0001], laterality [F(2, 102) = 14.40, p < .0001], signal window [F(2, 102) = 79.48, p < .0001],
and stimulus condition [F(3, 153) = 112.14, p < .0001]. The main effect of anteriority indicated,
as expected, that LPP amplitude significantly increased at each level of anteriority as electrode
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition
across early, middle, and late signal windows at left-hemisphere electrode positions
Left
Certain
Neutral (0)
M
Frontal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Fronto-central
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Central
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Centro-Parietal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Parietal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms

0.20
-2.20
1.57
1.25

0.87
-1.14
2.03
1.72

1.28
0.54
1.86
1.42

2.54
3.16
2.63
1.82

2.68
4.70
1.99
1.35

(SD)

(4.00)
(3.57)
(3.74)
(3.60)

(3.40)
(2.66)
(3.27)
(3.34)

(2.86)
(2.18)
(2.99)
(3.23)

(3.13)
(2.97)
(3.28)
(3.07)

(3.27)
(3.45)
(2.54)
(2.80)

Certain
Aversive

Uncertain
Neutral

Uncertain
Aversive

M

M

M

(SD)

0.48 (4.48)
-1.67 (4.24)
1.88 (4.29)
1.24 (4.16)

F3
-0.48 (4.73)
-2.11 (3.90)
0.79 (4.95)
-0.10 (4.88)

0.64
-2.06
2.11
1.88

(4.95)
(4.45)
(5.04)
(4.26)

-2.01 (4.03)
1.58 (4.53)
1.07 (4.28)

1.77 (4.02)
0.09 (3.42)
3.04 (4.12)
2.17 (3.95)

FC3
0.53 (4.00)
-0.83 (3.82)
1.44 (3.93)
0.97 (3.95)

1.05
-0.39
2.23
1.31

(4.60)
(3.94)
(4.63)
(4.89)

-0.57 (3.50)
2.18 (4.03)
1.55 (4.07)

2.38 (4.02)
1.87 (3.57)
3.02 (4.24)
2.26 (4.22)

C3
1.18 (4.12)
0.79 (3.66)
1.77 (4.17)
0.98 (4.51)

2.60
1.78
3.44
2.56

(4.09)
(3.73)
(4.33)
(4.11)

1.25 (3.37)
2.52 (4.01)
1.81 (4.07)

3.83 (3.77)
5.02 (3.55)
3.74 (3.82)
2.73 (3.65)

CP3
2.44 (3.75)
3.20 (2.82)
2.54 (3.96)
1.57 (4.23)

4.36
5.32
4.40
3.35

(3.85)
(3.58)
(3.80)
(4.00)

4.17 (3.38)
3.33 (3.78)
2.37 (3.80)

3.83 (4.20)
6.29 (4.20)
2.89 (3.73)
2.30 (3.56)

P3
3.26 (3.64)
4.97 (3.62)
2.73 (3.29)
2.08 (3.43)

3.62
6.33
2.61
1.90

(4.89)
(4.71)
(4.17)
(4.67)

5.57 (4.06)
2.56 (3.48)
1.91 (3.67)

(SD)
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(SD)

Grand
Mean
M

(SD)

Table 4. Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition
across early, middle, and late signal windows at midline electrode positions.

Mid-line
Certain
Neutral (0)
M
Frontal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Fronto-central
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Central
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Centro-Parietal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Parietal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms

-0.20
-2.26
1.20
0.45

0.24
-2.06
1.78
0.99

1.64
0.48
2.58
1.88

2.95
3.10
3.41
2.35

2.96
4.96
2.35
1.57

(SD)

(3.69)
(3.30)
(3.50)
(3.38)

(4.07)
(3.57)
(3.77)
(3.89)

(3.31)
(3.02)
(3.25)
(3.34)

(3.51)
(2.92)
(3.78)
(3.74)

(4.01)
(3.36)
(3.88)
(4.01)

Certain
Aversive

Uncertain
Neutral

Uncertain
Aversive

M

M

M

(SD)

(4.22)
(4.20)
(4.12)
(3.74)

Fz
0.50 (4.05)
-1.20 (3.88)
1.42 (3.75)
1.27 (4.04)

0.50
-1.27
2.21
0.57

(4.85)
(4.91)
(4.66)
(4.40)

-1.41 (4.12)
1.77 (4.03)
0.91 (3.90)

(4.58)
(4.95)
(4.21)
(3.61)

FCz
0.33 (4.26)
-1.70 (4.34)
1.74 (3.79)
0.94 (3.93)

1.61
-0.97
3.76
2.04

(5.57)
(5.84)
(4.95)
(4.91)

-1.36 (4.75)
2.63 (4.27)
1.52 (4.12)

(4.13)
(4.39)
(4.15)
(3.42)

Cz
1.37 (3.79)
0.30 (3.71)
2.19 (3.65)
1.61 (3.82)

4.05
2.37
5.56
4.23

(5.07)
(5.01)
(4.92)
(4.86)

1.32 (4.18)
3.80 (4.26)
2.83 (4.04)

(4.10)
(4.39)
(4.22)
(3.63)

CPz
2.88 (3.82)
2.84 (3.88)
3.37 (3.93)
2.42 (3.67)

5.93
5.30
6.66
5.84

(4.85)
(4.94)
(4.50)
(5.09)

3.97 (4.20)
4.67 (4.31)
3.65 (4.29)

(4.23)
(4.26)
(4.22)
(3.61)

Pz
2.78 (4.38)
4.68 (3.47)
2.21 (4.39)
1.44 (4.60)

5.84
7.63
5.35
4.54

(5.55)
(5.17)
(5.77)
(5.32)

6.07 (4.29)
3.68 (4.80)
2.83 (4.61)

0.90
-0.91
2.27
1.33

1.55
-0.70
3.24
2.12

3.53
2.13
4.86
3.61

4.62
4.62
5.26
3.99

5.19
6.99
4.79
3.79

(SD)

63

(SD)

Grand
Mean
M

(SD)

Table 5. Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition
across early, middle, and late signal windows at right-hemisphere electrode positions.

Right
Certain
Neutral (0)
M
Frontal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Fronto-central
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Central
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Centro-Parietal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms
Parietal
Window
500-1000 ms
1500-2000 ms
2001-2500 ms

-0.02
-2.67
1.45
1.15

0.43
-1.30
1.35
1.25

1.98
0.84
2.68
2.43

2.61
3.19
2.46
2.18

2.58
4.24
1.85
1.63

(SD)

(4.15)
(3.41)
(3.70)
(4.02)

(3.74)
(3.55)
(3.44)
(3.68)

(2.92)
(2.22)
(2.81)
(3.32)

(3.28)
(3.48)
(3.21)
(3.11)

(3.26)
(3.20)
(2.72)
(3.24)

Certain
Aversive

Uncertain
Neutral

Uncertain
Aversive

M

M

M

(SD)

(4.74)
(4.20)
(4.39)
(4.57)

F4
0.33 (4.41)
-2.23 (3.61)
1.78 (3.96)
1.44 (4.51)

0.67
-2.11
2.29
1.82

(5.06)
(4.64)
(4.41)
(4.99)

-2.22 (3.98)
1.95 (4.11)
1.54 (4.51)

(4.36)
(4.49)
(4.13)
(3.89)

FC4
0.62 (4.20)
-1.27 (2.92)
1.62 (4.39)
1.50 (4.51)

2.18
-0.16
3.51
3.18

(4.90)
(4.41)
(4.38)
(5.10)

-0.68 (3.91)
2.39 (4.18)
2.09 (4.37)

(3.19)
(3.61)
(2.91)
(2.52)

C4
1.24 (3.62)
0.44 (3.10)
2.05 (3.58)
1.28 (4.00)

3.85
2.59
4.62
4.34

(3.97)
(3.78)
(3.81)
(4.08)

1.34 (3.32)
3.31 (3.43)
2.74 (3.69)

(4.09)
(4.16)
(4.18)
(3.78)

CP4
2.82 (3.91)
3.38 (3.79)
2.75 (3.66)
2.33 (4.25)

5.00
5.50
5.06
4.44

(4.61)
(4.30)
(4.58)
(4.95)

4.19 (4.03)
3.58 (4.05)
2.97 (4.15)

(4.02)
(4.32)
(3.59)
(3.39)

P4
2.91 (4.18)
4.52 (3.70)
2.24 (4.01)
1.97 (4.42)

4.36
6.27
3.54
3.28

(5.09)
(4.87)
(4.70)
(5.22)

5.19 (4.13)
2.64 (3.85)
2.36 (4.16)

0.73
-1.86
2.28
1.76

1.84
0.00
3.10
2.43

2.78
1.51
3.90
2.99

3.89
4.71
4.05
2.91

3.73
5.72
2.94
2.55

(SD)

64

(SD)

Grand
Mean
M

(SD)

Table 6. Parameter estimates modeling the scalp distribution of LPP amplitudes (µv) across
signal window and stimulus condition.
Effect

df

Anteriority
Laterality
Signal window
Stimulus condition
Anteriority × Laterality
Anteriority × Signal window
Laterality × Signal window
Anteriority × Stimulus condition
Laterality × Stimulus condition
Signal window × Stimulus condition
Anteriority × Laterality × Signal window
Anteriority × Laterality × Stimulus condition
Anteriority × Signal window × Stimulus condition
Laterality × Signal window × Stimulus condition
Anteriority × Laterality × Signal window ×
Stimulus condition

F

p

(4, 204)
(2, 102)
(2, 102)
(3, 153)
(8, 408)

297.84
14.40
79.48
112.14
3.26

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
.0001
.0013

(8, 408)
(4, 204)
(12, 612)
(6, 306)
(6, 306)
(16, 814)
(24, 1222)
(24, 1224)
(12, 612)

103.86
4.88
4.60
4.24
0.82
1.22
1.61
0.28
0.35

<.0001
.0009
<.0001
.0004
.5553
.2458
.1815
.9998
.9797

(48, 2436)

0.19

1.000

Note. Levels of anteriority were frontal, fronto-central, central, centro-parietal, and parietal.
Levels of laterality were left hemisphere, midline, and right hemisphere. Levels of signal
window were early (500ms – 1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).
Levels of stimulus condition were certain-neutral, certain-aversive, uncertain-neutral, and
uncertain-aversive. Tukey-Kramer adjusted p-values are presented.

sites became more posterior (all ps < .0001). The main effect of laterality indicated that
electrodes on the left-side of the midlines had significantly lower LPP amplitudes than midline
and right-lateralized electrode sites (ps < .0006). Midline and electrodes to the right of the
midline were not significantly different from each other (p = .87). The main effect of signal
window revealed significant differences across all three windows. The middle signal window
(1500-1000 ms) had significantly more positive LPP amplitudes than the early (500-1000 ms)
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Figure 4. Grand average LPP waveforms elicited by neutral and aversive images preceded by
certain and uncertain stimulus cues at electrode CPz during the early, middle, and late signal
windows.

and late signal windows (2001-2500 ms); the late signal window had significantly more positive
LPP amplitudes than the early signal window (both ps < .0001). The main effect of stimulus
condition replicated past research indicating LPP amplitude is sensitive to unpleasant, arousing
emotional images (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Hajcak MacNamara, Foti, & Keil, 2011; Weinberg and
Hajcak, 2011, Foti et al., 2010; Schupp et al., 2000). Irrespective of cue type, aversive images
(certain: M = 2.74, s.d. = 4.39; and uncertain: M = 3.09, s.d. = 5.15) elicited significantly higher
LPP amplitudes compared to neutral images (certain: M = 1.52, s.d. = 3.70; and uncertain
images: M =1.52, s.d. = 4.22, all ps < .0001). Importantly, aversive images preceded by
uncertainty cues evoked significantly more positive deflections of LPP amplitude than aversive
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Early Signal Window

Middle Signal Window
+4.0
+2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0

Late Signal Window

Figure 5. Scalp topographies depicting differences in late positive potential amplitudes between
aversive and neutral images at every 100 ms interval within the early, middle and late signal
windows.
Note. Blue = negative amplitude; Red = positive amplitude.
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Early Signal Window

Middle Signal Window
+2.0
+1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0

Late Signal Window

Figure 6. Scalp topographies depicting differences in late positive potential amplitudes between
aversive images elicited by uncertainty and certainty cues at every 100 ms during the early,
middle and late signal windows.
Note. Blue = negative amplitude; Red = positive amplitude.
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images preceded by certainty cues (p = .01). This suggests that stimulus uncertainty amplified
the LPP amplitudes elicited by motivationally relevant aversive stimuli. No differences were
observed between neutral stimuli when preceded by uncertainty and certainty cues (p = .77).
Two-way interactions. There was a significant anteriority × stimulus window
interaction, F(8, 408) = 103.86, p < .0001. LPP amplitudes during the early signal window (5001000 ms) were significantly less positive than the middle (1500-2000 ms) and late (2001-2500
ms) signal windows across frontal, frontocentral, and central regions (all ps < .0001). At central
and centro-parietal the regions, the early and middle signal windows had higher amplitudes than
the late window (all ps > .04), and the early window. There was no difference in LPP amplitude
during the early and middle signal windows. At parietal sites, LPP amplitudes were larger
during the early window, compared to the middle and late windows (all ps < .0001).
A significant laterality × stimulus window interaction [F(4, 204) = 4.88, p = .0009]
indicated that during the early signal window LPP amplitudes were largest at mid-line electrodes
compared to left and right lateralized electrodes (all ps > .001). The left and right hemispheres
did not differ in LPP amplitude during the early window. During the middle window, midline
electrode sites had significantly higher LPP amplitudes than left and right-lateralize sites (both ps
< .0001), and there was a significant hemispheric difference indicating larger LPP amplitudes at
right lateralized electrodes (p = .005). During the late window, this right sided preponderance
was sustained: LPP amplitudes were larger at midline and right-side electrodes compared to leftsided electrodes (both ps < .0001), but there was not a significant difference between midline and
right-sided electrodes, p = .17.
A significant anteriority × stimulus condition interaction indicated the effect of stimulus
condition on LPP amplitude was different across levels of anteriority, F(12, 612) = 5.28, p <
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.0001. At frontal sites, there were no significant differences in LPP amplitude due to stimulus
condition (all ps > .58). However, LPPs elicited by certain and uncertain aversive images had
higher LPP amplitudes than certain and uncertain neutral images at each level of anteriority from
fronto-central to parietal scalp regions (all ps < .0001). At the centro-parietal midline there was
evidence to suggest LPPs in response to aversive stimuli are amplified by uncertainty (see Figure
4). Across the centro-parietal leads, LPP amplitude elicited by aversive images were
significantly larger when preceded by uncertainty cues (M = 5.10; s.d. = 4.50) compared to when
they were preceded by certainty cues (M = 4.11, s.d. = 4.00, p = .01). This effect did not emerge
at other scalp regions. Certainty and uncertainty cues did not influence LPP responses to neutral
images at any region.
A significant laterality × stimulus condition interaction [F(6, 306) = 4.24, p = .0004)
revealed that aversive images preceded by certain and uncertain cues were larger than neutral
images across all electrode locations (all ps < .0003). Neutral images were not different across
cue type. At right-lateralized scalp regions, aversive images preceded by uncertainty cues were
significantly larger than those preceded by certainty cues, p = .05. Three-way and four-way
interactions were not significant (all ps > .18).
In summary, these results are consistent with previous research that has indicated the
greatest magnitude LPPs in response to emotional stimuli occur at centro-parietal and parietal
regions during the processing of affective pictures (e.g., Cuthbert et al., 2000; Ferrari, Bradley &
Lang, 2011; Hajcak, MacNamara, Foti & Keil, 2011; Schupp et al., 2000). The results suggest
that during the early stimulus window, LPP amplitude was maximal and most sensitive to
stimulus condition at the centro-parietal midline (CPz). During the middle window, the LPP
began to take on a right-hemisphere preponderance at CP4, but was statistically equivalent with
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CPz in amplitude and sensitivity to stimulus condition. These results are consistent with the
scalp distribution depicted in the Figure 3, and time course of the LPP as depicted in Figures 5
and 6. In what follows, models of the LPP will be tested at electrode sites CPz and CP4.
Questions 2.1 and 2.2: Do certain and uncertain aversive images elicit larger LPP
amplitudes than certain and uncertain neutral images? Do uncertainty-cued aversive and
neutral images elicit larger LPP amplitudes than certainty-cued aversive and neutral
stimuli? To formally address the questions from specific aim 2, whether aversive images
elicited larger LPP amplitudes than neutral images (Question 2.1), and whether stimulus
uncertainty elicited larger LPP amplitudes than stimulus certainty (Question 2.2), I conducted a 2
(electrode site: CPz, CP4) × 3 (signal window: early, middle, late) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral,
aversive) × 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain) repeated measures mixed model using restricted
maximum likelihood estimation, with all independent variables entered as repeated measures.
Table 7 displays the parameter estimates for the full mixed model. Means and standard
deviations are available in Tables 4-6.
Main effects. There was a significant main effect for electrode site [F(1, 51) = 8.27, p =
.006], and Tukey-Kramer adjusted post-hoc comparisons indicated LPP amplitudes were higher
at electrode site CPz than CP4, t(51) = 2.88, p = .006. There were also significant main effects
for Stimulus cue [F(1, 51) = 12.64, p = .0008] and Stimulus valence, F(1, 51) = 130.07, p <
.0001. As expected, stimuli preceded by uncertainty cues elicited significantly larger LPP
amplitudes than when stimuli were preceded by certainty cues, t(51) = -3.56, p = .0008.
Aversive stimuli elicited significantly larger LPP amplitudes than neutral stimuli [t(51) = -11.41,
p < .0001], which was also expected. There was not a main effect of signal window, F (2, 102) =
1.62, p = .20.
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Table 7. Parameter estimates modeling the effects of signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus
valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4.

Effect

df

F

p

Electrode
Signal window
Stimulus cue
Stimulus valence
Electrode × Signal window

(1, 51)
(2, 102)
(1, 51)
(1, 51)
(2, 102)

8.27
1.62
12.64
130.07
5.43

.0059
.2034
.0008
<.0001
.0057

Electrode × Stimulus cue
Electrode × Stimulus valence
Signal window × Stimulus cue
Signal window × Stimulus valence
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
Electrode × Signal window × Stimulus cue
Electrode × Signal window × Stimulus valence
Electrode × Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
Signal window × Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
Electrode × Signal window × Stimulus cue ×
Stimulus valence

(1, 51)
(1, 51)
(2, 102)
(2, 102)
(1, 51)
(2, 102)
(2, 102)
(1, 51)
(2, 102)

0.01
3.08
0.88
0.38
10.16
0.13
0.62
0.46
0.45

.9059
.0854
.4167
.6833
.0024
.8803
.5418
.5011
.6404

(2, 102)

0.03

.9715

Notes. Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4. Levels of signal window were early (500ms –
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms). Levels of stimulus cue were
certain and uncertain. Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral. Tukey-Kramer
adjusted p-values are presented.

Two-way interactions. There was a significant Electrode × Signal window interaction,
F(2, 102) = 5.43, p = .006. Tukey-Kramer post-hoc tests indicated no differences in LPP
amplitude between electrode sites CPz and CP4 during the early signal window [t(102) = -.87, p
= .95], but during the middle [t(102) = 3.33, p = .001] and late signal windows [t(102) = 2.03, p
= .045], LPP amplitudes were larger at CPz compared to CP4.
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The significant main effects for stimulus cue and stimulus valence were qualified by a
significant stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction on LPP amplitude, F(1, 51) = 10.16, p =
.002. An examination of the simple effects of this interaction indicated that when stimuli were of
neutral valence, there were no differences in LPP amplitude due to stimulus cue, t(51) = -.26, p =
.99). However, when stimulus valence was aversive, uncertainty cues elicited significantly
larger LPP amplitudes than certainty cues, t(51) = -4.77, p < .0001.
In sum, results these results provide robust support for specific aim 2. Aversive stimuli
elicited larger LPP amplitudes than neutral stimuli, and uncertainty cues elicited larger LPP
amplitudes than certainty cues (i.e. main effects). Consistent with past research, uncertainty cues
were found to increase negative appraisals of unpleasant stimuli. There were no other significant
2-way, 3-way, or 4-way interaction terms (see Table 7).
Specific aim 3. Mindfulness and self-reported stimulus appraisal.
The third specific aim of the present study was to determine whether trait mindfulness
would predict more benign appraisals - less unpleasant affect and less unpleasant stimulus
ratings - following the display of uncertain stimulus cues. To provide additional support, traits
that contrast with mindfulness, including uncertainty-distress and anxiety-related traits, were
tested and expected to increase unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued
aversive and neutral images, compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images.
Preliminary assessment of psychological trait relations. Prior to conducting these
tests, I examined the correlations between each of the individual difference measures to ensure
all traits were related in the expected directions. The MAAS and FFMQ were highly correlated
(r51= .79, p < .0001), as were measures of uncertainty distress (the IUS and URS; r51 = .84, p <
.0001). Anxiety-related traits were also intercorrelated as expected. Neuroticism scores were
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highly correlated with the BDI and the PSWQ (r51 = .61 and r51 = .62, respectively; ps < .0001),
and the PSWQ was related to the BDI, r51 = .32, p = .02. Correlations between measures of
mindfulness with uncertainty-distress and anxiety-related traits are depicted in Table 8. As
expected, the correlations between the MAAS, FFMQAW, and ACS attentional control were
inversely related with measures of uncertainty distress (IUS and URS measures) and all three
anxiety-related traits (NEO neuroticism, PSWQ, BDI depression).

Table 8. Correlations between measures of mindfulness, uncertainty distress, and anxiety
related traits.

Trait variables

MAAS mindfulness
FFMQ awareness

Uncertainty distress

Anxiety

IUS
uncertainty

URS
emotion

NEO-FFI
neuroticism

PSWQ
worry

BDI
depression

-.61***
-.40*

-.63***
-.50**

-.60***
-.64***

-.55***
-.54***

-.57***
-.61***

Notes. N = 52 (n = 50 for IUS and URS). MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; FFMQ
= Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire; ACS = Attention Control Scale; IUS = Intolerance of
Uncertainty Scale; URS = Uncertainty Response Scale; NEO-FFI = Neuroticism Extroversion
Openness-Five Factor Inventory; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI = Beck
Depression Inventory.
*
P < 0.01, **P < 0.001, ***P < 0.0001

Question 3.1: Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant affect following
uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and
neutral images? To directly test whether trait mindfulness predicted lower unpleasant affect
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and
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neutral images, I conducted a 2 separate 2 (cue type: 0 = certain, 1 = uncertain) × 2 (stimulus
valence: 0 = neutral, 1 = aversive) repeated measures mixed models with restricted maximum
likelihood estimation, with each model covarying one measure of mindfulness.
In both models testing whether MAAS and FFMQAW mindfulness would reduce
unpleasant affect following emotional stimulus exposure, there were no significant effects
besides the main effect for stimulus valence described earlier when testing specific aim 1 (all ps
> .39). That is, aversive images elicited higher self-reported unpleasant affect compared to
neutral images, and uncertainty cues elicited more unpleasant affect than certainty cues, but there
were no significant main or interaction effects for MAAS or FFMQAW mindfulness. This
suggests that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that mindfulness ameliorates negative
affect following stimulus exposure.
Question 3.2. Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant stimulus ratings
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued
aversive and neutral images? Analogous mixed models to those tested in Question 3.1 were
conducted to determine whether mindfulness may reduce unpleasant perceptions of the images,
as indicated in post-stimulus picture ratings. That is, 2 separate 2 (cue type: 0 = certain, 1 =
uncertain) × 2 (stimulus valence: 0 = neutral, 1 = aversive) repeated measures mixed models
with restricted maximum likelihood estimation were conducted, with each model covarying one
measure of mindfulness. There were significant main effects for cue type [F(1, 49) = 5.09, p =
.03] and stimulus valence [F(1, 49) = 1116.94, p < .0001], but there were no significant main
effects for the MAAS or FFMQAW (ps > .12), nor any significant interaction effects (all ps >
.26). In sum, there was no evidence to suggest that dispositional mindfulness ameliorated the
influence of stimulus valence and cue-type on post-stimulus picture ratings.
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Question 3.3. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness (measures of uncertainty
distress and anxiety-related traits) predict higher unpleasant affect following uncertaintycued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images?
To assess whether traits that contrast with mindfulness would predict higher unpleasant affect
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and
neutral images, repeated measures mixed models with restricted maximum likelihood estimation
were conducted similar to those above. Five independent 2 (cue type: certainty, uncertainty) × 2
(stimulus valence: neutral, aversive) mixed models, were conducted with one trait entered as a
covariate in each model. The first two models covaried measures of uncertainty distress (the IUS
and URS, respectively), and the latter three models covaried anxiety related traits (NEO
neuroticism, PSWQ worry, and BDI depression, respectively).
The first two mixed models covarying measures of uncertainty distress (IUS intolerance
of uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty) yielded no significant main effects
or interactions on post-stimulus affect ratings (all ps > .27). Likewise, there were no significant
main or interaction effects for NEO-FFI neuroticism on post-stimulus affect ratings (ps > .10).
The latter two models testing PSWQ worry and BDI depression on affect ratings yielded no
significant main effects (ps > .25), but there was a significant PSWQ worry × stimulus valence
interaction [F(1, 138) = 9.98, p = .002] and a significant BDI depression × stimulus valence
interaction with post-stimulus affect ratings, F(1, 144) = 3.75, p = .05.
Figure 7 depicts the interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on poststimulus affect ratings, and Figure 8 depicts the interaction between stimulus valence and BDI
depression and on post-stimulus affect ratings. The slopes of the regression lines predicting
post-stimulus mood ratings with PSWQ worry were significantly different for neutral and
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Figure 7. Interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on post-stimulus affect
ratings.
Note. PSWQ Worry scores were group-mean centered. Mood Rating (-4 = unpleasant/negative;
0 = neutral; 4 = pleasant/happy).

aversive images. As is evident in Figure 7, post-stimulus affect ratings following aversive
pictures became more unpleasant as PSWQ worry scores increased. However, post-stimulus
mood ratings following neutral images became more positive as PSWQ worry scores increased.
This similar pattern was found for BDI depression. This evidence suggests that heightened
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Figure 8. Interaction between stimulus valence and BDI depression on post-stimulus affect
ratings.
Note. BDI depression scores were group-mean centered. Mood Rating (-4 =
unpleasant/negative; 0 = neutral; 4 = pleasant/happy).

predispositions of worry and depression are related to greater unpleasant affect following the
display of aversive stimuli, compared to neutral stimuli.
Question 3.4. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher unpleasant
stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to
certainty-cued aversive and neutral images? To examine whether traits that contrast with
mindfulness would predict higher unpleasant stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued
aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images, an
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analogous sequence of 5 repeated measure mixed models was conducted on post-stimulus picture
ratings. Each of the five 2 (cue type: certainty, uncertainty) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral,
aversive) repeated measures mixed models, were conducted with one trait entered as a covariate
in each model. The first two models covaried measures of uncertainty distress (the IUS and
URS, respectively), and the latter three models covaried anxiety related traits (NEO neuroticism,
PSWQ worry, and BDI depression, respectively).
There were no significant main or interaction effects with IUS intolerance of uncertainty
or URS emotional responses to uncertainty on picture ratings (all ps > .14). There were also no
main or interaction effects for BDI depression or NEO-FFI neuroticism (all ps > .11). The model
testing PSWQ worry indicated no significant main effect for worry, but there was a significant
PSWQ worry × stimulus valence interaction on post-stimulus picture ratings, F(1, 138) = 9.49, p
= .003.
Figure 9 depicts the interaction between stimulus valence × PSWQ Worry on poststimulus picture ratings. Consistent with the model tested on affect ratings in Question 3.3, the
slopes of the regression lines predicting post-stimulus picture ratings were significantly different
for neutral and aversive valence categories. Post-stimulus picture ratings for aversive stimuli
were more unpleasant as PSWQ increased, but post-stimulus picture ratings for neutral stimuli
became more positive as PSWQ increased.
In summary, the results of tests related to specific aim 3 indicated that there was no
evidence to suggest that dispositional mindfulness blunted self-reported negative appraisals in
response to the emotional images, with no significant effects of dispositional mindfulness on
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Figure 9. Interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on post-stimulus picture
ratings.
Note. PSWQ Worry scores were group-mean centered. Mood Rating (-4 = unpleasant/negative;
0 = neutral; 4 = pleasant/happy).

post-stimulus self-reported affect or post-stimulus self-reported image ratings. However, two
anxiety-related traits – PSWQ worry and BDI depression – did account for significant variability
in emotional appraisal processes. A heightened predisposition to worry, as captured by the
PSWQ worry scale, was predictive of significantly higher self-reported post-stimulus unpleasant
affect and image ratings, and higher levels of BDI depression was associated with greater selfreported post-stimulus unpleasant affect following aversive images.
Specific aim 4. Mindfulness and a cortical measure of stimulus appraisal.
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The fourth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether dispositional
mindfulness was predictive of attenuated LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli relative to
neutral stimuli under conditions of uncertainty and certainty, during an early time period (5001000ms) of the LPP. To address questions 4.1 and 4.2, I conducted a sequence of 2 (electrode
site: CPz, CP4) × 3 (signal window: early, middle, late) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, aversive)
× 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain) repeated measures mixed model using restricted maximum
likelihood estimation, with each of the individual difference variables sensitive to mindfulness
(Question 4.1) and traits that contrast with mindfulness (Question 4.2) entered as a covariate in
separate models. Means and standard deviations are available in Tables 3-7.
Question 4.1. Is trait mindfulness associated with lower deflections of the LPP
following aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by uncertainty and
certainty cues? To address whether trait mindfulness was associated with lower deflections of
the LPP following aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by uncertainty and
certainty cues, two mixed models were conducted (factors specified above) with each model
covarying MAAS and FFMQAW measures, respectively. Figure 10 depicts the average LPP
waveforms evoked by each stimulus condition across all three stimulus windows for participants
higher and lower in MAAS mindfulness (as derived by a median split) at electrode sites CPz and
CP4.
MAAS mindfulness on LPP amplitude. Significant parameter estimates for the model
testing the effect of MAAS dispositional mindfulness on signal window, stimulus cue and
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Figure 10. Grand average LPP waveforms at electrode locations CPz and CP4 elicited by certain
and uncertain aversive and neutral visual stimuli, shown separately for high and low MAAS
mindfulness groups created by a median split.
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Table 9. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of MAAS mindfulness, signal
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4.

Effect

Df

Electrode
Electrode × Signal window
Stimulus cue
Stimulus valence
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
MAAS
MAAS × Stimulus valence

F

p

(1, 51)
(2, 102)
(1, 51)
(1, 51)
(1, 51)

8.32
5.49
12.72
130.91
10.23

.0057
.0054
.0008
<.0001
.0024

(1, 50)
(1, 1150)

5.22
18.78

.0266
<.0001

Notes. Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4. Levels of signal window were early (500ms –
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms). Levels of stimulus cue were
certain and uncertain. Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral. Tukey-Kramer
adjusted p-values are presented.

stimulus valence at electrodes CPz and CP4 are depicted in Table 9. Model parameters not
involving mindfulness were consistent with those previously reported in Question 2.1, so the
present results will focus on mindfulness-related effects of interest. There was a significant main
effect of MAAS dispositional mindfulness, F(1, 50) = 5.22, p = .02. In contrast to my
expectations and past research on mindfulness and the LPP (Brown et al., 2013), higher levels of
dispositional mindfulness were associated with larger deflections of the LPP. There was also a
significant MAAS × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1150) = 18.78, p < .0001. Figure 11
displays the interaction between MAAS dispositional mindfulness and stimulus valence on LPP
amplitude. The slopes of the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude by MAAS were
significantly different due to the valence of the stimulus. For aversive stimuli, higher levels of
MAAS dispositional mindfulness predicted more positive deflections of the LPP. For neutral
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Figure 11. Interaction between stimulus valence and MAAS mindfulness on LPP amplitude
(µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows.

stimuli, slope of the line predicting LPP amplitude by mindfulness was significantly less
positive. There were no other significant interaction effects involving the MAAS.
FFMQAW mindfulness on LPP amplitude. A second analogous model was conducted to
examine the effect of FFMQAW mindfulness on LPP amplitude, and the findings were consistent
with the model testing the MAAS. Significant parameter estimates for the model testing the
effect of FFMQAW dispositional mindfulness on signal window, stimulus cue and stimulus
valence at electrodes CPz and CP4 are depicted in Table 10. There was a significant main effect
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of FFMQAW mindfulness, F(1, 50) = 13.00, p = .0007. As with the MAAS, higher levels of
FFMQAW mindfulness were associated with larger deflections of the LPP. There was also a
significant FFMQAW × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1127) = 10.93, p = .001. Figure 12
displays the interaction between FFMQAW dispositional mindfulness and stimulus valence. The
slopes of the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude by FFMQAW were significantly different
due to the valence of the stimulus. For aversive stimuli, higher levels of FFMQAW dispositional
mindfulness predicted more positive deflections of the LPP. For neutral stimuli, the slope of the
line predicting LPP amplitude by FFMQAW mindfulness was significantly less positive. There
were no other significant interaction effects involving the FFMQAW.

Table 10. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of FFMQAW mindfulness, signal
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4.

Effect

Df

Electrode
Electrode × Signal window
Stimulus cue
Stimulus valence
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
FFMQAW
FFMQAW × Stimulus valence

F

p

(1, 50)
(2, 100)
(1, 50)
(1, 50)
(1, 50)

7.38
1.68
12.28
127.80
9.64

.0009
.1923
.0010
<.0001
.0031

(1, 50)
(1, 1127)

13.00
10.93

.0007
<.0010

Notes. Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4. Levels of signal window were early (500ms –
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms). Levels of stimulus cue were
certain and uncertain. Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral. Tukey-Kramer
adjusted p-values are presented.
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Figure 12. Interaction between stimulus valence and FFMQAW mindfulness on LPP amplitude
(µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows.

Correlations between mindfulness and LPP amplitude. Table 11 shows the pattern of
correlations for MAAS and FFMQAW mindfulness at electrode site CPz. The effects for stimulus
condition were consistent with earlier models: uncertain and certain-cued aversive stimuli
elicited significantly larger deflections of the LPP compared to neutral images (ps < .0001). LPP
amplitudes were also significantly greater when aversive images were preceded by uncertainty
compared to certainty cues (ps < .0001). Both the MAAS and FFMQAW were predictors of
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Table 11. Correlations between LPP amplitude (µv) and mindfulness at electrode site CPz.
Certain
Neutral
MAAS mindfulness
Early (500-1000 ms)
Middle (1500-2000 ms)
Late (2001-2500 ms)
Full window
FFMQ awareness
Early
Middle
Late
Full window

Uncertain Certain
Neutral
Aversive

Uncertain
Aversive

.24
-.06

.25
.08

.30*
.08

.30*
.14

.03

.06

.13

.20

.05

.12

.17

.21

.17
.03

.14
.11

.18
.14

.18
.18

.14
.15

.21
.15

.22
.11

.29*
.22

Notes. N = 52. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; FFMQ = Five-Factor
Mindfulness Questionnaire Act with Awareness . *P < 0.05

positive LPP amplitude during the early window, indicating that higher mindfulness was
associated with larger deflections of the LPP, and for the MAAS this positive relation was
particularly strong for certain and uncertain aversive stimuli compared to neutral stimuli.
Question 4.2. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher LPP
deflections elicited by aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by
uncertainty and certainty cues? To determine whether traits that contrast with mindfulness
predict higher LPP deflections elicited by aversive images relative to neutral images when
preceded by uncertainty and certainty cues, 5 models were conducted similar to the two above
that tested mindfulness, with each model covarying one psychological trait. A sequence of 2
(electrode site: CPz, CP4) × 3 (signal window: early, middle, late) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral,
aversive) × 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain) repeated measures mixed models using restricted
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maximum likelihood estimation were tested, with each of the 5 individual difference variables
sensitive to uncertainty distress and anxiety-related traits entered into separate models as
covariates.
IUS intolerance of uncertainty on LPP amplitude. The model testing IUS intolerance of
uncertainty indicated no main effect for the IUS, F(1, 48) = 0.94, p = .34. However, there was a
significant IUS × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1104) = 9.40, p = .0022. Table 12 depicts all
the significant parameter estimates for the model and Figure 13 displays the interaction between
IUS intolerance of uncertainty and stimulus valence. The slopes of the regression lines
predicting LPP amplitude by IUS intolerance of uncertainty were significantly different due to

Table 12. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of IUS intolerance of uncertainty,
signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz
and CP4.

Effect

df

Electrode
Electrode × Signal window
Stimulus cue
Stimulus valence
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
IUS × Stimulus valence

F

p

(1, 49)
(2, 98)
(1, 49)
(1, 49)
(1, 49)

10.20
4.64
12.89
126.21
10.49

.0025
.0118
.0008
<.0001
.0022

(1, 1104)

9.40

.0022

Notes. Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4. Levels of signal window were early (500ms –
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms). Levels of stimulus cue were
certain and uncertain. Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral. Tukey-Kramer
adjusted p-values are presented.
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the valence of the stimulus. For aversive stimuli, higher levels of IUS intolerance of uncertainty
were associated with smaller deflections of the LPP. For neutral stimuli, slope of the line
predicting LPP amplitude was significantly more positive, with higher IUS intolerance of
uncertainty scores predicting larger deflections of the LPP. Thus, IUS intolerance for
uncertainty was predictive of LPP amplitude in the direction opposite of both measures of
mindfulness.

Figure 13. Interaction between stimulus valence and IUS intolerance of uncertainty on LPP
amplitude (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows.
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URS emotional responses to uncertainty on LPP amplitude. The model testing URS
emotional responses to uncertainty indicated no significant main effect for the URS [F(1, 48) =
1.74, p = .19], but there were significant URS × Electrode [F(1, 1104) = 7.69, p = .006] and URS
× stimulus valence interactions, F(1, 1104) = 5.68, p = .02. No other interaction effects with the
URS were significant. Table 13 depicts all the significant parameter estimates for the model.

Table 13. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of URS emotional responses to
uncertainty, signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at
electrodes CPz and CP4.
Effect

df

F

p

Electrode
Electrode × Signal window
Stimulus cue
Stimulus valence

(1, 49)
(2, 98)
(1, 49)
(1, 49)

10.18
4.65
12.86
126.00

.0025
.0118
.0008
<.0001

Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence

(1, 49)

10.47

.0022

(1, 1104)
(1, 1104)

7.69
5.68

.0057
.0173

URS × Electrode
URS × Stimulus valence

Notes. Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4. Levels of signal window were early (500ms –
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms). Levels of stimulus cue were
certain and uncertain. Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral. Tukey-Kramer
adjusted p-values are presented.

Decomposing the URS × Electrode interaction indicated that the URS was more strongly
related to LPP amplitudes at CPz, compared to CP4. The URS × stimulus valence interaction
indicated similar effects to those of IUS intolerance of uncertainty. Figure 14 displays the
interaction between URS emotional responses to uncertainty and stimulus valence. The slopes of
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Figure 14. Interaction between stimulus valence and URS emotional responses to uncertainty on
LPP amplitude (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows.

the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude URS emotional responses to uncertainty were
significantly different due to the valence of the stimulus. For aversive stimuli, higher levels of
IUS intolerance of uncertainty were associated with smaller deflections of the LPP. For neutral
stimuli, slope of the line predicting LPP amplitude was significantly more positive, with higher
IUS intolerance of uncertainty scores predicting larger deflections of the LPP.
NEO neuroticism on LPP amplitude. The model testing NEO neuroticism indicated no
significant main effect for the neuroticism [F(1, 50) = 0.97, p = .33], but there was a significant
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neuroticism × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1150) = 10.40, p = .001. No other interaction
effects with the neuroticism were significant. Significant parameter estimates are displayed in
Table 14 and the interaction between NEO neuroticism and stimulus valence is depicted in
Figure 15. Consistent with findings from models testing measures of uncertainty distress, the
slopes of the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude from with neuroticism were significantly
different. For aversive stimuli, higher levels of neuroticism predicted smaller deflections of the
LPP. For neutral stimuli, slope of the line predicting LPP amplitude was significantly more
positive, with higher neuroticism scores predicting larger deflections of the LPP.

Table 14. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of NEO neuroticism, signal
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4.
Effect

df

Electrode
Electrode × Signal window
Stimulus cue
Stimulus valence
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
NEO neuroticism × Stimulus valence

F

p

(1, 51)
(2, 102)
(1, 51)
(1, 51)
(1, 51)

8.24
5.42
12.60
129.62
10.13

.0060
.0058
.0008
<.0001
.0025

(1, 1150)

10.40

.0013

Notes. Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4. Levels of signal window were early (500ms –
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms). Levels of stimulus cue were
certain and uncertain. Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral. Tukey-Kramer
adjusted p-values are presented.
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Figure 15. Interaction between stimulus valence and NEO neuroticism on LPP amplitude (µv) at
electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows.

PSWQ worry on LPP amplitude. The model covarying PSWQ worry indicated no
significant main or interaction effects involving worry (all ps > .16).
BDI depression on LPP amplitude. The model testing BDI depression indicated no
significant main effect for depression [F(1, 50) = 0.93, p = .34], but there were significant
depression × electrode [F(1, 1150) = 8.41, p = .004], and depression × electrode × valence
interactions, F(1, 1150) = 6.37, p = .0118 . No other interaction effects with the depression were
significant. Significant parameter estimates are displayed in Table 15. The differences in slopes
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between neutral and aversive stimuli by BDI depression were significantly different at electrodes
CPz and CP4. Plots depicting this depression × electrode × stimulus valence interaction are
depicted in Figure 16. At electrode CPz, there was not a significant depression × stimulus
valence interaction, F(1, 550) = .35, p = .56. That is, the slopes of the regression lines predicting
LPP amplitude by BDI depression were not difference across the two stimulus valences. At the
right-sided electrode site CP4, however, the BDI depression × stimulus valence interaction was
highly significant [F(1, 550) = 12.62, p = .0004], which indicates the slopes of the regression
lines predicting LPP amplitude by BDI depression were significantly different for neutral
compared to aversive stimuli. For aversive stimuli, higher BDI depression scores were
associated with smaller deflections of the LPP. For neutral stimuli, higher BDI depression scores
were associated with larger deflections of the LPP.

Table 15. Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of BDI depression, signal
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4.
Effect

Df

Electrode
Electrode × Signal window
Stimulus cue
Stimulus valence
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence
BDI depression × Electrode
BDI depression × Electrode × Stimulus valence

F

p

(1, 51)
(2, 102)
(1, 51)
(1, 51)
(1, 51)

8.28
5.44
12.67
130.33
10.18

.0058
.0057
.0008
<.0001
.0024

(1, 1150)
(1, 1150)

8.41
6.37

.0038
.0118

Notes. Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4. Levels of signal window were early (500ms –
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms). Levels of stimulus cue were
certain and uncertain. Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral. Tukey-Kramer
adjusted p-values are presented.
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Figure 16. Interaction between stimulus valence and BDI depression on LPP amplitude (µv) at
electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows.
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Summary of findings addressing Specific Aim 4. In contrast to my expectations and
past research (Brown et al., 2013), trait mindfulness as measured by both the MAAS and
FFMQAW were directly related to LPP amplitude, such that higher levels of dispositional
mindfulness were associated with larger deflections of the LPP elicited by aversive picture
content. There were no significant effects due to the stimulus window, however, the correlation
between the MAAS and FFMQAW measures had the most robust relations with LPP amplitude
during the early stimulus window. Two measures of uncertainty distress (IUS intolerance of
uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty) and two measures of anxiety-related
traits (NEO neuroticism and BDI depression) predicted opposite patterns of association with
mindfulness and predicted lower LPP amplitudes elicited by aversive stimuli relative to neutral
stimuli. There were no significant interactive effects between psychological traits and stimulus
cue on LPP amplitude, which suggests there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that these
psychological traits modulate the effect of stimulus uncertainty on a neural marker of emotional
stimulus appraisal.
Specific Aim 5. Uncertainty and Self-reported Stimulus Anticipation.
The fifth aim of the present research was to replicate demonstrate a priori and online
covariation biases amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the display of
unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty. Before examining this question, I conducted
preliminary tests to demonstrate the presence of covariation biases. Then I examined whether a
priori and online covariation biases predicted higher self-reported unpleasant affect (Question
5.1) and higher self-reported unpleasant image ratings (Question 5.2) following the presentation
of neutral and aversive images under conditions of uncertainty, relative to certainty. The
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correlations between each measure of covariation bias and post-stimulus affect and picture
ratings are depicted in Tables 16 and 17, respectively.

Table 16. Correlations between covariation biases and post-stimulus affect ratings.
Covariation bias

CN

CA

UN

UA

A priori
Online
Post-experiment

-.09
.17
.07

-.23
.23
-.33*

-.07
.07
.13

-.25
.15
-.31*

Notes. n = 48 for post-experiment covariation bias). CN = certain-neutral; CA = certain
aversive; UA = uncertain aversive.
*
P < 0.05

Table 17. Correlations between covariation biases and post-stimulus picture ratings.
Covariation bias

CN

CA

UN

UA

A priori
Online
Post-experiment

.10
-.03
.10

-.23
.14
-.33*

.08
.06
.04

-.23
.22
-.20

Notes. N = 52 (n = 48 for post-experiment covariation bias). CN = certain-neutral; CA = certain
aversive; UA = uncertain aversive.
*
P < 0.05

Preliminary analysis: Did participants demonstrate a priori, online, and a posteriori
covariation biases? To demonstrate the presence of a priori and online covariation biases, two
one-sample t-tests were conducted comparing expectancy ratings to the first “?” cue and online
expectancy ratings (the mean expectancy rating following all but the first uncertain cue) to a
value of 5, which was the mid-point on the rating scale labeled as “uncertain.” On average,
97

participants were more likely to expect aversive images following the first uncertain cue [(M =
5.56, s.d. = 1.70), t(51) = 2.37, p=.022, ηp² = .09], which indicates the presence of an a priori
covariation bias to associate uncertainty with aversion. Evidence for an online expectancy bias
was also found. When participants were presented with uncertainty cues they expected aversive
images would follow significantly more than their actual rate of 50% (M = 5.70, s.d. = .85), t(51)
= 5.88, p < .0001, ηp² = .40. To test whether participants baseline a priori covariation biases
were amplified as they proceeded through the experiment, a priori and online covariation biases
were compared using a paired-samples t-test; the test was not significant, t(51) = -.553, p = .58.
To assess post-experiment covariation bias participants were asked to estimate the percentage of
“?” cues that were followed by aversive pictures after they completed the experiment. A onesample t-test was conducted comparing these retrospective estimates to their actual rate of
appearance (50%), but there wasn’t sufficient evidence of a post-experiment covariation bias.2
Participants’ post-experiment judgments (M = 53.83, s.d. = 15.17) were not different from a rate
of 50%, t(47) = 1.731, p = .09, ηp² = .06. The lack of post-experiment covariation bias is
consistent with the findings of Grupe et al. (2011). However, these and other authors (Amin &
Lovibond, 1998) have found significant relations between online and post-experiment estimates
of covariation bias. The present study replicated this finding (r48 = -.30, p = .04). This relation
suggests that the magnitude of online covariation bias to expect aversive images to follow
uncertainty cues was associated with heightened retrospective estimates of the proportion of
uncertain cues followed by aversive pictures.
Question 5.1. Do anticipations, or expectations to associate uncertain cues with
unpleasant outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict more unpleasant affect
Five participants did not respond to the post-experiment covariation bias item, leaving a sample
of n=48 for analysis.
2
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after neutral and aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty relative to
certainty? To test whether a priori and online covariation biases would increase unpleasant
affect after exposure to aversive and neutral pictures following uncertainty, relative to certainty,
two multilevel models were conducted using restricted maximum likelihood estimation in SAS
PROC MIXED. In the first model, stimulus cue (certain, uncertain) and stimulus valence
(neutral, aversive) were entered as repeated measures and the continuous measure of a priori
covariation bias (the expectancy rating following the very first uncertainty cue) was entered into
the model as a covariate. The second model was identical to the first, except online covariation
bias (the average expectancy rating following all but the first uncertainty cue) was entered as a
covariate. A third model was also tested to explore whether a posteriori covariation bias would
be associated with self-reported affect ratings. Pearson product-moment correlations between
each measure of covariation bias and post-stimulus mood ratings are depicted in Table 16.
A priori covariation bias on self-reported affect. The model testing a priori covariation
bias on self-reported affect indicated a significant main effect of stimulus valence [F(1, 49) =
35.72, p < .0001. Affect ratings were significantly more unpleasant following aversive images
(M = -2.27, s.d. = 0.95) compared to neutral images (M = 0.60, s.d. = 0.65). The main effect for
stimulus cue and the stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction terms were not significant (both
ps > .60). There was a significant main effect for a priori covariation bias [F(1, 48) = 5.13, p =
.03]. Higher levels of a priori covariation bias were predictive of higher unpleasant affect,
irrespective of cue and valence. There were no significant interactions involving a priori
covariation bias (all ps > .16). The results of the present analysis suggest that higher levels of a
priori covariation bias were associated with a general tendency to self-report more unpleasant
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affect, but there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation bias influenced
affect differently due to the nature of the emotional picture content or the stimulus cue.
Online covariation bias on self-reported affect. The model testing online covariation
bias on self-reported affect indicated, as before, a significant main effect of stimulus valence,
F(1, 49) = 6.22, p =.02. Affect ratings were significantly more unpleasant following aversive
images (M = -2.27, s.d. = 0.95) compared to neutral images (M = 0.60, s.d. = 0.65). No other
main or interaction effects were significant (all ps > .46). These latter results suggest that online
covariation bias did not account for a significant proportion of the variability in self-reported
affect.
A posteriori covariation bias on self-reported affect. The model testing a posteriori
covariation bias on self-reported affect, indicated a significant main effect of stimulus valence
[F(1, 46) = 23.27, p < .0001]. The main effects for stimulus cue and a posteriori covariation
bias, and the stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction terms were not significant (all ps > .57).
There was a significant a posteriori covariation bias × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 125) =
5.82, p = .02]. As is evident by the pattern of correlations depicted in Table 16, higher levels of a
posteriori covariation bias were significantly related to higher unpleasant affect for aversive
stimuli. However, a posteriori covariation bias was not a significant predictor of affect following
neutral stimuli. There were no other significant interaction terms involving a priori covariation
bias (all ps > .87). The results of the present analysis suggest that higher levels of a posteriori
covariation bias were associated with heightened unpleasant affect following aversive picture
content, but there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation bias
influenced affect differently due to the nature of the stimulus cue.
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Question 5.2. Do expectations to associate uncertain cues with unpleasant outcomes
(a priori and online covariation bias) predict more unpleasant image ratings after neutral
and aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty relative to certainty?
Analogous models to those conducted in Question 5.1 were tested here to address whether a
priori and online covariation bias would predict more unpleasant image ratings after neutral and
aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty relative to certainty. In the first model,
stimulus cue (certain, uncertain) and stimulus valence (neutral, aversive) were entered as
repeated measures and the continuous measure of a priori covariation bias was entered into the
model as a covariate. The second model was identical to the first, except online covariation bias
was entered as a covariate. A third model was also tested to explore whether a posteriori
covariation bias would predict self-reported image ratings. Pearson product-moment correlations
between each measure of covariation bias and post-stimulus picture ratings are depicted in Table
17.
A priori covariation bias on self-reported image ratings. The model testing a priori
covariation bias on self-reported image ratings indicated a significant main effect for stimulus
valence [F(1, 49) = 60.46, p < .0001], but no main effects for stimulus cue or a priori covariation
bias (both ps > .26). Aversive images (M = -2.57, s.d. = 0.75) were perceived as significantly
more unpleasant than neutral images (M = 0.62, s.d. = 0.59). There was also a significant a
priori covariation bias × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 144) = 4.25, p = .04. The slopes of
the regression lines predicting picture ratings from a priori covariation bias depended on the
valence of the image. Higher levels of a priori covariation bias were predictive of more
unpleasant image ratings following aversive stimuli, but the slope of the relationship between a
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priori covariation bias and images ratings was different for neutral images. For neutral images,
higher covariation bias was associated with less unpleasant stimulus ratings.
Online covariation bias on self-reported image ratings. The model testing online
covariation bias on self-reported perceptions of the pictures indicated a significant main effect of
stimulus valence, F(1, 49) = 6.22, p =.02. No other main or interaction effects were significant
(all ps > .46). This latter result suggests that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that online
covariation bias influences self-reported image ratings.
A posteriori covariation bias on self-reported image ratings. The model testing a
posteriori covariation bias on self-reported image ratings indicated a significant main effect of
stimulus valence [F(1, 46) = 49.94, p < .0001. The main effects for stimulus cue and a posteriori
covariation bias, and the stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction terms were not significant
(both ps > .35). There was a significant a posteriori covariation bias × stimulus valence
interaction, F(1, 135) = 5.21, p = .02]. Higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias were
associated with higher unpleasant perceptions of aversive stimuli. However, a posteriori
covariation bias was associated with less unpleasant perceptions of neutral stimuli. There were
no other significant interaction terms involving a posteriori covariation bias (all ps > .46). The
results of the present analysis suggest that higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias were
associated with heightened perceptions of the pictures as unpleasant following aversive picture
content, but there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation bias
influenced affect differently due to the nature of the stimulus cue.
Summary of findings addressing Specific Aim 5. The results of the present analyses
suggest that heightened a priori covariation bias was associated with a general tendency to selfreport more unpleasant affect, and heightened perceptions of unpleasantness following the
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display of aversive images. There was not sufficient evidence to conclude that online
covariation bias modulated self-reported appraisals. Higher levels of a posteriori covariation
bias were associated with heightened unpleasant affect and stimulus perceptions for aversive
stimuli. There was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation, online, or a
posteriori covariation biases were associated with differences in self-reported appraisals due to
the nature of the stimulus cues.
Specific Aim 6: Uncertainty and a cortical measure of stimulus anticipation.
The sixth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional
anticipation as indexed by the SPN is largest for certain-aversive and uncertain stimulus cues
compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues. Before conducting this test it was necessary to
conduct a region of interest analysis to determine whether the SPN component was present and
sensitive to cue type at electrode locations consistent with past research. Following the region of
interest analysis, mixed models will be tested to formally evaluate the question from Specific
Aim 6.
Preliminary Region of Interest Analysis on the SPN.
Visual inspection of the SPN waveforms averaged separately for each cue type indicated
maximal differences due to cue type across frontal and fronto-central regions of the scalp (see
Figure 17). This observed frontal scalp distribution is consistent with past studies that have
examined the modulation of SPN amplitudes during the anticipation of emotional images
(Klorman & Ryan, 1980; Moser et al., 2009; Takeuchi et al., 2005) and threat of shock (Böcker
et al., 2001). of emotional picture stimuli.
To examine the effects of electrode location, and stimulus condition on SPN amplitude, a
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Figure 17. Scalp distribution of grand averaged SPN waveforms elicited by each stimulus cue
across a 1000 ms (post-expectancy rating) to 4000 ms (earliest image onset) recording period.
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3 [anteriority: frontal (F3, Fz, F4), central (C3, Cz, C4), parietal (P3, Pz, P4)] × 3 [electrode
position: left (F3, C3, P3), midline (Fz, Cz, Pz), right (F4, C4, P4)] × 3 (cue type: certainneutral, certain-aversive, uncertain) repeated measures mixed model was tested using restricted
maximum likelihood estimation (REML; e.g., Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992).
The model indicated a significant main effect of anteriority on SPN amplitude [F(2, 102)
= 38.59, p < .0001]. Tukey-Kramer adjusted post-hoc comparisons revealed that the SPN
became significantly more negative as electrode locations progressed in posteriority from frontal
(M = 1.34, s.d. = 3.93) through central (M = .43, s.d. = 3.44), to parietal sites (M = -.72, s.d. =
3.71; ps < .0006 for all paired comparisons), a finding consistent with past research on the scalp
distribution of the SPN during emotional stimulus anticipation (Brunia, van Boxtel, & Böcker,
2012). There were no main effects for laterality [F(2, 102) = .21, p =.13] or cue type [F(2, 102) =
.67, p = .52), and there was not a significant anteriority × cue type interaction, F(4, 204) = 2.06,
p = .09.
Given the apparent differences due to cue type in frontal regions depicted in Figures 17
and 18, and on the basis of past research indicating a similar scalp distribution of SPN during
anticipation of emotional stimuli (Klorman and Ryan, 1980; Böcker et al., 2001; Takeuchi et al.,
2005), a multilevel model was conducted in which the anteriority factor was restricted to frontal
(F3, Fz, F4) and fronto-central (FC3, FCz, FC4) leads. The model indicated a significant main
effect for laterality, F(2, 102) = 4.86, p = .01. SPN amplitudes were more negative at the
midline (M = .96, s.d. = 3.47) compared to the left-hemisphere (M =1.80, s.d. = 4.35; p = .01),
but there were no other significant differences (ps > .07). There was not a significant effect of
effect of anteriority on the SPN, F(1, 51) = .02, p = .89. Of central importance to the present
study, there was a significant main effect of cue type, F(2, 102) = 5.50, p = .005. Uncertainty
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cues (M = .79, s.d. = 3.68) elicited significantly greater (i.e., lower amplitude) SPN deflections
than aversive (M = 1.55, s.d. = 3.80) and neutral cues (M = 1.61, s.d. = 4.02; ps < .02). In
contrast to past research, deflections of the SPN in response to aversive and neutral cues were
not different from each other, p =.97. Anteriority × cue type, laterality × cue type, and
anteriority × laterality × cue type interactions were not significant, all ps > .62. Subsequent
analyses testing the modulation of SPN amplitude will be conducted at anterior midline sites Fz
and FCz, where cue effects on SPN amplitudes were visually and statistically maximal, a finding
consistent with past studies of the SPN during emotional anticipation (Klorman and Ryan, 1980;
Böcker et al., 2001; Takeuchi et al., 2005). Waveforms at these electrode sites are depicted in
Figure 19.
Question 6.1. Do uncertain and certain-aversive stimulus cues elicit larger (less
positive) deflections of the SPN compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues? To specifically
test Question 6.1, a 3 (cue type: certain-neutral, certain-aversive, uncertain) × 2 (electrode: Fz,
FCz) repeated measures mixed model was conducted on SPN amplitude. There was not a main
effect for electrode site [F(1, 51) = 0.05, p = .83] nor cue type [F(2, 102) = 1.96, p = .15], nor
was there an electrode × cue type interaction, F(2, 102) = 0.20, p = .82. This suggests there is
not sufficient evidence to conclude that the SPN was present and modulated by cue type at the
electrodes consistent with the region of interest analysis and past research on the SPN during
emotional anticipation. Subsequent specific aims that test the modulation of the SPN by
psychological traits (Specific Aim 8) will not be tested.
Specific aim 7: Mindfulness and self-reported stimulus anticipation.
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Figure 18. Grand average SPN waveforms at electrodes Fz and FCz elicited by neutral,
aversive, and uncertain stimulus cues.
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The seventh specific aim of the present study was to explore whether trait mindfulness
would predict lower levels of a priori covariation bias and lower online expectancies for aversive
images to follow from uncertain (online covariation bias) and aversive cues, relative to neutral
cues. Pearson product-moment correlations between psychological traits and a priori and online
covariation biases are depicted in Table 18.

Table 18. Correlations between psychological traits and a priori and online covariation biases.
Psychological trait
MAAS mindfulness
FFMQ awareness
IUS uncertainty
URS emotion
NEO-FFI neuroticism
BDI depression
PSWQ worry

A priori
-.09
-.12
-.16
.05
-.05
.00
.16

Online
uncertain
-.10
.02
.28*
.28*
.13
-.03
.12

Online
aversive

Online
neutral

A posteriori

-.29*
-.29*
.02
-.04
.08
.10
.18

.14
.11
.11
.04
.08
-.01
-.07

.07
-.04
-.07
-.05
-.01
-.01
-.03

Notes. N = 52 (n = 50 for IUS and URS). MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; FFMQ
= Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; URS =
Uncertainty Response Scale; NEO-FFI = Neuroticism Extroversion Openness-Five Factor
Inventory; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory. *P <
0.05

Question 7.1. Does trait mindfulness predict lower expectancies for the first
uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (less a priori covariation bias)? To
address question 7.1 2 simple regression models were tested. For the first model a priori
covariation bias was regressed onto MAAS mindfulness, and for the second model a priori
covariation bias was regressed onto FFMQAW mindfulness. Together, the models indicated that
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the MAAS [β = -.09, t(50) = -0.64, p = .52] and the FFMQ mindfulness measures [β = -.12, t(49)
= -0.87, p = .39] did not account for a significant proportion of the variability in a priori
covariation bias. These results suggest that trait mindfulness does not predict a smaller baseline
tendency to associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes (i.e., less a priori covariation bias).
Question 7.2. Does trait mindfulness predict lower online expectations for aversive
pictures to follow from uncertain (less online covariation bias) and certain-aversive cues
relative to neutral cues? To examine the question as to whether trait mindfulness would predict
lower (less unpleasant) expectancy ratings in response to uncertain and aversive cues relative to
neutral cues, two repeated measures mixed models were conducted (one for each trait
mindfulness measure) using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML) multilevel
models. Cue type (neutral, aversive, uncertain) was entered as a repeated measure and MAAS
and FFMQAW measures of trait mindfulness were entered as covariates in separate models.
MAAS. The model testing the MAAS revealed a significant main effect for cue type
[F(2, 96) = 353.42, p < .0001]. Uncertainty and aversive cues elicited significantly higher
expectations for aversive outcomes than neutral cues, and aversive cues elicited significantly
higher expectations for aversive outcomes than uncertainty cues (all ps < .0001). The main effect
of the MAAS [F(1, 48) = 3.25, p = .08], and the MAAS × cue type interaction did not reach
significance, F(2, 96) = 2.01, p =.14. While the interaction term in the model was not
significant, an examination of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicate mindfulness was
significantly associated with lowered expectations for aversive stimuli to follow after aversive
cues (r52 = -.29, p = .04) but not uncertain cues (r52 = -.10, p =.50) or neutral cues (r52 = .14, p
=.32).
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FFMQAW. The analogous model testing the FFMQAW indicated similar pattern of results.
There a significant main effect for cue type, but there was not a significant main effect for the
FFMQAW [F(1, 47) = .81, p = .37] or a FFMQAW × cue type interaction, F(2, 94) = 1.61, p = .20.
As depicted in Table 18, the FFMQAW was consistent with the MAAS in that it was significantly
associated with lower expectations of aversion following aversive cues(r51 = -.29, p =.04), but
not uncertain (r51 = .02, p =.89) or neutral cues (r51 = .11, p =.46).
Question 7.3. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher expectancies
for the first uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (higher a priori
covariation bias)? To address question 7.2 five separate simple regression models were tested.
The first two models regressed a priori covariation bias on IUS intolerance for uncertainty and
URS emotional responses to uncertainty, respectively (measures of uncertainty distress). The
latter three models regressed a priori covariation bias onto NEO neuroticism, BDI depression,
and PSWQ worry, respectively (anxiety related traits). The first two models testing uncertainty
distress indicated that IUS intolerance of uncertainty [β = -.16, t(48) = -1.15, p = .25] and URS
emotional responses to uncertainty [β = .05, t(48) = 0.34, p = .73] were not significant predictors
of a priori covariation bias. The latter three regression models testing anxiety related traits
indicated that NEO neuroticism [β = -.05, t(50) = 0.37, p = .72], BDI depression [β = .00, t(50) =
-0.01, p = .99], and PSWQ worry [β = .16, t(48) = 1.12, p = .27] were not significant predictors
of a priori covariation bias. These results suggest that measures of uncertainty distress and
anxiety-related traits were not associated with baseline tendencies to associate uncertainty with
aversive outcomes (a priori covariation bias).
Question 7.4. Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher online
expectations for aversive pictures to follow from uncertain and certain-aversive cues
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relative to neutral cues (more online covariation bias)? To examine the question as to
whether traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher (more unpleasant) expectancy ratings
in response to uncertain and aversive cues relative to neutral cues, five repeated measures mixed
models were conducted using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML). Cue type
(neutral, aversive, uncertain) was entered as a repeated measure and measures of uncertainty
distress (IUS intolerance of uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty) and
anxiety-related traits (NEO neuroticism, BDI depression, and PSWQ worry) were entered as
covariates in separate models.
IUS intolerance of uncertainty. The model testing IUS intolerance of uncertainty
revealed a significant main effect for cue type [F(2, 92) = 324.82, p < .0001], consistent with the
models conducted above for mindfulness. Uncertainty and aversive cues elicited significantly
higher expectations for aversive outcomes than neutral cues, and aversive cues elicited
significantly higher expectations for aversive outcomes than uncertainty cues (all ps < .0001).
There was also a main effect of IUS intolerance of uncertainty [F(1, 46) = 8.14, p = .007], which
indicated higher levels of IUS intolerance of uncertainty predicted higher expectations for
aversive outcomes. The IUS intolerance of uncertainty × cue type interaction did not reach
significance, F(2, 92) = 0.59, p =.55.
URS emotional responses to uncertainty. The model testing URS emotional responses
to uncertainty revealed an identical main effect for cue type [F(2, 92) = 324.82, p < .0001]
consistent with the analogous models reported above mindfulness. The main and interactive
effects of URS emotional responses to uncertainty were not significant [F(1, 46) = 3.18, p = .08
and F(2, 92) = 0.79, p = .46, respectively]. While the interaction term in the model was not
significant, an examination of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicates a pattern of
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correlations identical to IUS intolerance of uncertainty. URS emotional responses to uncertainty
was significantly associated with higher expectations for aversive stimuli to follow after
uncertain cues (r50 = .28, p = .04) but not aversive cues (r50 = -.04, p =.79) or neutral cues (r50 =
.04, p =.79).
NEO Neuroticism. The model testing NEO neuroticism revealed an identical main effect
for cue type [F(2, 92) = 324.82, p < .0001] consistent with the analogous models reported above
mindfulness. The main and interactive effects of NEO neuroticism on expectancy ratings was
significant [F(1, 48) = 4.11, p = .04. Higher levels of neuroticism were associated with the
general tendency to expect aversive outcomes following the stimulus cues. The NEO neuroticism
× cue type interaction was not significant, F(2, 96) = 0.25, p = .78. Together, the results of the
present analysis suggest that higher levels of NEO neuroticism predicted heighten overall
expectations for aversive outcomes throughout the experiment.
BDI Depression. As in prior models, the model testing BDI depression revealed a main
effect for cue type [F(2, 96) = 345.86, p < .0001]. The main and interactive effects of BDI
depression on expectancy ratings were not significant [F(1, 48) = 1.05, p = .31 and F(2, 96) =
0.74, p = .48, respectively]. An examination of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicates
that BDI depression was not significantly associated with online expectancy ratings following
any of the stimulus cues (all ps > .48).
PSWQ Worry. The model testing PSWQ worry indicated, again, a main effect for cue
type [F(2, 92) = 328.00, p < .0001]. The main and interactive effects of PSWQ worry were not
significant [F(1, 46) = 1.87, p = .18 and F(2, 92) = 1.30, p = .28, respectively]. An examination
of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicates that PSWQ worry was not significantly
associated with online expectancy ratings following any of the stimulus cues (all ps > .22).
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Summary of findings related to Specific Aim 7. Several tests were conducted to
explore whether trait mindfulness would predict lower levels of a priori covariation bias and
lower online expectancies for aversive images to follow from uncertain (online covariation bias)
and aversive cues, relative to neutral cues. Measures of trait mindfulness did not predict a priori
covariation bias, and neither were any of the traits that contrast with mindfulness. However,
both measures of trait mindfulness were associated with lower expectations for unpleasant
outcomes following aversive cues. Both measures of uncertainty distress were associated with
heightened expectations for unpleasant stimuli to follow after uncertainty cues, and NEO
neuroticism was associated with a general tendency to expect aversive outcomes, irrespective of
the type of stimulus cue.
Specific Aim 8: Mindfulness and a cortical measure of stimulus anticipation.
The eighth aim of the present study was to explore whether trait mindfulness would be
associated with lower deflections of the SPN in response to aversive and uncertain cues, relative
to neutral cues. However, tests conducted during Specific Aim 6 indicated there was not
sufficient evidence to suggest that stimulus cues modulated the SPN, which was a precondition
to test whether mindfulness would modulate the effect of stimulus cue on SPN amplitude.
Discussion
The present study tested whether uncertainty about the nature of a forthcoming emotional
stimulus would increase anticipation for unpleasant outcomes (covariation bias) and amplify
post-stimulus appraisals of emotional stimuli as unpleasant, as captured by self-report and
cortical measures of emotional anticipation and appraisal. The primary purpose of the study was
to examine whether dispositional mindfulness, relative to traits that contrast with mindfulness,
would modulate the effect of uncertainty on these markers of anticipation and appraisal.
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Evidence was found that replicated and extended prior research on the effects of
anticipatory uncertainty for both emotional anticipation and appraisal processes. Regarding
appraisal processes, pre-stimulus cues that left participants uncertain about the nature of the
forthcoming stimulus were found to increase self-reported perceptions of neutral and aversive
stimuli as unpleasant (Specific Aim 1). This self-reported evidence of unpleasant appraisal
following anticipatory uncertainty was corroborated by cortical evidence that indicated the
combination of uncertainty and aversiveness of stimuli increased the amplitude of the LPP, an
ERP marker of post-stimulus emotional appraisal (Specific Aim 2). There was not sufficient
evidence to indicate that dispositional mindfulness influenced self-reported appraisal processes,
but the predisposition to worry, a trait contrasting with mindfulness, was associated with
heightened unpleasant appraisals, as indicated by post-stimulus self-reports of state affect and
stimulus perceptions (Specific Aim 3). Individual differences in depression were also associated
with heightened unpleasant affect following the display of aversive stimuli (Specific Aim 3).
Dispositional mindfulness and anxiety-related traits were found to modulate the LPP in opposing
directions, but the direction of this modulating influence was inconsistent with my expectations,
and with past research on the influence of individual differences in LPP variability (Specific Aim
4).
Regarding stimulus anticipation, participants demonstrated biased expectations for
uncertainty to be associated with aversive outcome at baseline (a prior covariation bias) and
throughout the task (online covariation bias). A priori covariation bias predicted a general trend
for higher unpleasant affect and greater unpleasant perceptions of the emotional stimulus
content, as indicated by self-report (Specific Aim 5). A posteriori covariation bias predicted
heightened unpleasant affect following the display of aversive stimuli, as well as heightened
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perceptions of aversive stimuli as unpleasant (Specific Aim 5). There was not sufficient
evidence to suggest the presence of an SPN component, a cortical marker of emotional
anticipation (Specific Aims 6 and 8). However, two measures of dispositional mindfulness were
associated with reduced expectations for unpleasant outcomes following aversive cues (Specific
Aim 7). In contrast, two measures of uncertainty-distress were associated with greater
expectations for unpleasant stimuli to follow after uncertainty cues (online covariation bias), and
neuroticism was related to general expectations for emotional stimuli to be aversive (Specific
Aim 7).
Specific Aim 1: Uncertainty and self-reported appraisal.
Past research has demonstrated that unpredictable threats amplify unpleasantness
compared to the same threats when they are predictable (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009;
Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967;
Nader & Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), and findings from the present research were
generally consistent with this body of evidence. Past research that has used an identical cued
image task demonstrated higher levels of unpleasant affect and unpleasant stimulus perceptions
following the display of aversive images preceded by uncertainty cues relative to certainty
cues. Results from the present study did not provide evidence indicating heightened negative
affect following the display of uncertainty cues (Question 1.2), but evidence was found for a
strong general effect of uncertainty on stimulus perceptions. Participants perceived both neutral
and aversive images as being more unpleasant, that is, irrespective of the image valence, when
the stimulus was preceded by uncertainty cues compared to certainty cues. (Question 1.2).
Simply restricting information about the nature of an upcoming emotional stimulus was
enough to distort participants’ perceptions of the stimuli as more unpleasant, irrespective of their
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valence. While past research has found that uncertainty amplifies unpleasant perceptions of
aversive stimuli, the findings from the present study suggest a more general effect that extends to
both neutral and aversive stimuli. This highlights the dramatic influence informational
uncertainty can have on downstream perceptual appraisal, and suggests that uncertainty during
the anticipation of potentially unpleasant future outcomes can distort the way those outcomes are
perceived, even when they are innocuous.
On the other hand, there is a possible alternative interpretation for results of specific aim
1. When participants have foreknowledge about the nature of the upcoming stimulus, they are in
a better position to prepare for and regulate their emotional responses (Gross, 1998; Hirsch &
Inzlicht, 2008). From this perspective, it may not be that uncertainty amplifies unpleasant
experiences, but that providing information that an upcoming event will be aversive allows for
better preparation and regulation when faced with emotionally challenging events. In other
words, it may not be that uncertainty amplifies unpleasantness, but that certainty promotes more
regulated, benign appraisals (Gross, 1998). To test this possibility, future research should
examine whether varying degrees of informational content about the nature of forthcoming
emotional stimuli influences post-stimulus appraisal processes. As it stands, the present findings
are consistent with a substantial body of evidence that indicates uncertainty can amplify the
negative impact of emotional stimuli (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Dickerson &
Kemeny, 2004; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967; Nader &
Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010).
Specific Aim 2. Uncertainty and a cortical measure of stimulus appraisal.
The second specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional
appraisal as indexed by the LPP is larger for aversive and neutral stimuli presented following
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uncertainty about the nature of an emotional image stimulus, compared to when participants
know an upcoming emotional image stimulus will be aversive or neutral. First, the present study
replicated past research by providing evidence that the LPP was modulated by unpleasant, highly
arousing emotional picture stimuli at electrode sites consistent with past research using
emotional picture stimuli (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Hajcak MacNamara, Foti, & Keil, 2011;
Weinberg and Hajcak, 2011, Foti et al., 2010; Schupp et al., 2000). Past research using galvanic
skin conductance responses (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011) and neuroimaging measures
(Sarinopoulos et al., 2010) have demonstrated that stimulus uncertainty can amplify
physiological arousal to aversive emotional stimuli, and the present research extended this work
using a cortical marker of emotional stimulus appraisal. LPP amplitudes elicited by aversive
stimuli were amplified when the valence of a forthcoming stimulus was uncertain, relative to
when the image valence was known in advance with certainty.
This finding that the LPP is modulated by stimulus valence and uncertainty is consistent
with emerging evidence that suggests that LPP amplitudes are increased when participants are
exposed to ambiguous (uncertain) compared to unambiguous emotional facial expressions (Tritt,
Peterson, & Inzlicht, under review). However, there is an important difference between the
manipulation of uncertainty in the present study, and in the work of Tritt, Peterson, & Inzlicht
(under review). While the present study examined the influence of uncertainty during stimulus
anticipation without changing the stimulus content, the study by Tritt et al. (under review)
manipulated the stimulus content itself to evoke uncertainty. This difference could have distinct
influences on psychological processes. The present study showed how uncertainty during
anticipation of a stimulus can have downstream psychological consequences for stimulus
appraisal, and thus assesses the influence of informational uncertainty on the psychological
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context in which stimuli are perceived. Tritt et al.’s (under review) manipulation examined how
uncertainty about the nature of an emotional stimulus itself can exert an immediate influence on
appraisal processes. Despite this difference, the consistent effect of uncertainty on LPP
amplitude found in both studies highlights how robust the influence of uncertainty can be on
cortical markers of emotional appraisal. Together, this evidence from these two studies suggests
that different types of uncertainty can bias cortical markers of appraisal in similar ways, by either
influencing the psychological context in which unambiguous emotional stimuli are perceived, or
by directly manipulating the ambiguity of stimulus content. Further, by directly examining the
influence of an ambiguous stimulus on the LPP, participants were not given the opportunity to
regulate their responses, and the findings of Tritt et al. (under review) lend support to the theory
that uncertainty indeed amplifies unpleasant appraisals, rather than certainty providing an
opportunity to regulate emotional responses and promote more benign appraisals.
Specific Aim 3. Mindfulness and Self-reported Appraisal
Considerable research has demonstrated that dispositional mindfulness is associated with
more benign appraisals of aversive stimuli (Arch & Craske, 2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003;
Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2010). The third aim of the present study was to determine whether
trait mindfulness would predict more benign appraisals of emotional stimuli when participants
were uncertain about the nature of the forthcoming stimulus, relative to when they were
certain. Evidence was not found to suggest that mindfulness reduced self-reported unpleasant
affect (Question 3.1) or unpleasant stimulus perceptions (Question 3.2) following emotional
stimulus exposure. However, evidence was found that self-reported affect and appraisals were
sensitive to other individual differences. Two anxiety-related individual difference measures
were related to increased unpleasant appraisals, though these traits were not related to stimulus
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certainty. The predisposition to engage in ruminative, uncontrollable worry, as indexed by the
PSWQ, was associated with higher levels of unpleasant affect (Question 3.3) and unpleasant
perceptions of the images (Question 3.4) following stimulus exposure, but this effect did not
depend on the certainty of the stimuli. Similarly, higher levels of depressive symptoms were
associated with greater self-reported unpleasant affect following aversive images. These effects
are consistent with past research linking greater levels of worry and depression with the
experience of negative affect (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988).
Specific Aim 4. Mindfulness and a Cortical Measure of Stimulus Appraisal.
The fourth specific aim was to determine whether dispositional mindfulness would
predict attenuated LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli under
conditions of uncertainty and certainty, during an early time period (500-1000ms) of the LPP.
Past research has provided evidence that mindfulness attenuates LPP responses to motivationally
salient pleasant and unpleasant emotional picture stimuli in a similar time period (Brown et al.,
2013), while traits that contrasted with mindfulness amplified LPP responses. The present study
found that dispositional mindfulness indeed modulated the LPP, and measures of uncertainty
distress and anxiety-related traits modulated the LPP in an opposite direction of mindfulness, but
the direction of these effects were in the opposite direction of what was expected, and were
inconsistent with the findings of past research on mindfulness and the LPP (Brown et al., 2013;
Sobolewski et al., 2011). Dispositional mindfulness, as measured by two psychometric
instruments, was predictive of higher LPP amplitudes in response to certain and uncertain
aversive emotional stimuli at centro-parietal electrodes (CPz and CP4). Dispositional
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mindfulness was not associated with LPP amplitude differences due to stimulus certainty
(Question 4.1).
Future research is needed to clarify why mindfulness amplified the LPP in response to
aversive stimuli in the present study, but one potential reason is that the experimental paradigms
used in both studies are not directly comparable, and one primary difference may have
influenced the relations between mindfulness and the LPP. In the study by Brown et al. (2013),
participants passively viewed images without receiving any cueing information about the nature
of the upcoming image content. In the present study, participants learned about the nature of the
upcoming stimuli from pre-stimulus cues. Given the high degree of sensitivity of cortical
measures, this may be an important distinction that has implications for future research.
As discussed above in Specific Aims 1 and 3, it is likely the information conveyed by the
stimulus cue could change the psychological context during stimulus anticipation and influence
the processes involved in downstream appraisal. For example, the stimulus cues could influence
how participants deployed their attention prior to and during the display of a stimulus, and this
difference would likely be reflected by changes in the LPP, given the strong relation between this
ERP component and attention. Past research on mindfulness and emotion regulation has
suggested that mindfulness may promote a greater willingness to stay with, rather than avoid
aversive emotional experiences (Arch & Craske, 2006). Indeed, this is theorized to be one of the
most important benefits of mindfulness in clinical settings because mindfulness is thought to
facilitate exposure and minimize avoidance of unpleasant experience (Follette et al., 2006;
Greeson et al., 2009). Additionally, this heightened ability to stay with difficult experiences,
such as psychological suffering, mortality, and uncertainty, is a central goal of mindfulness from
the perspective of ancient wisdom traditions (Anālayo, 2003; Davis and Thompson, in press).
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While entirely speculative, it is theoretically defensible that participants lower in mindfulness
would be more likely to avoid and divert their attention away when information cues them that
an upcoming emotional stimulus could be potentially unpleasant. On the other hand, a higher
degree of mindfulness would facilitate a greater willingness to stay with a potentially unpleasant
experience. If this were the case, mindfulness would be expected to promote higher LPP
amplitudes in response to aversive and uncertain unpleasant stimuli, while traits that contrast
with the open and receptive nature of mindfulness would promote reduced LPP amplitudes, and
this is precisely what was observed in the present study. Future research should directly examine
the effect of stimulus cueing information on variability in the LPP response by comparing ERP
averages for trials that provide cueing information against trials that do not provide cueing
information. This change would contribute to understanding the influence of cueing information
on the LPP, and would elucidate how such information may modulate the subsequent processing
of emotional stimuli.
Another relevant finding from the present study involves the time-course of the effect of
mindfulness on LPP amplitude. While there was not a significant effect of signal window on
LPP amplitude in any of the models, dispositional mindfulness had its most robust influence on
the LPP during the early stimulus window (500-1000ms), as indicated by a significant
correlation with LPP amplitude during only the early signal window. That mindfulness exerted
the most potent influence on the LPP at an early time period is interesting in the light of prior
research on the LPP and emotion regulation. The LPP is sensitive to changes in attention and to
changes in stimulus meaning (see Hajcak, 2013), but consistent with the process model of
emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), regulation strategies that modify attention influence the LPP
much earlier than more effortful regulation strategies which involve modifying stimulus meaning
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(MacNamara, Oschner, & Hajcak; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). More specifically, modulation of
the LPP by reappraisal instructions has been consistently prominent for approximately 1000ms
post stimulus presentation, while attention regulation strategies modulate the LPP as early as
300ms. Mindfulness operates at the level of attention, so as an emotion regulation strategy,
mindfulness was expected to modulate the LPP earlier than more effortful downstream types of
emotion regulation that focus on modifying stimulus meaning (e.g. reappraisal).
Traits that contrasted with mindfulness predicted an opposite pattern of association with
the LPP, though again, in the opposite of the hypothesized direction. Two measures of
uncertainty distress (IUS intolerance of uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty)
and two measures of anxiety-related traits (NEO neuroticism and BDI depression) predicted
attenuated LPP amplitudes elicited by aversive stimuli relative to neutral stimuli. As with
mindfulness, these psychological traits interacted with stimulus valence, and not the stimulus
cue, which suggests there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that individual differences in
mindfulness and traits that contrast with mindfulness modulated the effect of stimulus
uncertainty on a neural marker of emotional stimulus appraisal.
Specific Aim 5. Uncertainty and Self-reported Anticipation.
The fifth aim of the present research was to replicate past research that has demonstrated
a priori and online covariation biases amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following
the display of unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty, relative to certainty. The
results of the present analysis suggest that heightened a priori covariation bias was associated
with a general tendency to self-report more unpleasant affect (Question 5.1), and heightened
perceptions of unpleasantness following the display of aversive images (Question 5.2). There
was not sufficient evidence to conclude that online covariation bias modulated self-reported
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appraisals (Questions 5.1 and 5.2). Higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias were associated
with heightened unpleasant affect and stimulus perceptions for aversive stimuli. The effects of
covariation bias measures on self-reported appraisals did not depend on whether the stimulus cue
was certain or uncertain.
Prior to the aforementioned analyses assessing the influence of covariation biases on
post-stimulus appraisals, evidence was found to suggest that participants’ indeed demonstrated
both a priori and online covariation biases, tendencies to associate uncertainty with aversive
outcomes. Participants associated uncertainty with the presentation of aversive pictures at
baseline (a priori covariation bias), and as they progressed through the experimental task (online
covariation bias). These findings are consistent with previous research using similar
experimental paradigms (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011). At the outset of the experiment, participants
had no knowledge of the actual probability that an aversive image would appear following their
first exposure to an uncertainty cue. However, on average, participants’ self-reports indicated
expectations that more aversive images would follow after the presentation of uncertainty cues.
Participants continued to associate uncertainty with aversiveness as they progressed through the
experimental task, demonstrating an online covariation bias.
There was not significant evidence to suggest that participants’ retrospective (postexperiment) estimates of the relationship between uncertain cues and aversive pictures was over
the actual rate of 50%, though past research has also failed to find this effect (Grupe & Nitschke,
2011). In fact, the overwhelming majority of studies that have examined post-experiment
covariation assessments have found results using phobics or high anxiety populations (deJong et
al., 1992), whereas relatively few studies have found effects among a convenience sample of
normative college students (Witvliet & Vrana, 2000). One likely reason the post-experiment (a
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posteriori) measure of covariation bias did not reach significance is due to the high degree of
variability in these post-experiment estimates (estimates ranged from 20%-80%), a finding noted
in similar studies (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011).
Another aspect of the present work that was consistent with prior studies is the finding
that the magnitude of online covariation bias predicted participant’s post-experiment covariation
bias estimates (Amin & Lovibond, 1998; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011). The relation between online
expectancy ratings and post-experiment estimates suggests that heightened expectations to
associate uncertainty with aversive stimuli are linked with biases in memory about what actually
occurred. When the experiment ended and participants had been exposed to every cue-picture
combination - that is, when the full facts about the actual probability of uncertainty-aversive
pairings was in, the tendency to anticipate that uncertainty would lead to aversive outcomes was
linked with a greater degree of retrospective bias about the frequency that uncertainty was paired
with aversive stimuli. Said differently, not only did uncertainty during anticipation distort
perceptions of stimuli as unpleasant (Specific Aim 1), but higher tendencies to anticipate
unpleasant outcomes following uncertainty also distorted retrospective appraisals of the events
that actually took place during the study. This finding is further evidence that highlights the
distorting influence uncertainty can have on downstream appraisal processes.
Past research has linked covariation bias with the amplification of fear (De Jong et al.,
1993; 1995; Tomarken et al., 1989), and studies administering an identical paradigm to the one
administered here found heightened amygdalae responses to aversive stimuli when preceded by
uncertainty compared to certainty cues (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). Covariation biases develop
from the experience of anxiety when confronted with negative events, and the magnitude of the
anxiety that is elicited determines the strength of the covariation bias (Pauli, Wiedemann,
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Dengler, & Kühlkamp, 2001). Results from the present study suggest that uncertainty was
associated with aversiveness, which provides support for the idea that uncertainty can serve as a
cue signaling something unpleasant.
Specific Aim 6. Uncertainty and a Cortical Measure of Anticipation.
The sixth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional
anticipation as indexed by the SPN is largest for certain-aversive and uncertain stimulus cues
compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues. Evidence from region of interest analysis did not
indicate significant evidence to conclude an SPN component was isolated in the present
study. While visual inspection of the SPN waveforms indicated the EEG signal was higher for
uncertainty cues during the appropriate time window and at the electrode locations consistent
with past research, there was no statistical evidence to suggest the SPN was modulated by the
emotional information provided by the stimulus cues. This failure to isolate the SPN precluded
the examination of Specific Aim 8, which sought to examine the influence of mindfulness on
variability in the SPN, so the planned analyses for these tests were not conducted.
One possibility for this lack of effect is that the cued image task was not designed to
measure the SPN, and I decided to assess the component post-hoc. As such, there was a crucial
barrier in the trial parameters that could have added considerable noise to the SPN measure.
That is, the interstimulus interval (ISI) between the participant expectancy ratings and the onset
of the emotional picture was a random interval ranging between 4 and 10 seconds, which is the
period during which the SPN is captured. Typically, the late component of the SPN is measured
as the period just prior to a stimulus onset, and the period between a stimulus cue (S1) and the
stimulus (S2) is static interval, rather than a random interval. To overcome this I operationalized
the SPN as the average EEG activity during a 200ms time period prior to the earliest possible

125

image onset (4 seconds), but it is likely that the random interstimulus interval during this
anticipatory period contributed to the lack of significant finding of an SPN component.
Subsequent research using this cued image task to explore questions relating to the SPN should
implement a constant interstimulus interval between S1 and S2.
Specific Aim 7: Mindfulness and Self-reported Anticipation.
Several tests were conducted to explore whether trait mindfulness would predict lower
levels of a priori covariation bias and lower online expectancies for aversive images to follow
from uncertain (online covariation bias) and aversive cues, relative to neutral cues. Measures of
trait mindfulness were not predictive of a priori covariation bias, and neither were any of the
traits that contrast with mindfulness (Question 7.1). However, both measures of trait
mindfulness were significantly correlated with lower expectations for unpleasant outcomes
following aversive cues. This finding is consistent with a previous study that found a state
mindfulness induction reduced negativity bias and promoted more positive appraisals of novel
stimuli during attitude formation (Kiken & Shook, 2011).
Several traits that contrast with mindfulness were related to exaggerated covariation
biases. Two measures of uncertainty distress -- intolerance of uncertainty, and emotional
responses to uncertainty-- were associated with heightened expectations for unpleasant stimuli to
follow after uncertainty cues. Neuroticism was associated with a general tendency to expect
aversive outcomes, irrespective of the type of stimulus cue. This finding is consistent with the
nature of neuroticism as a personality trait associated with heightened interpretation of situations
as threatening (Matthews & Deary, 1998) and is consistent with research relating covariation
biases and clinical anxiety (Barlow, 2000; Borkovec, 2002) and heightened anxiety and fear
(Davey & Dixon, 1995).
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Limitations
This study was designed to examine the influence of uncertainty on self-reported and
cortical measures of emotional stimulus anticipation and appraisal, and particularly the
modulation of these effects by dispositional mindfulness. The target sample size for the study
was estimated at 60 participants (to achieve a power of .80), but data from 10 participants was
not usable due to procedural non-compliance, or poor quality EEG signal, leaving a sample of N
= 52 for analysis. Thus, the study was statistically underpowered, which suggests the present
study might have had a higher than ideal rate of type 2 errors. That is, some the effects that
didn’t reach statistical significance (e.g., marginally significant results) might have been detected
with an adequate sample size.
Second, I am not aware of past research that has used this cued image task to investigate
variability in LPP amplitudes elicited by emotional picture stimuli. The presentation of cueing
information on the LPP clearly influenced the amplitude of the LPP, but more research is
necessary to uncover how pre-stimulus information influences psychological processes that
modulate the LPP. An important next step would be to include multiple types of certain and
uncertain stimulus cues that convey information associated with varying degrees of stimulus
probability as well as the degree of unpleasantness for stimulus outcomes.
Third, the present study was designed to examine the association between dispositional
mindfulness and variability in LPP responses to emotional stimuli. Attempts were made to
increase confidence that the results were specific to mindfulness by also examining the influence
of psychological traits antithetical to mindfulness. However, it is possible that the correlational
results described here could be due to a third variable, and future studies should be conducted
using experimental manipulations of mindfulness, such as mindfulness training or state
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inductions of mindfulness to determine whether observed relations between mindfulness and the
LPP are causal in nature.
Finally, the cued image task was not designed to measure the SPN appropriately in the
current study, and the decision was made to assess the component after data had been collected
with the paradigm. In the present design, the interstimulus interval (ISI) between the participant
expectancy ratings and the onset of the emotional picture was a random interval ranging between
4 and 10 seconds, which is the period during which the SPN is captured. To be consistent with
previous studies that have investigated the SPN during emotional anticipation, the period
between a stimulus cue (S1) and the stimulus (S2), which is the time period in which the SPN is
isolated, should us a constant interval.
Concluding Remarks.
This study was designed to examine the influence of uncertainty on self-reported and
cortical measures of emotional stimulus anticipation and appraisal, and the modulation of these
effects by dispositional mindfulness. The study replicated and extended prior research on the
effects of anticipatory uncertainty for both emotional anticipation and appraisal processes.
Uncertainty during stimulus anticipation was found to increase unpleasant stimulus perceptions,
and this was corroborated with cortical evidence indicating that uncertainty increased LPP
amplitudes elicited by emotional stimuli relative to the same stimuli presented under conditions
of certainty. Together these findings suggest informational uncertainty during anticipation can
exert a potent downstream influence on emotional appraisal processes.
Individual differences in depression and worry were associated with heightened
unpleasant appraisals. Evidence was not found to suggest dispositional mindfulness influenced
self-reported appraisals, but mindfulness and several traits that contrast with mindfulness, were
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found to modulate the LPP in opposing directions. The direction of the modulating influence of
these traits on the LPP was opposite of what was expected, and potentials explanations derived
from mindfulness theory were discussed to inform future research.
Participants demonstrated biased expectations for uncertainty to be associated with
aversive outcomes, both at baseline (a prior covariation bias) and throughout the task (online
covariation bias), and online covariation bias was associated with distorted retrospective (a
posteriori) appraisals of the uncertainty-aversive pairings.

A priori covariation bias predicted a

general trend for higher unpleasant affect and greater unpleasant perceptions of the emotional
stimulus content, and a posteriori covariation bias predicted heightened unpleasant affect
following the display of aversive stimuli, as well as heightened perceptions of aversive stimuli as
unpleasant.
Two measures of dispositional mindfulness were associated with reduced expectations
for unpleasant outcomes following aversive cues, while traits that contrast with mindfulness
were associated with greater online covariation bias, and general expectations for emotional
stimuli to be aversive. The evidence described in the present study contributes to a growing
body of evidence linking uncertainty during anticipation with biased expectancies for aversion,
and higher unpleasant stimulus appraisal, and advances our understanding of the important role
that individual differences play in event-related neural variability.
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Appendix A
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale

Day-to-Day Experiences
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using the
1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have each
experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather than
what you think your experience should be. Please treat each item separately from every
other item.
1
Almost
Always

2
Very
Frequently

3
Somewhat
Frequently

4
Somewhat
Infrequently

5
Very
Infrequently

6
Almost
Never

1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of
it until sometime later.

1

2

3

4

5

6

2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying
attention, or thinking of something else.

1

2

3

4

5

6

3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the
present.

1

2

3

4

5

6

4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying
attention to what I experience along the way.

1

2

3

4

5

6

5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort
until they really grab my attention.

1

2

3

4

5

6

6. I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it
for the first time.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7. It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much awareness
of what I’m doing.

1

2

3

4

5

6

8. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch
with what I’m doing right now to get there.

1

2

3

4

5

6
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1
Almost
Always

2
Very
Frequently

3
Somewhat
Frequently

4
Somewhat
Infrequently

5
Very
Infrequently

6
Almost
Never

10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what
I'm doing.

1

2

3

4

5

6

11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing
something else at the same time.

1

2

3

4

5

6

12. I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then wonder why I went
there.

1

2

3

4

5

6

13. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past.

1

2

3

4

5

6

14. I find myself doing things without paying attention.

1

2

3

4

5

6

15. I snack without being aware that I’m eating.

1

2

3

4

5

6
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Appendix B
Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire
FACETS OF EXPERIENCE
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Write the number in the blank
that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you.
1

2

3

4

5

never or very
rarely true

rarely
true

sometimes
true

often
true

very often or
always true

_____ 1. When I’m walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving.
_____ 2. I’m good at finding words to describe my feelings.
_____ 3. I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions.
_____ 4. I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them.
_____ 5. When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted.
_____ 6. When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my
body.
_____ 7. I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words.
_____ 8. I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or
otherwise distracted.
_____ 9. I watch my feelings without getting lost in them.
_____ 10. I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling.
_____ 11. I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and
emotions.
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1

2

3

4

5

never or very
rarely true

rarely
true

sometimes
true

often
true

very often or
always true

_____ 12. It’s hard for me to find the words to describe what I’m thinking.
_____ 13. I am easily distracted.
_____ 14. I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that
way.
_____ 15. I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face.
_____ 16. I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things
_____ 17. I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad.
_____ 18. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present.
_____ 19. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware of the
thought or image without getting taken over by it.
_____ 20. I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars
passing.
_____ 21. In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting.
_____ 22. When I have a sensation in my body, it’s difficult for me to describe it because
I can’t find the right words.
_____ 23. It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m
doing.
_____24. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after.
_____ 25. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking.

148

1

2

3

4

5

never or very
rarely true

rarely
true

sometimes
true

often
true

very often or
always true

_____ 26. I notice the smells and aromas of things.
_____ 27. Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words.
_____ 28. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.
_____ 29. When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them
without reacting.
_____ 30. I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel
them.
_____ 31. I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or
patterns of light and shadow.
_____ 32. My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words.
_____ 33. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them go.
_____ 34. I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing.
_____ 35. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge myself as good or bad,
depending what the thought/image is about.
_____ 36. I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior.
_____ 37. I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail.
_____ 38. I find myself doing things without paying attention.
_____ 39. I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas.
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Appendix C
Attentional Control Scale

TASK BEHAVIORS
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate how frequently you have the following experiences using
the scale shown below.
1 = almost never
2 = sometimes
3 = often
4 = always
____

1.

It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when there are noises around.

____

2.

When I need to concentrate and solve a problem, I have trouble focusing my
attention.

____

3.

When I am working hard on something, I still get distracted by events around me.

____

4.

My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me.

____

5.

When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that I become unaware of what’s
going on in the room around me.

____

6.

When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted if there are people talking in the
same room.

____

7.

When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out
distracting thoughts.

____

8.

I have a hard time concentrating when I’m excited about something.

____

9.

When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst.

____

10.

I can quickly switch from one task to another.

____

11.

It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task.

____

12.

It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between the listening and writing
required when taking notes during lectures.
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1 = almost never
2 = sometimes
3 = often
4 = always
____

13.

I can become interested in a new topic very quickly when I need to.

____

14.

It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also talking on the phone.

____

15.

I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once.

____

16.

I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly.

____

17.

After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily shift my attention back to what I was
doing before.

____

18.

When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy for me to shift my attention away
from it.

____

19.

It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks.

____

20.

It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about something and look at it
from another point of view.
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Appendix D
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale

HOW I FEEL
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the degree to which each of the following statements is
characteristic of you as a person. Indicate how you really feel, and not what you think the
correct response is. Please use the 5-point scale shown below.

1
not at all
characteristic of
me

2
slightly
characteristic of
me

3
moderately
characteristic of
me

4
very
characteristic of
me

5
entirely
characteristic of
me

1.

Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.

1

2

3

4

5

2.

Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized.

1

2

3

4

5

3.

Uncertainty makes life intolerable.

1

2

3

4

5

4.

It’s unfair having no guarantees in life.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will happen
tomorrow.

1

2

3

4

5

6.

Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed.

1

2

3

4

5

7.

Unforseen events upset me greatly.

1

2

3

4

5

8.

It frustrates me not having all the information I need.

1

2

3

4

5

9.

Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life.

1

2

3

4

5

10. One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises.

1

2

3

4

5

11. A small unforseen event can spoil everything, even with the best
planning.

1

2

3

4

5
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1
not at all
characteristic of
me

2
slightly
characteristic of
me

3
moderately
characteristic of
me

4
very characteristic
of me

5
entirely
characteristic of
me

12. When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me.

1

2

3

4

5

13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate.

1

2

3

4

5

14. When I am uncertain I can’t go forward.

1

2

3

4

5

15. When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well.

1

2

3

4

5

16. Unlike me, others seem to know where they are going with their lives.

1

2

3

4

5

17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.

1

2

3

4

5

18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me.

1

2

3

4

5

19. I can’t stand being taken by surprise.

1

2

3

4

5

20. The smallest doubt can stop me from acting.

1

2

3

4

5

21. I should be able to organize everything in advance.

1

2

3

4

5

22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence.

1

2

3

4

5

23. I think it’s unfair that other people seem to be sure about their future.

1

2

3

4

5

24. Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly.

1

2

3

4

5

25. I must get away from all uncertain situations.

1

2

3

4

5

26. The ambiguities in life stress me.

1

2

3

4

5

27. I can’t stand being undecided about my future.

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix E
Uncertainty Response Scale

EVERYDAY LIFE
INSTRUCTIONS: Following are some statements which regard different ways of reacting to
situations. Please read each one carefully and circle the one alternative which you feel is
most like you. The alternatives are as follows:
1 = Never
2 = Sometimes
3 = Often
4 = Always
1.

I tend to give up easily when I don’t clearly understand a situation.

1

2

3

4

2.

I find the prospect of change exciting and stimulating.

1

2

3

4

3.

When I go shopping, I like to have a list of exactly what I need.

1

2

3

4

4.

Sudden changes make me feel upset.

1

2

3

4

5.

There is something exciting about being kept in suspense.

1

2

3

4

6.

I feel better about myself when I know that I have done all I can to plan
my future accurately.

1

2

3

4

7.

When making a decision, I am deterred by the fear of making a mistake.

1

2

3

4

8.

The idea of taking a trip to a new country fascinates me.

1

2

3

4

9.

When uncertain, I act very cautiously until I have more information
about the situation.

1

2

3

4

10.

When the future is uncertain, I generally expect the worst to happen.

1

2

3

4

11.

I like going on holidays with nothing planned in advance.

1

2

3

4

12.

I like to have things under control.

1

2

3

4
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1 = Never
2 = Sometimes
3 = Often
4 = Always
13.

Facing uncertainty is a nerve-wracking experience.

1

2

3

4

14.

Taking chances is part of life.

1

2

3

4

15.

When I feel uncertain about something, I try to weigh up rationally all
the information I have.

1

2

3

4

16.

I get worried when a situation is uncertain.

1

2

3

4

17.

I think you have to be flexible to work effectively.

1

2

3

4

18.

Before making any changes, I need to think things over thoroughly.

1

2

3

4

19.

Thinking about uncertainty makes me feel depressed.

1

2

3

4

20.

I feel curious about new experiences.

1

2

3

4

21.

I prefer to stick to tried and tested ways of doing things.

1

2

3

4

22.

Uncertainty frightens me.

1

2

3

4

23.

I like to think of a new experience in terms of a challenge.

1

2

3

4

24.

I like to have my weekends planned in advance.

1

2

3

4

25.

When I can’t clearly discern situations, I get apprehensive.

1

2

3

4

26.

A new experience is an occasion to learn something new.

1

2

3

4

27.

When I feel a situation is unclear, I try to do my best to resolve it.

1

2

3

4

28.

When I’m not certain about someone’s intentions towards me, I often
become upset or angry.

1

2

3

4

29.

I enjoy finding new ways of working out problems.

1

2

3

4

30.

I like to know exactly what I’m going to do next.

1

2

3

4

31.

When uncertain about what to do next, I tend to feel lost.

1

2

3

4

32.

New experiences can be useful.

1

2

3

4

33.

When facing an uncertain situation, I tend to prepare as much as
possible and then hope for the best.

1

2

3

4
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1 = Never
2 = Sometimes
3 = Often
4 = Always
34.

I feel anxious when things are changing.

1

2

3

4

35.

New experiences excite me.

1

2

3

4

36.

I feel relieved when an ambiguous situation suddenly becomes clear.

1

2

3

4

37.

When a situation is unclear, it makes me feel angry.

1

2

3

4

38.

I think variety is the spice of life.

1

2

3

4

39.

When I feel uncertain, I try to take decisive steps to clarify the situation.

1

2

3

4

40.

I get really anxious if I don’t know what someone thinks about me.

1

2

3

4

41.

I think a mid-life career change is an exciting idea.

1

2

3

4

42.

I try to have my life and career clearly mapped out.

1

2

3

4

43.

I am hesitant when it comes to making changes.

1

2

3

4

44.

I enjoy unexpected events.

1

2

3

4

45.

I like things to be ordered and in place, both at work and at home.

1

2

3

4

46.

I easily adapt to novelty.

1

2

3

4

47.

I like to plan ahead in detail rather than leaving things to chance.

1

2

3

4

48.

Before I buy something, I have to view every sample I can find.

1

2

3

4
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Appendix F
NEO-Five Factor Inventory

BEHAVIORAL STYLES
Instructions: Please read each of the statements carefully. Using the 0 to 4 scale below,
indicate to what extent you agree with each statement.
0 = If you strongly disagree or the statement is definitely false.
1 = If you disagree or the statement is mostly false.
2 = If you are neutral on the statement, you cannot decide, or the
statement is equally true or false.
3 = If you agree or the statement is mostly true.
4 = If you strongly agree or the statement is definitely true.
1. I often feel helpless and want someone else
to solve my problems.

0

1

2

3

4

2. Sometimes I feel completely worthless.

0

1

2

3

4

3. I don't like to waste my time daydreaming.

0

1

2

3

4

4. I don't consider myself especially "light-hearted."

0

1

2

3

4

5. Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at
a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement.

0

1

2

3

4

6. I rarely feel fearful or anxious.

0

1

2

3

4

7. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity.

0

1

2

3

4

8. I am not a worrier.

0

1

2

3

4

9. I often feel as if I'm bursting with energy.

0

1

2

3

4

10. Once I find the right way to do something,
I stick to it.

0

1

2

3

4
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0 = If you strongly disagree or the statement is definitely false.
1 = If you disagree or the statement is mostly false.
2 = If you are neutral on the statement, you cannot decide, or the
statement is equally true or false.
3 = If you agree or the statement is mostly true.
4 = If you strongly agree or the statement is definitely true.
11. I often feel tense and jittery.

0

1

2

3

4

12. I rarely feel lonely or blue.

0

1

2

3

4

13. I often get angry at the way people treat me.

0

1

2

3

4

14. I often enjoy playing with theories or
abstract ideas.

0

1

2

3

4

15. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person.

0

1

2

3

4

16. I am a very active person.

0

1

2

3

4

17. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature.

0

1

2

3

4

18. I am seldom sad or depressed.

0

1

2

3

4

19. I have little interest in speculating on the nature
of the universe or the human condition.

0

1

2

3

4

20. I often feel inferior to others.

0

1

2

3

4

21. I like to have a lot of people around me.

0

1

2

3

4

22. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that
different environments produce.

0

1

2

3

4

23. I am not a cheerful optimist.

0

1

2

3

4

24. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide.

0

1

2

3

4

25. I believe letting students hear controversial
speakers can only confuse and mislead them.

0

1

2

3

4

26. I usually prefer to do things alone.

0

1

2

3

4
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0 = If you strongly disagree or the statement is definitely false.
1 = If you disagree or the statement is mostly false.
2 = If you are neutral on the statement, you cannot decide, or the
statement is equally true or false.
3 = If you agree or the statement is mostly true.
4 = If you strongly agree or the statement is definitely true.
27. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged
and feel like giving up.

0

1

2

3

4

28. My life is fast-paced.

0

1

2

3

4

29. I believe we should look to our religious authorities
for decisions on moral issues.

0

1

2

3

4

30. I like to be where the action is.

0

1

2

3

4

31. I would rather go my own way than
be a leader of others.

0

1

2

3

4

32. Poetry has little or no effect on me.

0

1

2

3

4

33. When I’m under a great deal of stress,
sometimes I feel like I’m going to pieces.

0

1

2

3

4

34. I laugh easily.

0

1

2

3

4

35. I often try new and foreign foods.

0

1

2

3

4

36. I really enjoy talking to people.

0

1

2

3

4
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Appendix G
Penn State Worry Questionnaire

HOW I AM
INSTRUCTIONS: Rate each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of
me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”). Please do not leave any blank items.

Not at all
typical
of me

Very
typical
of me

1.

If I do not have enough time to do
everything, I do not worry about it.

1

2

3

4

5

2.

My worries overwhelm me.

1

2

3

4

5

3.

I do not tend to worry about things.

1

2

3

4

5

4.

Many situations make me worry.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

I know I should not worry about things,
but I just cannot help it.

1

2

3

4

5

6.

When I am under pressure I worry a lot.

1

2

3

4

5

7.

I am always worrying about something.

1

2

3

4

5

8.

I find it easy to dismiss worrisome
thoughts.

1

2

3

4

5

9.

As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry
about everything else I have to do.

1

2

3

4

5

10.

I never worry about anything.

1

2

3

4

5

11.

When there is nothing more I can do about
a concern, I do not worry about it anymore.

1

2

3

4

5
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12.

I have been a worrier all my life.

1

2

3

4

5

13.

I notice that I have been worrying about
things.

1

2

3

4

5

14.

Once I start worrying, I cannot stop.

1

2

3

4

5

15.

I worry all the time.

1

2

3

4

5

16.

I worry about projects until they are done.

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix H
Beck Depression Inventory
THOUGHTS, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR

DIRECTIONS: On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of statements
carefully. Then choose the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have been
feeling during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY. Fill in the number on the scantron sheet to
indicate your choice. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice.
Question 1.
1 I do not feel sad
2 I feel sad
3 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it
4 I am so sad or unhappy I can’t stand it
Question 2.
1 I am not particularly discouraged about the future
2 I feel discouraged about the future
3 I feel I have nothing to look forward to
4 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve
Question 3.
1 I do not feel like a failure
2 I feel I have failed more than the average person
3 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures
4 I feel I am a complete failure as a person
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Question 4.
1 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to
2 I don’t enjoy things the way I used to
3 I don’t get any real satisfaction out of anything anymore
4 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything
Question 5.
1 I don’t feel particularly guilty
2 I feel guilty a good part of the time
3 I feel quite guilty most of the time
4 I feel guilty all of the time
Question 6.
1 I don’t feel I am being punished
2 I feel I may be punished
3 I expect to be punished
4 I feel I am being punished
Question 7.
1 I don’t feel disappointed in myself
2 I am disappointed in myself
3 I am disgusted with myself
4 I hate myself
Question 8.
1 I don’t feel I am any worse than anybody else
2 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes
3 I blame myself all the time for my faults
4 I blame myself for everything bad that happens
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Question 9.
1 I don’t cry any more than usual
2 I cry more now than I used to
3 I cry all the time now
4 I used to be able to cry, but now I can’t cry even though I want to
Question 10.
1 I am no more irritated by things than I ever am
2 I am slightly more irritated now than usual
3 I am quite annoyed and irritated a good deal of the time
4 I feel irritated all the time now
Question 11.
1 I have not lost interest in other people
2 I am less interested in other people than I used to be
3 I have lost most of my interest in other people
4 I have lost all of my interest in other people
Question 12.
1 I make decisions about as well as I ever could
2 I put off making decisions more than I used to
3 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before
4 I can’t make decisions at all anymore
Question 13.
1 I don’t feel that I look any worse than I used to
2 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive
3 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive
4 I believe that I look ugly
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Question 14.
1 I can work about as well as before
2 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something
3 I have to push myself very hard to do anything
4 I can’t do any work at all
Question 15.
1 I can sleep as well as usual
2 I don’t sleep as well as I used to
3 I wake up 2-3 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to go back to sleep
4 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep
Question 16.
1 I don’t get more tired than usual
2 I get tired more easily than I used to
3 I get tired from doing almost anything
4 I am too tired to do anything
Question 17.
1 My appetite is no worse than usual
2 My appetite is not as good as it used to be
3 My appetite is much worse now
4 I have no appetite at all anymore
Question 18.
1 I haven’t lost much weight, if any, lately
2 I have lost more than five pounds
3 I have lost more than ten pounds
4 I have lost more than fifteen pounds
Note: Choose “1” if you have been purposely trying to lose weight
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Question 19.
1 I am no more worried about my health than usual
2 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, or upset stomach, or
constipation
3 I am very worried about physical problems, and it’s hard to think of much else
4 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else
Question 20.
1 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex
2 I am less interested in sex that I used to be
3 I am much less interested in sex now
4 I have lost interest in sex completely
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Appendix I
Medical History Information Form
MEDICAL HISTORY INFORMATION FORM
Section 1
Please indicate if you currently or in the past have experienced any of the following:
(If you check yes, state when)
I. Neurological conditions:
____Epilepsy
____Head injury
____Hemorrhage
____Meningitis
____Migraine
____Multiple Sclerosis
____Parkinson’s
____Seizures
____Stroke
____Shingles
____Postherapeutic neuralgia
____Other

When
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

II. Have you ever undergone any form of brain surgery?
Yes

No

III. Are you currently taking any medications for a problem associated with a neurological condition,
attention-related condition, or mental health condition?
Yes

No

IV. Do you currently have problems with alcohol or drugs (excluding tobacco or social use of alcohol)?
Yes

No

V. Are you currently in treatment for alcohol or drug use?
Yes

No

VI. Are you currently being treated for a psychological or psychiatric condition?
Yes

No
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VII. Have you ever experienced brain trauma (e.g., an accident that left you unconscious for more than 10
minutes)?
Yes

No

Section 2
I. Current weight:

___________

II. Current height:

___________

168

Appendix J
RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM
TITLE: Psychological Correlates of Neurological Responses
VCU IRB #: HM13858
This consent form may contain words that you do not understand. Please ask the study staff to explain any
words that you do not clearly understand. You may take home an unsigned copy of this consent form to
think about or discuss with family or friends before making your decision
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study seeks to understand neurological patterns (brain waves) associated with several key
psychological states. You are being asked to participate in this study because you are an undergraduate
student at Virginia Commonwealth University. The research project will be conducted in one session
lasting approximately 3 hours. Participation is voluntary, and all responses will remain strictly
confidential.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT
If you decide to be in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent form after you have had
all your questions answered and understand what will happen to you. You will then be asked to complete
a form about your past medical history, and a series of psychological questionnaires that ask about
various experiences you may have. After this you will be asked to sit quietly while non-invasive, painless
neurological recordings are made using a sensor cap (similar to a swim cap). This procedure does not
alter or disrupt brain activity in any way. You will then be asked to sit quietly for eight periods of one
minute. After this we will ask you to play a game on the computer that involves looking at pictures on
the computer screen, and answering questions about your experience viewing them, like how they
influence your mood. Some of the pictures are of everyday items and other pictures are of an unpleasant
nature.
This study will take approximately 3 hours to complete. You do not have to answer any questions, or
participate in any activities you do not wish to. You may withdraw from the study at any time, without
penalty. We plan to enroll 60 VCU students in our study.
Significant new findings developed during the course of the research which may relate to your
willingness to continue participation will be provided to you.
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
The physical risks involved in this study are minimal and are related to wearing the sensor cap. We will
use a snug-fitting cap that fits like a swim cap and is embedded with sensors that detect electrical brain
activity on the surface of the scalp.
If you choose to participate in this experiment, you will be asked to complete measures of your medical
history, personality, and emotional well-being, you may also experience feelings of distress while
participating in this study. You will also see a variety of pictures that have been judged to be neutral or
unpleasant. The risks are not greater than the risks associated with daily living. However, if participating
in this study causes you to feel upset or you become concerned about your psychological state or your
current life situation, the study staff will provide you with contact information for resources available on
campus that can help you address these issues, including:
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University Counseling Services, which offers free counseling for VCU students; phone 828-6200
(Monroe Park Campus) or 828-3964 (Medical Campus).
University Student Health Services (also free for VCU students); phone 828-8828 (Monroe Park
Campus) or 828-9220 (Medical Campus).
Center for Psychological Services and Development, which offers counseling services on a sliding fee
scale; phone 828-8069.

Should you need services other than those provided by VCU University Counseling Services or
University Student Health Services, fees for such treatment will be billed to you or to appropriate third
party insurance.
BENEFITS TO YOU AND OTHERS
You may not get any direct benefit from this study, but, the information we learn from people in this
study may help us better understand the processes under study.
COSTS
There are no costs for participating in this study other than the time you will spend on the tasks and filling
out questionnaires.
ALTERNATIVES
The alternative to participating in this study is to not participate.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The data collected in this study will not be personally identifiable, as no name, birth date, or other
potentially identifiable information will be collected. Data is being collected only for research purposes,
identified only by an anonymous study ID number, and stored separately from the consent form in a
locked research area. All information will be kept in password protected electronic files. Hard copy
questionnaires will be kept in a locked file cabinet for 3 years after the study ends and will be destroyed at
that time. Electronic files of the study data will be kept indefinitely. Access to all data will be limited to
study personnel. A data and safety monitoring plan is established.
We will not tell anyone the answers you give us; however, information from the study and the consent
form signed by you may be looked at or copied for research or legal purposes by the sponsor of the
research, or by Virginia Commonwealth University. Personal information about you might be shared
with or copied by authorized officials of the Federal Food and Drug Administration, or the Department of
Health and Human Services (if applicable). What we find from this study may be presented at meetings or
published in papers, but your name will not ever be used in these presentations or papers.
IF AN INJURY OR ILLNESS HAPPENS
Virginia Commonwealth University and the VCU Health System (also known as MCV Hospital) do not
have a plan to give long-term care or money if you are injured because you are in the study. If you are
injured because of being in this study, tell the study staff right away. The study staff will arrange for
short-term emergency care or referral if it is needed. Bills for treatment may be sent to you or your
insurance. Your insurance may or may not pay for taking care of injuries that happen because of being in
this study.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose to participate, you may stop at any time
without any penalty. You may also choose not to answer particular questions that are asked in the study.
Withdrawal from the study will not affect you present or future University relationship.
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Your participation in this study may be stopped at any time by the study staff without your consent. The
reasons might include:
 the study staff thinks it necessary for your health or safety;
 you have not followed study instructions;
 administrative reasons require your withdrawal.
QUESTIONS
In the future, you may have questions about your participation in this study. If you have any questions,
complaints, or concerns about the research, contact:
Kirk Warren Brown, PhD
Virginia Commonwealth University
808 W. Franklin Street, Room 202
P.O. Box 982018
Richmond, VA 23284
Telephone: 804-828-6754
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact:
Office for Research
Virginia Commonwealth University
800 East Leigh Street, Suite 113
P.O. Box 980568
Richmond, VA 23298
Telephone: 804-827-2157
You may also contact this number for general questions, concerns or complaints about the research.
Please call this number if you cannot reach the research team or wish to talk to someone else. Additional
information about participation in research studies can be found at
http://www.research.vcu.edu/irb/volunteers.htm.
CONSENT
I have been given the chance to read this consent form. I understand the information about this study.
Questions that I wanted to ask about the study have been answered. My signature says that I am willing to
participate in this study. I will receive a copy of the consent form once I have agreed to participate.
Participant name printed

Participant signature

________________________________________________
Name of Person Conducting Informed Consent
Discussion / Witness (printed)
________________________________________________ ________________
Signature of Person Conducting Informed Consent
Date
Discussion / Witness
_______________________________________________ ________________
Principal Investigator Signature (if different from above)
Date
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Date

Vitae
Robert J. Goodman was born on August 2, 1979 in Charleston, South Carolina, and is an
American citizen. He graduated from Milford High School in Milford, Ohio in 1997. He
received an Associates of Applied Business in Computer Information Systems from the
University of Cincinnati, Batavia, Ohio, in 2003. In 2007 he received his Bachelor of Arts in
Religious Studies and Bachelor of Arts in Psychology from Cleveland State University,
Cleveland, Ohio. He received his Master of Arts in Experimental Psychology from Cleveland
State University, Cleveland, OH in 2009.
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